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Summary:
Developing countries are far more successful in increasing tax pressure on the poor
than on the wealthy. To explain this difference, I argue that taxing the wealthy is more
prominently a problem of credibility than of coercion. The poor can be forced to pay
taxes. Given weak administrative capacities and de facto political power distributions,
governments in many developing countries cannot force the wealthy to the same degree.
In this line, I examine the conditions under which wealthy taxpayers consent to tax-
ation in developing countries from different methodological angles. The second chapter
analyses the Peruvian and the Colombian tax history between 1970 and 2010 using a
comparative case study framework. The analysis provides evidence suggesting that sta-
ble party systems and strong business organizations increase the capacity of collective
action between political actors and wealthy taxpayers. Thereby these factors also enable
the definition of fiscal contracts involving higher tax contributions by the latter group.
The third chapter examines the effect of institutional trust on the support for pro-
gressive taxation using public opinion data from the Latin American Opinion Project
(LAPOP). The results show that trust in political institutions strongly mitigates the
opposition of wealthy taxpayers to progressive taxation.
The fourth chapter four uses panel data for over 90 countries to explore the rela-
tionship between party system institutionalisation and reliance on the personal income
tax. The analysis indicates that administrative capacity mitigates the effect of party
system institutionalization: where the level of administrative capacity is low, party sys-
tem institutionalisation has a positive and highly significant effect. At high levels of
administrative capacity this effect disappears.
Overall, the findings support the notion that especially in developing countries taxing
the wealthy is best understood as a political challenge. The good news is that contrary to
what is commonly assumed, wealthy taxpayers are not a priori opposed to higher taxes
on them. There is scope for wealthy taxpayers to support taxation but this demands
reliable political and institutional systems that are able to credibly commit to not
misusing the tax contributions. The analysis has major implications for development
cooperation active in this field as it demands that the approaches employed balance
better the technical and the political dimensions of taxation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Political determinants of taxation in devel-
oping countries
1
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Chapter 1
1.1 The increasing importance of taxation in the development agenda
and the limits of a technical approach to it
This dissertation focuses on the political determinants of taxation in developing coun-
tries. Interest in taxation is currently high on the international development agenda.
Some authors argue that interest in this topic “comes and goes” (Keen 2012, p.3), but
it seems that this time the topic is here to stay. Domestic revenue mobilisation in gen-
eral, and taxation in particular, are now an integral part of the dominant development
rhetoric. As such these topics play a prominent role in all the recently launched strategic
documents meant to guide international development cooperation for the next decades.
For instance, an explicit reference to these topics opens the section on means of
implementation in the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”.1 This is highly
significant because the means of implementation section is not meant to define ultimate
sustainable development goals as such, but rather identify conditions required for the
successful implementation of the agenda. In this sense, target 17.1. sets the commitment
to “Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support
to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue col-
lection” (United Nations 2015b). Thereby taxation is highlighted as a cornerstone for
sustainable development.
Similarly, the crucial role of taxation in development is also very present in the
final resolution of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development
(Addis Ababa Action Agenda), another crucial document for the future of development
cooperation endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 27 July 2015.
In particular, paragraph 22 states:
“We recognize that significant additional domestic public resources, supple-
mented by international assistance as appropriate, will be critical to realizing
sustainable development and achieving the sustainable development goals.
We commit to enhancing revenue administration through modernized, pro-
gressive tax systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax collection.
We will work to improve the fairness, transparency, efficiency and effective-
1This agenda was agreed upon on September 25 2015 at the United Nations after a long and broad
consultation phase including inputs by many different state and civil society organisations. Find detailed
information at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015
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ness of our tax systems, including by broadening the tax base and continuing
efforts to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy in line with
country circumstances. In this regard, we will strengthen international coop-
eration to support efforts to build capacity in developing countries, includ-
ing through enhanced official development assistance (ODA). We welcome
efforts by countries to set nationally defined domestic targets and time lines
for enhancing domestic revenue as part of their national sustainable devel-
opment strategies and will support developing countries in need in reaching
these targets” (United Nations 2015a, p.8).
It is certainly true that a skeptic could argue that these statements and targets are
too broadly defined to have real impact. Many specific aspects such as who and how
achievement and progress will be measured remain open and call into question whether
these declarations will really make a difference or simply remain rhetoric.
Although these concerns certainly merit consideration, regardless of the actual im-
pact of these documents, it is noteworthy how prominently taxation is positioned in
them. Yes, if we take the declarations literally and expect them to list strong and
precise commitments, given the vagueness we will tend to be critical and pessimistic.
However, our evaluation changes if we interpret the targets as “symbol of the kinds
of outcomes toward which the development community should strive” (Clemens et al.
2007, p.747). As Clemens et al. indicate “[g]oals generate discussions, focus attention
and help assign accountability for leaders’ pledges” (Clemens et al. 2007, p.747). From
this more instrumental perspective, even the vague references to taxation and domestic
revenue mobilisation clearly signal that higher performing and more efficiently working
tax systems are accepted to be key for development.
Beyond this agreement, incentives to work in this area seem to be strong and well
aligned as both governments in developed and developing countries do have good rea-
sons to support the tax and development agenda. From a technical perspective, donors
emphasize this topic because they are increasingly recognizing the centrality of a good
working public finance system to development (Fjeldstad 2014, Mosley 2015). Better
performing public financial management systems are identified as prerequisites for en-
abling effective development support and hence as prerequisites for aid effectiveness.
Also better public financial management systems allow a better control of how the aid
4
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money is being used by increasing transparency and accountability. Along this line
the idea of increasing tax effort speaks also directly to a politically controversial issue,
namely the legitimate concerns of donors that aid might be discouraging own revenue-
raising efforts in partner countries.2 Donors are well aware that pressure on ODA funds
is high, especially now in a time of social cuts. Therefore, they have an interest in
signaling that they keep an eye on the partners’ tax effort and contradict the claim that
development cooperation liberates economic elites in developing countries from paying
their fair share of tax.3
Many governments in developing countries also have good reasons to support the
tax and development agenda. In development cooperation rhetoric, they seem to have
ownership for this topic. At least in principle, it seems plausible that they have a genuine
interest to escape the “low tax - low capacity trap” by improving the performance
of existing tax handles and gaining access to additional and more reliable sources of
revenues.4 They also openly communicate their interest in these topics. For instance,
Mr Nene, Finance Minister of the Republic of South Africa, echoes these ambitions in
his opening speech to the ATAF Conference on Cross Border Taxation in Africa when
he indicates that “[i]t cannot be over-emphasized that the continent must endeavor to
mobilise its own resources through the development of strong and capable tax systems
and reliable trade facilities”. Furthermore, the Finance Minister also very passionately
demands that “we on the African continent must find new ways in which we no longer
speak of aid but rather of sustaining our development through our own resources. And
2See Benedek et al. (2014) and Clist & Morrissey (2011) for conflicting perspectives and estimation
results on this issue.
3A very vivid illustration of this kind of discussions can be found in International Development Committee
(2013). In this hearing the experts are confronted with this concern in many instances. For instance,
the Chair of the Committee, Sir Malcolm Bruce, explicitly asks “It is a standard question you will
hear from a British taxpayer: ‘’Why should British taxpayers be putting money into public services
in Pakistan when those people who can afford to pay taxes in Pakistan are not doing so at all, or at
anything reasonable? (...) People want to support Pakistan; it is not a recognition that DFID and UK
assistance is not needed, but we also want to see a parallel commitment within Pakistan to match that
funding”(International Development Committee 2013, p.Ev31).
4The discussion concerning the motivations behind the governmental support of this vision to increase
revenue collection is controversial. Governments might have more benevolent and malevolent reasons.
In an extreme, the only reason to support higher revenue collection might be to increase the private rent
and have more resources available for corruption and clientelistic networks. How institutions potentially
mitigate the citizens’ concerns that their governments might use their tax contributions only with these
goals in mind is actually at the core of the argument and research interest of this dissertation. Yet, the
point here is not developing my argument but indicating that there are good reasons to expect that
governments in developing countries in general support the vision to increase tax revenue.
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a significant part of those resources have to come through taxation.” (Nene 2015).
Of course it is difficult to assess how far reaching this political will goes. As in
so many instances, there is far less agreement on the means to achieve the shared
goal of improving tax performance than on the abstract goal itself. Specifically, major
challenges remain in terms of a proper and just implementation of tax policies. There
are numerous cases of inconsistent implementation of tax policies and, for instance,
highly intransparent processes of granting tax incentives. Beyond that, the emphasis
on instruments that have incidence on certain social or economic groups for political
reasons is common.
Taxation defines who pays and who does not and as such is an ‘inherently conflictive’
issue. In theory, the current circumstances and the hype of the topic seem to allow an
optimistic outlook for measures aiming at improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of tax systems in developing countries. So far, however, development partners have
achieved mixed if not poor results (Fjeldstad 2014). Tax administrations have improved
remarkably but in many cases expected outcomes lack behind. Why? One of the main
obstacles identified is the highly technical approach that has prevailed in this field and
how this widely leads to ignoring the political nature of taxation. Moore summarizes
well the main criticism made to this predominant technical approach:
“it is not very helpful, either analytically or from a policy perspective, to
approach the problem of low tax revenues by complaining that taxpayers
are failing to meet their legal obligations, or to take the view that the art
of successful tax collection is based solely or primarily on finding ways of
enforcing those obligations. Effective enforcement is essential to efficient
revenue collection. (...) Law and obligation are essential tools that make
the revenue collection machine operate. But the machine itself is constructed
through politics and bargaining” (Moore 2013, p.11).
The present dissertation focuses precisely on these political factors sustaining and
shaping tax outcomes in developing countries. In particular, it aims at gaining a better
understanding of which domestic political factors enable consent to progressive taxation
and agreement on more ambitious fiscal contracts, specifically among a group commonly
blamed to contribute little to tax effort in developing countries: the wealthy.
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1.2 Main argument and research question
The political nature of taxation and its bargaining element are at the centre of this
dissertation. Conceptually, the overarching theoretical approach employed can be la-
beled as fiscal contractualism. Fiscal contractualism can be summarized as “the notion
that polities are significantly constructed through a process of exchange of fiscal and
other resources between states and societal groups” (Moore 2008, p.39).5 It deviates
from other approaches to state building in highlighting the capacity of citizens to resist
authority and the crucial role played by bargaining between governments and citizens.
Hence, it calls into question the state-autonomy paradigm and the common assumption
that states a priori have the capacity to implement the laws they dictate (Timmons
2005).
A key implication of the fiscal contractualism approach is that in order to collect
revenue efficiently and effectively, governments have to “create or encourage situations
where taxpayers engage in quasi-voluntary compliance” (Levi 1989, p.52). As Levi
highlights, this “requires rulers to behave like political entrepreneurs (...). They must
create confidence in their credibility and their capacity to deliver promised return for
taxes. They must convince taxpayers that taxpayer contributions make a difference in
producing the desired goods” (Levi 1989, p.53).
The main goal of this dissertation is a better understanding of the circumstances
under which a high level of cooperation between citizens and governments develops
and is sustained over time. In doing that, I specifically focus on the conditions for a
constructive engagement between the government and a particularly challenging group
of taxpayers: wealthy taxpayers.
In general, governments have two main options to make individuals pay taxes: coerce
them or convince them that paying taxes is reasonable and acceptable. The common
intuition is that the first option is the most promising one. In fact, we know that
individuals overestimate the probability of being caught in case of evading (See for
instance Alm et al. 1992). But, for this threat to be credible and effective a strong
5Fiscal contractualism can be traced back to fiscal sociology as understood by Schumpeter (1918). Also
Bates & Lien (1985) and Levi (1989) are crucial contributions to this strand of the literature.
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bureaucracy is required, something that many developing countries lack.
Furthermore, coercion might be an especially challenging approach to taxing the
wealthy. Wealthy taxpayers can be expected to be the best equipped to evade and
avoid taxes as well as successfully lobby for favorable tax legislation. Hence, from a
tax coercion perspective, monitoring and sanctioning the wealthy is particularly costly
and inefficient. Moreover, even if governments have the administrative capacity to
tax the wealthy coercively, the fact that support of these economically powerful actors
is necessary (and in extreme cases sufficient) for the political survival of government
creates strong incentives to spare them from a higher tax burden (CABRI et al. 2010,
p. 9- 12). As a result, the scope to make the wealthy pay through increasing coercion
is limited.
Many would argue that a strategy based on convincing the wealthy that paying taxes
is reasonable and desirable offers even worse prospects. The reason they normally claim
is that wealthy taxpayers can expect little in exchange for paying comparatively high
amounts of taxes and therefore will oppose them. This idea relies on the assumption
that taxes will be used for redistribution purposes and that the wealthy will not benefit
from these expenditures.
The starting point of my argument is questioning the assumption that wealthy tax-
payers will always connect higher taxation on them unequivocally to more costs. Taxa-
tion does not necessary lead to redistribution. In practice, little can be said about the
effect of a tax without taking into consideration what the collected revenue is used for.
There are numerous areas of public expenditure that do not only benefit the poor but
also, if not more prominently, the wealthy. In fact, even the effect of classical compo-
nents of social spending such as health and education do not always have a progressive
impact (Lustig 2015). In addition, even if the actual effect of a policy is progressive, the
wealthy might support it in expectation of positive indirect effects on them, such as the
reduction of crime.6 Along this line, I contend that in developing countries the scope for
higher public spending to benefit the wealthy is much larger than in economically more
advanced economies, because the spending will tend to be more often used to provide
6See for instance the discussion about externality-related motivations for support for redistribution
(Rueda & Stegmueller 2016)
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much needed infrastructure, security and basic state services, all sectors that directly
or indirectly can benefit the wealthy strongly.
If lack of potential benefits does not explain the commonly perceived opposition of
wealthy taxpayers to accept paying taxes, there must be another reason explaining it. I
argue that, especially in developing countries, the reason is connected to the low capacity
of political actors to make credible commitments. Wealthy taxpayers do have incentives
to pay taxes, even in absence of coercion, but the level of uncertainty associated with
the realisation of the envisioned benefits in exchange for the tax contributions is very
high.
On the one hand, taxpayers have legitimate concerns about the incentives for gov-
ernments to extract revenue and about what the governments will actually use the
money for. On the other hand, the uncertainty goes beyond the motives or anticipated
behavior of governments in power and refers to a general political uncertainty at the
systemic level. As Lupu & Riedl highlight, uncertainty is present in all political systems
but is “vastly greater” (Lupu & Riedl 2013, p.1344) in the developing world.7 In this
sense, political uncertainty is not limited to specific outcomes of policies but to the
political institutions themselves. Furthermore, the structure of political interactions,
which is key to reduce uncertainty in the medium and long term, is far less stable in
developing countries and more vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Lupu & Riedl 2013, p.
1344- 1345). Overall, the political constellations in many developing countries make it
even more difficult than it naturally is to agree with the wealthy on more ambitious
fiscal contracts including higher tax contributions by them.
In opposition to most of the political science literature on taxation, this dissertation
does not focus on constraints shaping the capacity of governments to force citizens into
taxation, but on the effect of political, institutional and attitudinal factors on the degree
to which wealthy taxpayers consent to contribute significantly to the tax effort. Overall,
the research question that guides the analysis is: Under which circumstances do wealthy
taxpayers consent to pay more taxes?’.
7Lupu & Riedl focus on democracies but I consider most of their arguments can be applied to developing
countries more in general.
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1.3 Dissertation outline
This dissertation proceeds in five chapters. Chapters two, three and four correspond
to papers that can be considered to be independent pieces of research. However, they
are closely interlinked and deal with specific aspects of the research question formulated
above from different methodological angles. This allows to exploit the strengths of
the particular approaches and gain cumulative and complementary evidence supporting
the reliability and validity of the main argument of the dissertation, namely that the
political environment plays a crucial role in shaping wealthy taxpayers’ consent to being
taxed.8
Research question:
“Under which circumstances
do wealthy taxpayers con-
sent to pay more taxes?”
Chapter 2:
Historical comparative case
studies
Chapter 3:
Analysis of public opinion
data
Chapter 4:
Large N cross-country
regression analysis
(+) Focus on the microfounda-
tions of the argument
(+) Improved generalisability
through asking the same ques-
tionnaire in 10 different coun-
tries
(+) In depth analysis and more
reliable data
(+) Improved comparability
between cases and within cases
over time
(+) Shows the general correla-
tion in large scale patterns and
trends
(+) Improved generalisabil-
ity through inclusion of large
worldwide sample
Figure 1.1: Complementarity between the different chapters and strength of the method-
ological approaches
The second chapter analyses the relationship between socio-political institutions and
8To some degree the papers in this cumulative dissertation –here presented as chapters– can be considered
to follow an overall research design that is inspired by the idea of an ‘inductive case study nested
analysis’ (Rohlfing, 2009). The paper presented in the second chapter has an explorative goal that
serves as inspiration for the quantitative papers presented in the following chapters, which test the
generalisability and explanatory power of the inductively developed theory. However, although the
papers focus on closely connected aspects, they address different dimensions of the guiding research
question. In this sense, all papers contribute from different methodological angles to answering this
guiding question, but they are not part of a completely coherent and comprehensive mixed methods
research strategy.
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tax composition in developing countries using a comparative case study framework. The
main goals of this analysis are proposing and illustrating an institutionalist perspective
on the determinants of the long-term trends in tax composition as well as highlighting
specific institutions that can contribute to reduce the uncertainty that wealthy taxpay-
ers attach to fiscal contracts. More precisely, the chapter focuses on the role that strong
business organizations and stable political party systems play in this regard. To empir-
ically substantiate my argument, I analyze the Peruvian and the Colombian tax history
between 1970 and 2010. The comparison of these cases is appealing because, although
both countries share many characteristics highlighted by the tax performance literature
as relevant to explain how countries tax, they in fact tax very differently. The results
support the intuition that institutionalised party systems and strong encompassing busi-
ness organization increase the capacity of credible commitment when negotiating fiscal
contracts. Most importantly, this institutional set-up enables the definition of more
ambitious fiscal contracts involving a stronger predominance of progressive taxes in the
tax mix.
Chapter three uses public opinion data to examine the conditions under which
wealthy taxpayers accept higher taxes on them. In particular, this chapter focuses
on the effect of institutional trust on wealthy taxpayers’ consent to higher tax progres-
sivity. The analysis is based on the 2012 survey round of the Latin American Opinion
Project (LAPOP), which offers a unique opportunity to gain evidence at the individual
level on the commonly stated nexus between institutional trust and consent to taxation.
In contrast to other surveys, the LAPOP survey adds in this particular year a question
specifically focusing on preferences for progressive income taxation. The results of the
analysis indicate that although – as might be expected – wealthy taxpayers are not en-
thusiastic about the idea of progressive taxation, trust in political institutions strongly
mitigates their opposition to it. Hence, the results support the claim that higher income
earners’ consent to taxation hinges upon the existence of more reliable and trustworthy
political institutions.
The fourth chapter explores the relationship between party system institutionalisa-
tion and the relevance of the personal income tax in the tax composition. This chapter
complements the analysis in previous chapters by showing how the relationship shown
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in chapter three translates into the macro level and how the results suggested in chap-
ter two hold in a broader sample. It focuses on the effect of institutionalised political
party systems on the share of the tax burden that wealthy taxpayers consent to pay via
progressive taxes. Methodologically, this chapter exploits panel data on tax collection
for more than 90 countries over a period of 20 years (1990-2010), a rather exceptional
sample size for cross-country studies in this field. The results indicate that party system
institutionalisation not only has a positive effect on the relevance of more progressive
tax types in the tax composition, but that this effect is specially strong an significant
where the level of bureaucratic capacity is low. In fact, where the level of bureaucratic
capacity is high the effect disappears. Thereby, these findings strongly support the
main claim of this dissertation, namely that particularly in developing countries, where
bureaucratic capacity tends to be limited, taxation is best understood as a problem of
credible commitment.
Chapter five concludes connecting and summarizing the results of the preceding
chapters. It highlights how they complement and strengthen each other by providing
evidence from different methodological perspectives. Furthermore, I discuss the impli-
cations of this research for the strategic design of development cooperation activities
aiming at supporting the development of fairer, more efficient and stronger performing
tax systems in developing countries. The conclusion closes indicating avenues for future
research that the results of the analysis in this dissertation open.
1.4 Main contributions
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature on the political economy of taxa-
tion. In particular, it adds evidence highlighting the relevance of the political dimension
of taxation and addresses three closely interlinked aspects that have not received much
attention in academic research yet. First, the dissertation focuses on developing coun-
tries. Much of the literature on political determinants of taxation has been focused on
the OECD world. This is understandable for various reasons, such as most prominently
data availability. By contrast, this dissertation specifically sheds light on the specific
challenges that developing countries face and analyses the factors that make a difference
12
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in these contexts.
Second, this dissertation challenges the idea that wealthy taxpayers will always
oppose progressive taxation and identifies specific factors and conditions under which
members of this specific group consent to it. This is highly relevant as it calls into
question the common assumption that coercion is the only viable strategy to significantly
increase tax pressure on this group.
Third, this dissertation focuses on the relative contribution of different taxes and
social groups to overall tax collection. By doing this it addresses a gap in the literature in
this field, which has most prominently addressed questions related to the occurrence of
tax reforms, determinants of overall tax collection and determinants of the performance
of individual tax types. Thereby, the results speak directly to one of the most pressing
question for political science, namely: what determines the degree to which different
groups contribute to sustaining the state.
The results show that the tax game is remarkably different in developing countries.
In both, developed and developing countries, taxation has an element of coercion and an
element of consent. However, in developing countries, the fact that often bureaucratic
capacities are rather weak, changes the game. Especially when it comes to taxing the
wealthy, forcing compliance through coercion is politically risky and administratively
not viable. As a result, generating consent is not an alternative, but actually the most
promising approach to increase taxes on the wealthy. This demands convincing wealthy
taxpayers that taxation is not just a cost but a reasonable investment.
This dissertation stresses the idea of taxation as a game of credible commitment and
points at different factors, at the individual and the country level, that enable wealthy
taxpayers to consent to finance a bigger share of the tax burden. At the country level,
the results suggest that wealthy taxpayers will consent to pay more taxes when they
face an institutional set-up able to sustain fiscal agreements over time. The existence
of strong and stable social actors able to aggregate interests and facilitate collective
action as well as the existence of stable political party systems is identified as being
crucial in these contexts. Similarly, at the individual level, trust in the political system
and its capacity to monitor and sanction politicians strongly mitigates the opposition
of wealthy taxpayers to higher taxes on them.
13
The importance of consent
The biggest contribution of this dissertation, is showing that the opposition of
wealthy taxpayers to taxation is not a given that governments must try to overcome
the best they can through enforcement mechanisms. The results indicate how there is
potential for wealthy taxpayers to consent to taxation. Moreover, rather than lack of
potential benefits, the key obstacle for wealthy taxpayers to consent to taxation is the
risk they associate with their money being misused.
These results entail some strong messages for development cooperation trying to
support developing countries to improve their tax systems and tax performance. In
essence, they suggest that even great improvements in administrative capacities will
achieve only modest results if wealthy taxpayers do not expect that their tax contribu-
tions will be used in a reasonable and valuable manner. In this sense, these findings
support the intuition that has been crystallizing among development practitioners over
the last decades: taxation is a highly political issue that requires a political approach
and not merely a technical one. Increasing funds devoted to tax education campaigns
show that development cooperation and partner countries are aware of the relevance of
a broader citizen engagement around taxation. These efforts however have to be further
developed and intensified.
In his assessment of donor support to strengthening tax systems in developing coun-
tries, Fjeldstad underlines that “[h]ow to establish a constructive dialogue with elites
on taxation and development remains an unsettled challenge”(Fjeldstad 2013, p.17).
This analysis indicates that the way to move forward in this direction is to look for
the “best fit” (Booth 2011) by acknowledging the existing power constellations and, at
least partly, aligning to the interest of powerful actors in the society. Under the given
circumstances, this more consensual approach is the most promising way to get wealthy
taxpaxers to pay higher tax contributions.
How much and from whom a society extracts taxes, reflects a “political equilibrium”
(Bird et al. 2008). In many developing countries, this equilibrium might be suboptimal
for the society in general including the wealthy. Enabling an environment in which
uncertainty is reduced and relevant actors are capable to credibly commit to fiscal con-
tracts is key to change this equilibrium. Overall, if development cooperation aspires to
support fairer and higher-performing tax systems, it must not only take into account
14
Chapter 1
what is technically possible and economically desirable, but also what is politically fea-
sible. To achieve this, development cooperation cannot perceive politics as an obstacle
to be overcome, but rather as a necessary part of the solution (Unsworth 2009, p.887).
Hence, a proper consideration and understanding of how attitudes of wealthy taxpayers
are defined and how they shape what is politically feasible is crucial. This dissertation
offers a contribution in this direction.
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Chapter 2
Business organisations, party systems and tax composition
in developing countries: A comparison between Colombia
and Peru.∗
∗A shorter version of this chapter has been published as a journal article at The Journal of Development
Studies.
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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between socio-political institutions and
tax composition in developing countries. It argues that strong business or-
ganisations and stable political party systems reduce the uncertainty of fiscal
contracts for economic elites. The decrease in uncertainty leads elites to ac-
cept a larger share of the tax burden, which governments then collect using
progressive tax types more intensively. To illustrate this claim, I provide ev-
idence from a comparative analysis of the Peruvian and the Colombian tax
history between 1970 and 2010.
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2.1 Introduction
What is the role of socio-political institutions in explaining tax revenue composition
in developing countries? Within the growing literature on the political economy of tax-
ation, tax composition has received less attention than the level of tax revenue or the
factors driving tax reform.9 Yet, analysing tax composition gives better insights into
one crucial and highly controversial political question. As incidence assumptions for
individual tax types are easier to make than for overall tax collection, tax composition
will tell us more about how the tax burden is distributed among social groups. Interest-
ingly, especially in developing countries tax composition varies far more than overall tax
collection levels. It seems that while most developing countries tax equally moderately,
they however tax very differently in terms of their reliance on different tax types and
we lack an understanding of political factors shaping this fact.
In this paper I propose an institutionalist perspective on the determinants of the
long-term trends in tax composition in developing countries. Based on a fiscal con-
tractualism approach and the idea that taxation does not necessarily have to equal
redistribution, I question the common assumption that economic elites will always re-
sist taxation. If state policies and spending strongly benefit the economic elites, paying
taxes can be very much in their interest. Thus I contend that in many developing coun-
tries, rather than fear of redistribution, the main explanation for the elites’ opposition to
taxation is connected to uncertainty about effectively receiving agreed services from the
government in exchange. Furthermore, I contend that stable party systems and strong
business organisations play a crucial role in reducing this uncertainty and thereby affect
the elites’ acceptance of a bigger share of the tax burden.
To substantiate my claim, I compare the tax records of two Andean countries:
Colombia and Peru. The comparison of these cases is appealing because, although
following the tax performance literature both countries should be expected to tax sim-
ilarly, they in fact tax very differently. The proposed variables account well for the
differences in tax performance and tax composition in both countries as well as the dy-
namics that can be observed within countries in the time period analysed (1970-2010).
9Exceptions are Mahdavi (2008), Kenny & Winer (2006), Timmons (2010a,b) and Seiferling (2012).
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In Colombia, more progressive taxes have been gradually losing relevance in the tax
composition in parallel to a weakening of the two above-mentioned institutions. At the
same time in Peru, the poorly institutionalised party system and fragmented economic
elites can be identified as limiting factors for the definition of fiscal agreements involving
higher contributions of the wealthy and conditioning the strong and enduring reliance
on regressive taxes.
The broader significance of these findings for development cooperation is worth con-
sidering. Although a causal interpretation of the results should be made with consid-
erable caution, the results indicate that the growing domestic and international efforts
to support fairer and higher performing tax systems in developing countries should
not ignore how political and institutional factors shape the feasibility of tax reforms
at least as much as their technical viability or economic pertinence. Moreover, they
suggest that efforts by international cooperation that only focus on improving adminis-
trative capacities might not have the intended effects. By contrast, less tangible efforts
aiming at strengthening intermediary institutions responsible for interest aggregation
and representation can make a crucial positive contribution to modify the self-enforcing
equilibrium that taxation represents.
The paper proceeds in four sections. In section 2.2, I discuss the limitations of
the existing literature related to tax composition. Section 2.3 introduces the analytical
framework and describes the causal link between the two proposed independent variables
and tax composition. In section 2.4 I portray the remarkable divergence in terms of tax
collection and tax composition between Peru and Colombia and explain it through the
differences in the stability of the party system and the strength of business organisations
in each country. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Three explanations of variation in tax composition among devel-
oping countries
A robust finding of the tax literature is the inertia in tax level and tax composition
within countries (Bird & Zolt 2005, p. 24). It suggests that taxation represents a self-
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enforcing equilibrium.10 In fact it is easy to imagine that ‘what is right, or at least
feasible, in Chile or Brazil, for example, is likely to continue to differ from what may be
sustainable in Colombia or Honduras’ (Bird et al. 2008, p. 58). The crucial question
is consequently what defines these long-term equilibriums, and thereby explains the
existing variation in tax composition among developing countries. In the literature we
find three main approaches that provide insight into this question.11
The most prevalent explanation emphasises the relevance of administrative con-
straints. It argues that the combination of ‘hard-to-tax’ economic sectors, limited tax
bases and deficient administrative capacities lead governments in developing countries
to focus on indirect and trade taxes instead of the administratively more demanding
income and property taxes (Profeta & Scabrosetti 2010).In essence, the argument states
that under these circumstances the reliance on ‘easy to collect taxes’(such as VAT) is a
rational decision for governments.12
Empirical data, however, only partly support this argument. Figure 2.1 plots the
collection of different tax types as the percentage of overall tax collection by levels of
bureaucratic quality.13 As predicted by the ‘administrative-constraints’ argument: with
increasing bureaucratic capacity, trade taxes lose relevance in the tax composition, while
10For a detailed discussion of self-enforcing equilibria (although applied to the study of democratisation
processes) see Przeworski (1991) and Weingast (1997). Perroni & Scharf (2007) discuss the pertinence
of such a conceptual approach focusing on tax legislation.
11It is important to underline that the differentiation between approaches is difficult, as scholars tend to
mix elements from all of them. A discussion on this, as well as an overview on existing approaches to
taxation in developing countries can be found in di John (2006).
12This approach is closely connected to the argument linking level of economic development and taxation.
To a certain degree the weaknesses of the tax administration can be interpret as a consequence of facing
a more demanding environment to tax. The characteristics of the economies in developing countries
simply make it more complex to tax economic activities (for instance taxing agriculture is more difficult
than taxing industry). Still, the main issue is administrative capacity as in practice tax handles do exist.
On the effect of economic development and economic structure on tax performance and tax composition
see Aizenman & Jinjarak (2009), Gupta (2007), Teera & Hudson (2004), Stotsky &WoldeMariam (1997)
and Tanzi (1992).
13Bureaucratic Quality from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Dataset is the variable used.
Unfortunately ICRG data are only available after 1984. Employing alternative time periods to construct
Figure 2.1 (such as 1991-2010 or 2000-2010) leads to the same implications and insights. Please note
that the divisions are not constant as in some countries the level of Bureaucratic Quality changes
overtime. The group of countries with very low bureaucratic quality comprises 61 observations. Mali
is the country with the highest number of observations in this group (12). The group of countries with
low bureaucratic quality comprises 197 observations. Zambia is the country with the highest number of
observations in this group (24). The group of countries with moderate bureaucratic quality comprises
460 observations. Tunisia and Egypt are the countries with the highest number of observations in this
group (26). The group of countries with high bureaucratic quality comprises 367 observations. India is
the country with the highest number of observations in this group (26). The group of countries with very
high bureaucratic quality comprises 489 observations. Japan, Iceland, Canada, United States, Norway,
New Zealand, Switzerland are the countries with the highest number of observations in this group (27).
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the relevance of income taxes increases. Yet, differences among the groups of countries
at different levels of bureaucratic capacity are only remarkable when comparing the
extremes.14 In addition, variation within groups sharing the same level of bureaucratic
quality is high. This suggests that administrative capacity might be a necessary but not
sufficient condition to increase tax collection of particular taxes. In any case other factor
are necessary to explain the remarkable level of variation in the collection of different
taxes at the some level of different level of administrative capacity. It appears that
some factors allow developing countries to handle the challenge of weak administrative
capacities more successfully.15
Figure 2.1: Relevance of different tax types at different levels of bureaucratic quality
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Boxplots indicate mininum and maximum values as well as the 25, 50 and 75 percentile. The sample includes 
country-year observations from 1984 to 2010 (1574 observations -100 countries). Bureacratic quality is based 
on rounded ICRG data on bureaucratic quality.
An alternative explanation maintains that tax composition is explained by how polit-
14This is also the case when analysing tax performance in country-groups identified using other variables
closely related to the idea of structural difficulties to tax, such as level of economic development (see
for example IMF 2011).
15Using data on tax collection-to-GDP instead of tax collection-to-overall tax collection leads to similar
results. In accordance with the bureaucratic-constraints argument, the group of countries with a low
level of bureaucratic quality tends to collect less from taxes. However, against the argument, the decrease
of tax collection is not concentrated on any particular tax type.
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ical institutions change the incentives for governments to use certain tax instruments.16
The starting point for this approach is the notion that political considerations rather
than technical ones shape these governments’ decisions most predominantly. Against
the administrative-constraints argument, this approach claims that ‘if the political will
to tax is there, the administrative way to do so can be found, if not immediately then
shortly’(Bird et al. 2008, p. 56). Hence, weak administrative capacities are seen as a
symptom of lack of political will, rather than as the direct cause of weak tax collection.
In a seminal work, Cheibub (1998) analysed the effect of regime type (democra-
cies versus autocracies) on overall tax collection, without finding evidence of significant
differences. More recently, as availability and quality of data has increased, other au-
thors have taken up this question and broadened it by looking also into the effect on
particular tax types.17 Most results suggest that democracies tax more and rely more
strongly on more progressive tax types (Kenny & Winer 2006, Bird et al. 2008, Pro-
feta & Scabrosetti 2010, García & von Haldenwang 2015) but the analyses raise major
concerns about endogeneity and robustness.
Moreover, as the sample grows and non-OECD countries are included in the analysis,
another concern becomes more prominent: In developing countries, politics are far less
bureaucratised than in industrialised countries (e.g. Therkildsen 2001, p. 111). Under
these circumstances, it is questionable to assume that formally similar institutions have
a constant effect over broad samples of countries. Contextual factors can be expected to
strongly mitigate the relevance and effect of these institutions, especially where these are
weak.This calls for an approach that relies more heavily on the strength of institutions
rather than on their mere existence or their formal competencies and goals (Levitsky &
Murillo 2009).
A third approach focuses on the effect of cohesion between economic and political
elites on taxation.18 Two opposing arguments can be found in this literature: On the
16This approach is closely connected to the new institutionalist literature (e.g. Levi 1989, North et al.
2007, Acemoglu & Robinson 2006b) .
17The sample in Cheibub’s article was limited to 108 countries.
18This literature does not directly address the issue of tax composition as it focuses on the performance
of particular tax types as a percentage of GDP. Still, if, as I defend, we consider the relevance of more
progressive tax types in the tax composition, a valid indicator of how much economic elites pay in taxes ,
we can interpret the results of this literature as suggesting that elite cohesion explains tax compositions
skewed towards more progressive tax types.
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one hand, some scholars maintain that cohesion increases trust and lengthens elites’ time
horizons in negotiations. Consequently, cohesion should lead to higher tax contributions
by economic elites. Weyland (1997) for instance uses this argument to explain the
Chilean tax system in democracy while Lieberman’s comparative analysis of the South
African and Brazilian tax systems argues along similar lines (Lieberman 2003). By
contrast, Fairfield (2010), based mainly on examples from Argentina and Chile, upholds
the opposite, namely that cohesion among elites increases the capacity of economic elites
to resist taxation.19
Flores-Macías (2014) tests these apparently competing arguments in a case study
on the Colombian Democratic Security Taxes20 and identifies synergies rather than
contradictions between them. In his view, in the design and implementation of this tax,
‘both hypothesized mechanisms of elite cohesion were at play’ (Flores-Macías 2014, p.
16). More generally, the analysis indicates that cohesion is not necessarily connected
to the higher or lower willingness of elites to bear a larger share of the tax burden, but
that it facilitates the identification of compromise solutions.
Building on the strengths and weaknesses of the last two approaches, in the next
section I develop my argument. In doing so, I emphasize the notion of ‘institutional
strength’ (Levitsky & Murillo 2009) and stress how, beyond interest constellations, the
institutional setting is crucial to enable reliable compromises and agreements between
economic elites and the government in the field of taxation.
2.3 Why strong business organisations and party systems matter for
tax composition
Following fiscal contractualism, taxation rests on a bargain between citizens and gov-
ernments (e.g. Moore 2008, Timmons 2005). The argument is that no actor can make
unilateral decisions on fiscal policies if these are aimed at sustainability. For instance,
governments cannot consistently force citizens to pay taxes without linking it to a clear
benefit in exchange (Timmons 2005, p. 534-535). Instead, fiscal contracts and tax
19Fairfield (2013) further specifies her argument and discusses practical implications of this framework for
strategies to tax economic elites in unequal democracies.
20Find a description of this tax in Flores-Macías (2014, p. 3-5).
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systems represent self-enforcing equilibriums defined by compromises specifying feasible
exchange of tax contributions for public services.21 Of course, deviations from that
equilibrium are possible but if these are not backed by changes in the power relations
underpinning the fiscal contract they will tend to be short-lived. This is why focusing
not only on the circumstances enabling particular tax reforms but also on the long-term
trends in taxation is relevant.
Although governments need to be responsive towards all social groups that they
tax, negotiations with each of them are not identical. The strength of the government’s
position towards different groups varies enormously and with it the bargaining structures
of the different negotiations. In this sense, economic elites can be expected to have a
particularly strong position to influence and resist tax policies they dislike (Fairfield
2013). Also, they can be considered to be in a stronger bargaining position because
economic elites tend to be able to evaluate better the implications of tax legislations
than the average citizen (Hacker & Pierson 2005).
In many developing countries, due to the highly unequal distribution of economic
power, economic elites can be assumed to have the capacity to obstruct or destabilise
governments. Therefore, governments need at least the implicit acceptance by a sub-
stantial segment of the economic elites to remain capable and in power (de Mesquita
et al. 2003, Khan 2010)22. As a result, governments will be very careful about how much
to demand from economic elites and how to frame these demands. In particular, the
economic elites will be especially demanding in terms of what they expect in exchange
for tax contributions and governments’ threats to coercively tax these elites will not be
particularly credible (Levi 1989, Bates & Lien 1985). Under these circumstances the
strategy to raise sanctions and increase costs associated to non-compliance will have
little effect. Instead governments will need to make economic elites consent to taxation.
In essence, the challenge is to convince elites that paying taxes represents a reasonable
21Eubank (2012) illustrates, by using the case of Somaliland, what this bargaining between the state and
business can look like. Historical accounts of the development of the tax state in Western Europe (e.g.
Tilly 1992, Scheve & Stasavage 2010) also highlight the role that bargaining, especially in a context of
war, played in defining fiscal contracts.
22While Khan talks of ‘the ruling coalition of factions’, de Mesquita et al. use the term ‘winning coalition’.
In essence, both terms refer to the same idea: a group of social actors who, by coordinating their actions,
are able to sustain or distort a certain socio-political order. I claim economic elites have this power in
most developing countries.
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investment.23
In general, most of the literature ignores the possibility that opposition to taxation
by elites can be overcome by linking taxation to certain benefits and assumes that
economic elites will only pay when they are forced to do so through high domestic
pressure for redistribution (e.g. Boix 2003, Acemoglu & Robinson 2006b).24
This claim is based on the assumption that taxation always leads to redistribution.
However this assumption is questionable. Taxation does not automatically equal re-
distribution. In practice, little can be said about the fiscal incidence of a tax without
taking into account the incidence of the spending it makes possible. On the one hand,
looking into very restrictively defined benefits, taxes regardless their incidence can fi-
nance highly regressive state spending (e.g. Lustig et al. 2013, Jaramillo 2013). In this
context, such as for instance paying taxes that finance eliterian public universities pay-
ing taxes would have a neutral if not even positive net effect for the elites. On the
other hand, beyond narrowly defined benefits, paying taxes can enable the delivery of
club and public goods much in the interest of elites. In this sense, states can solve
coordination problems present in many major projects (e.g. infrastructure development
projects) that private actors are unable to implement on their own (Timmons 2005).
Also public goods such as peace or functioning judicial systems can be appealing from
a cost-benefit calculation perspective. So would even argue that progressive state ex-
penditures financed by tax contributions of the elites can be very much in their interest.
One example to illustrate this is education: Increasing primary education is costly but
it can potentially entitled enough benefits for elites in terms of raising the quality of
available human resources that the ‘invesment in the poor’ is justified. 25 Hence, if we
23This argument echoes the path-breaking account of the development of constitutional arrangements in
seventeenth-century England and its effect on public finance by North & Weingast (1989). As they
argue in their article “the credible threat of removal” to the Crown after the Glorious Revolution is
key to understand the change in behavior to gain access to revenue and limiting the level of “arbitrary
government”. The authors highlight that in the new situation “[f]or the Crown to achieve its own goals
this meant it had to establish successful relations with parliaments” North & Weingast (1989, p. 816). It
could be argued that nowadays for many governments in developing countries the strategic environment
vis a vis economic elites has strong parallels to the one North and Weingast analyse.
24To my knowledge, Best is the first author to explicitly argue ‘that tax size and composition are primarily
a reflection of political choice. But a choice weighted by power’. He also offers a first critique of
approaches to taxation focusing merely on economic or administrative dimensions (1976, p.66).
25This example is based on the discussion by Hossain & Moore (2002). Their analysis does not focus on
taxation but on the political economy of pro-poor policies more broadly and they identify education and
health as the more promising sectors in which the interests of elites and the general population might
converge.
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assume that powerful elites are able to influence public policy and direct state action
into areas of their interest, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which elites would benefit
from supporting a well-financed state. In fact, from this perspective the question is
rather, why should elites want to pay so little in taxes?
In a pathbreaking work on the political dimension of taxation, Archer argues that
interest groups (or elites) will most often operate in a defensive mode against taxation
not out of fear of redistribution but because ‘there are so many steps between revenue
collection and expenditures that no group can count on a sure and significant increase in
benefits’ (Ascher 1989, p.419). Thus, the common opposition of economic elites towards
taxation might well originate in a problem of credible commitment rather than one of
lack of benefits.26
What can lower elites’ uncertainty about effectively receiving valued services in
exchange for higher tax contributions?27 I argue that in the context of developing
countries strong business organisations and stable political systems are crucial.28 In
this sense, it is not the mere existence of these institutions but their ‘institutional
strength’ that will affect the expectations and behaviour of actors (Levitsky & Murillo
2009).
26This idea has also been defended by Timmons (2010a). One main result of his analysis on the effect
of partisanship on the relevance of particular tax instruments in OECD countries is that, while the
effect exists in political systems with low government turnover, it is negligible if government turnover is
high. Mahon (2004), although not explicitly labelling it as a credible commitment problem, applies the
same logic in his analysis on the factors shaping the occurrence of tax reform in Latin America. The
stability of political regimes and party systems is explicitly thematised. However the empirical analysis
offers mixed results when it comes to the statistical significance of their effects. Focanti et al. (2013)
replicate Mahon’s exercise with a broader and more detailed database on tax reforms as well as more
recent data. Their results indicate a consistent significant effect of party fragmentation on the number
of reforms. The authors propose increasing common-pool problems and facilities for particularistic
lobbying as mechanisms linking political fragmentation and tax reform.
27In her discussion on different strategies for taxing economic elites, Fairfield (2013) differentiates tax-
side and benefit-side strategies as well two main mechanisms by which these can work: tempering
antagonism of the elites; and mobilising public support. Within this framework, the focus of this paper
lays on the strategies that Fairfield labels ‘Linking to universal benefits: Emphasizing stabilisation’ and
‘Compensation’ (Fairfield 2013, p.46). This does not preclude that other strategies might be relevant
to get elites to pay taxes. For instance, Scheve & Stasavage (2012) explore the relationship between
mass mobilisation for war and progressive taxation. Yet, as argued above, I consider that especially
in developing countries, in absence of major social-political events that distort the underlying power
constellations, any successful strategy to substantially increase the tax contributions of elites will require
their consent.
28The relevance of collective actors for various dimensions has been highlighted by many authors. For
instance Faust (2010) underlines how, specially in newly established democracies, “collective actors with
the incentive to aggregate the diversity of societal demands into comprehensive political programmes”
(2010, p.522) are crucial to reduce volatility in the policy process, disincentivise populism and increase
the capacity of the government to credibly commit to broader segment of society.
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Strong business organisations are crucial because they allow economic elites to act
as an unitary actor. In defining common goals that go beyond particularistic interests,
economic elites face a coordination challenge due to their different, if not conflicting,
interests. Comprehensive and long-term policy options raise the potential for free-riding
(Ascher 1989, p.419). Even if an elite would benefit from a certain action or policy in
exchange for taxes, it will always prefer to enjoy the benefits without bearing the cost.
Therefore, if economic elites are uncertain about other elites’ behaviour, the scope of
their lobbying will be narrow and their attitude defensive.
Encompassing and strong business organisations reduce these problems by lowering
information costs and enhancing interaction among economic elites which facilitates
internal coordination and cohesion. Some strong business organisations are even able
to not only act as a coordination forum but even sanction members and force them to
adhere to a certain behaviour (Doner & Schneider 2000). All this increases the chances
of overcoming the coordination problems. In addition, coordinated actions improve the
capacity of economic elites to impose their policy options (Grossman & Helpman 1995)
and thereby increase their certainty about the actual implementation of public policies
they value. As a result, I claim that, by solving the coordination problem between
economic elites, encompassing business organisations contribute to enabling broad and
long-term agreements between economic elites and governments.29
The stability of the political system is key to improve a government’s credibility
when interacting with economic elites. Economic elites have a legitimate concern about
whether governments will follow through agreements and use higher tax contributions
to implement valued services. As tax legislation tends to consolidate, the concern goes
beyond short-term policy shifts and the credibility of the particular governments in
power. The question is rather how much economic elites can expect the political system
in a country to stick to long-term agreements regardless of political cycles.
As Powell and Tucker state ‘party systems with high levels of volatility can lead to
wild swings in policy (...) [and] open doors to non-traditional parties and candidates’
29Besides the free-riding problem between the economic elites, there is also a free-riding problem between
the elites and the general population. If possible, the economic elites will always prefer to enjoy the
benefits without paying for the costs. However, in accordance with Fairfield, I defend that, given the
economic and political characteristics of many developing countries, ‘to a significant extent raising more
revenue (...) requires directly taxing the economic elites’ (2013, p.42).
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(2013, p. 1). Also Flores-Macías (2010) has shown how institutionalised party systems
contribute to the preservation of the status quo and avoid drastic reforms in economic
policy. Stable party systems also enhance party discipline and sharpen the content pro-
file of policy options (e. g. Mainwaring 1998). This reduces the room to manoeuvre for
personalistic leaders and create an environment which mimics repeated interaction be-
tween negotiation partners over time (e.g. Flores-Macías 2010). Moreover, party system
stability increases the incentives for elites to invest in building up connections to the
parties which fosters interaction and trust among economic and political elites (Doner
& Schneider 2000). As a result, stable political party systems ought to generate more
predictable economic policy and increase a governments’ credibility about sticking to
long-term agreements.
Overall, I argue that stable political parties and strong business organisations reduce un-
certainty for economic elites about future returns to their tax contributions and thereby
increase their acceptance of taxation. While strong business organisations reduce intra-
elite cooperation problems, a stable political party system reduces the concerns about
sudden policy shifts and opportunistic use of tax contributions by political represen-
tatives. In this context the definition of more ambitious and long-term oriented fiscal
agreements between the economic elites and the political actors should be more feasible.
This does not imply that economic elites will be enthusiastic about the idea of bearing
a bigger share of the tax burden, but that these two factors provide an institutional
setting that increases the chances for agreements that would not be viable in their ab-
sence. Assuming that higher acceptance of taxation by economic elites will be mirrored
in the stronger relevance of progressive taxes in the tax composition, I claim that the
two factors discussed above will lead to tax compositions which have a stronger empha-
sis on progressive tax types. The plausibility of this claim is examined in the following
section by comparing the cases of Peru and Colombia.
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2.4 Empirical approach and analysis
2.4.1 Peru and Colombia as similar case studies
The following empirical analysis should be considered as a “plausibility probe” (Eckstein
2000, p. 140–143). The goal of the analysis is exploratory in nature. In this context,
the plausibility probe serve as a preliminary study “on relatively untested theories and
hypothesis to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted”
(George & Bennett 2005, p. 75).30
Methodologically the analysis is based on the ‘a most similar cases method’. The
case selection strategy is to identify a pair cases that differ in the outcome of interest
but are similar on various variables supposedly linked to that outcome (Gerring 2008,
p. 668–671). Against this background, the analysis compares the long-term patterns of
taxation in two Andean countries: Colombia and Peru. The comparison is appealing
because although, as Table 2.1 shows, Peru and Colombia are comparable in respect
to the variables included in the standard models of tax performance (e.g. Le et al.
2012, Teera & Hudson 2004) both countries have very different tax systems. Precisely
the similarities on these various control variables allows to eliminate them as sufficient
explanations for the divergence in tax performance and explore the explanatory power
of the proposed additional independent variables (see discussion in Mahoney 2003).
In terms of economic development, Colombia and Peru have continuously shared
a similar status in the World Bank’s income group classification and have had similar
GDP per capita values until the 1990s when figures on Colombia became slightly higher.
The indicators on the value added of different economic sectors are also comparable.
Finally, trade, economic openness31 and demographic indicators, as well as inequality
levels are very close to each other.
30In this line, the present analysis is not aiming at properly testing my claim but acquiring suggestive
evidence supporting its feasibility. This is very closely connected to degrees of freedom problem of case
studies (see e.g. George & Bennett 2005, p. 28–30). It seems obvious that a properly test of my claim,
which involves two variables and an interaction between them, is not feasible by comparing two cases.
Even if I exploit the historical development in the countries which mitigates the degree of freedom
problem the research design is indeterminate.
31Economic globalisation as operationalised in the KOF Index can be mainly interpreted as economic
openness (see Dreher 2006)
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Table 2.1: Comparison between Peru and Colombia on traditional indicators used in the tax performance literature
Colombia Peru
Full
period 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Full
period 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Agriculture, VA (% of GDP) 16.3 24.3 18.4 15.1 8.3 10.5 15.8 10.0 8.8 7.5
Industry, VA (% of GDP) 32.5 30.1 34.7 32.6 32.5 32.5 34.5 32.6 29.4 33.5
Manufacturing, VA (% of GDP) 19.3 23.0 22.2 17.4 15.2 18.9 21,2 26.7 16.9 15.7
Population < 15 (% of total) 36.9 43.7 38.6 35.0 30.8 37.8 43.2 40.3 36.4 32.0
Population > 65 (% of total) 4.3 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.1 4.3 3.5 3.8 4.3 5.4
Trade (% of GDP) 32.3 29.8 28.2 35.4 35.3 35.7 34.9 34.6 30.1 42.4
Urban population (% of total) 66.9 58.1 65.1 70.2 73.6 68.5 60.9 66.6 70.8 75.0
Economic growth (annual %) 4.1 5.8 3.4 2.9 4.1 3.3 3.9 0.3 3.2 5.5
GDP p.c. (constant 2005 US$) 2800 2116 2528 3032 3458 2633 2665 2582 2250 2999
Natural resources rents (% of GDP) 5.9 4.4 6.0 5.1 8.0 7.2 6.3 12.4 3.0 7.3
KOF Economic Globalization Index 37.0 24.4 28,7 42.4 51.3 43.9 29.3 33.5 46.5 64.3
Gini Coefficient 53,0 53,9 53,3 52,4 52,5 53,1 53,7 55,2 53,9 50,8
Average years of schooling 6,3 4,6 5,7 6,7 8,0 7,6 5,7 6,9 8,3 9,2
Size of the public sector 12,7 9,0 10,1 15,1 16,0 10,3 12,1 10,3 9,1 10,0
Explanations and sources of the variables can be found in appendix A. Data for the decades correspond to 10 year averages (that is 1970s equal the average of 1970 to
1979). The most recent decade (2000s) includes the period 2000 to 2010.
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Other aspects that can be expected to be closely linked to taxation by affecting
the availability of and facility to exploit certain tax handles are the levels of trade and
urbanisation, average levels of education along as well as the size of the public sector.32
The values for the two countries are also similar in these dimensions.33
In addition, the comparability of these cases increases, thanks to their common
cultural heritage and geographical region (Ivanyna & von Haldenwang 2012). With
regard to administrative capacities, both countries can be considered to have had sim-
ilarly weak tax administrations during this period (Ascher 1989). In fact, actions to
strengthen them started in both countries at the end of the 1980s, with the founding of
the Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administracion Tributaria (SUNAT)
in Peru and the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales de Colombia (DIAN) in
Colombia.
Hence, Peru and Colombia appear to be comparable cases and should, according to
tax performance literature, be expected to tax similarly. However, this is not the case,
as the following section discusses.
2.4.2 The dependent variables: tax composition in Peru and Colombia
Long-term patterns of taxation especially in terms of tax composition differ strongly
between Peru and Colombia. Figure 2.2 shows the development of the tax-to-GDP
ratio in Peru and Colombia from 1970 to 2010.34 Although Peru tends to collect more
taxes than Colombia, by international standards, both countries are considered ‘low
tax performers’ (Chelliah et al. 1975, Le et al. 2012, Piancastelli 2001, Ivanyna & von
Haldenwang 2012). Historically, differences in overall tax collection were especially
32Unfortunately data for the size of the informal sector are not available only for very recent years. Yet,
available data indicate that Peru and Colombia do not show remarkable differences on this dimension.
In any case, both countries have a dramatically large informal sectors. For instance, estimates for 1998
indicate that the level was above 50% in both countries (54.6% for Peru and 53.8% for Colombia).
These are high numbers even within Latin America, a region that is known for having large informal
sectors (Schneider 2012). In general, the informal economy as a percentage of GDP is considered to be
somehow higher in Peru than Colombia, although Colombia is among the countries with the highest
levels (e.g. Schneider & Enste 2000, Vuletin 2008)
33Information on the operationalisation and sources for all the variables can be found in appendix A. Apart
from two variables, all the variables presented in Table 2.1 follow similar trends in both countries. Only
two variables behave significantly differently in both countries: economic growth, and rents from natural
resources (Figure A2.1- Appendix B). The short-term variation of these variables is not able to explain
the long term trend in tax composition which remain stable over time.
34The analysis is limited to the period 1970-2010 due to data availability. Operationalisation and sources
for tax data can be found in Appendix B.
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strong during the 1970s and 1980s.35 The trends are very similar which points at how
these countries historically have shared economic cycles.
Figure 2.2: Tax collection as a percentage of GDP in Peru and Colombia (1970-2010)
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To avoid the effect of particular year and reporting errors a moving average for three years was calculated.
The period used is of three years and includes beyond the present year, the previous and the following one
If we analyse the collection data for specific tax types some interesting patterns
emerge: During the period 1970-2010 Colombia has consistently collected more tax
revenue from income taxes than Peru. The average income taxes-to-GDP ratio was
4.4% in Colombia while the figure was 3.8% in Peru. By contrast, while the average
collection of indirect taxes-to-GDP over the whole period was 2.9% in Colombia; in Peru
it amounted to 7.3%.36 If we look into the data from a time-series perspective sonce the
1990s overall tax collection shows a similar upward trend in both countries, although the
trend is stronger for the Peruvian case. Collection from trade taxes decreases in both
countries, in accordance to a general trend in developing countries during the period
35For a more historical account, see Musgrave & Gillis (1971, p. 24-28). These authors compare Colombia’s
tax performance to that of other countries in the region (including Peru). Measured against regional
standards, the Colombian performance qualifies as low, whilst the Peruvian one is evaluated as average.
36Due to poor data availability, I focus on three tax types: income taxes, indirect taxes (mostly sales tax),
and trade taxes. Although ‘available quantitative evidence on tax incidence in developing countries is
neither conclusive nor persuasive’ (Bird & Zolt 2005, p. 18), most scholars agree that income taxes will
commonly have a progressive incidence while indirect taxes will have a regressive one. For an alternative
perspective and an overview on the discussion, see Shah &Whalley (1991), Gemmell & Morrissey (2003).
Tax incidence studies on Colombia and Peru mostly support these incidence assumptions. For Colombia
evidence is strong (McLure 1975, 1989). For Peru the evidence is weaker (Taylor 1967, Webb 1973).
More recent estimates as well as trends in terms of incidence of taxation can be found in Barreix et al.
(2007), Goñi et al. (2011) and Morley (2001).
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analysed (Baunsgaard & Keen 2010, Aizenman & Jinjarak 2009).37
For the sake of my argument, however, the most relevant information is the relative
contribution of each tax instrument to the overall tax effort. Assuming that income taxes
have a stronger incidence on the economic elites, the relevance of these taxes in the tax
mix will be the indicator that best captures the relative contribution of the wealthy to
tax collection . The analysis of the tax composition data suggests that Colombia has
been relying far more strongly on the contributions of the economic elites than Peru.
While income taxes play a pivotal role in the Colombian tax system, the Peruvian public
finance system is based very predominantly on indirect taxation (or taxing the poor).
Table 2.2 shows the collection of different taxes as a percentage of total tax collection.
The strong divergences between Peru and Colombia become evident.
Table 2.2: Different tax types as a percentage of total tax collection in Peru and Colom-
bia (1970-2010)
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1970-2010
Colombia Income taxes 46.1 32 41.4 41.4 40.3
Indirect taxes 21.5 25.1 30.3 30.1 26.8
Trade taxes 27.7 40.1 25 20.6 28.1
Peru Income taxes 31.2 23.3 19.9 29.1 26.1
Indirect taxes 39 48.7 59.1 56.9 51
Trade taxes 24.1 22.1 11.8 7 15.9
In Peru, indirect taxes dominate the tax composition for all time periods, contribut-
ing on average more than 50% of overall tax collection. This is almost twice as much
as the the average contribution of these taxes in Colombia (26.8 %). By contrast, in
Colombia income taxes have played a far more relevant role in the tax mix and has
represented the most important tax source over most of the time periods.38 In both
countries, trade taxes have been losing relevance although in Colombia its role remains
far stronger.39
37Figure A2.3 in appendix C shows the evolution of the collection from trade taxes as a percentage of
total tax in Peru and Colombia over the complete period of analysis. The decrease is stronger in Peru
than in Colombia but the tendency is similar.
38The introduction of the VAT as the main indirect tax took place at nearly the same point in time: 1973
in Peru and 1975 in Colombia (Ebrill et al. 2001).
39See appendix C Figure A2.3. In Peru, trade taxes remain the lowest contributor to tax collection in all
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Figure 2.3 focuses on the relevance of income versus indirect taxes for the tax com-
position in both countries.40
Figure 2.3: Ratio of the collection from indirect taxes versus the collection from income
taxes in Peru and Colombia (1970-2010)
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To avoid the effect of particular year and reporting errors a moving average for three years was calculated.
The period used is of three years and includes beyond the present year, the previous and the following one
In line with Table 2.2 Figure 2.3 underlines how, compared to the Colombian tax
system, the Peruvian one has been consistently relying more strongly on indirect taxes
and less so on income taxes. The ratio is significantly and consistently lower for Peru
than for Colombia and the gap between both countries remains over time. Furthermore,
the trends of the ratio values are similar. This points at the comparability of the cases
and how not only regional trends in taxation have influenced both cases similarly but also
how they have been exposed to similar economic cycles.41. Yet, significant differences
in the contribution of each tax to total tax collection remain over time. The ratio is
time periods. In Colombia, trade taxes were more relevant than indirect taxes in the 1970s and 80s and
indeed in the 80s it was the most relevant tax source. With regard to comparability, it is also relevant
to highlight that both countries took measures to liberalise their economies at similar points in time
(Agosin & Ffrench-Davis 1993).
40The discussion will focus on these tax types because the incidence assumptions for them are the most
reliable ones. Trade taxes and property taxes pose greater problems. In any case, including property as
a more progressive tax and adding it to income tax does not change the results noticeably. If anything,
it would make the results stronger as in Peru the property tax collected by the central government has
had more limited relevance than in Colombia. The figures in the main text are based on data collected
from local sources. Figure A2.4 in appendix C shows the relevance of the income versus indirect taxes
for all years. If international sources (IMF 2012) are used, the trends remain very similar (see Figure
A2.5 in appendix C).
41An exception to the similarities are the years around 1990 where Peru suffer a profound economic crisis
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significantly and consistently lower for Peru than for Colombia and the beyond similar
trends the differences remain over time.
The stronger reliance on income taxes is a first hint that overall tax collection might
have been more progressive in Colombia than in Peru. Yet, although most scholars
would agree to ascribe a regressive nature to indirect taxes, the question whether relying
stronger on income taxes leads to more progressive tax systems is a highly a controversial
discussion (e.g. see discussion in Shah & Whalley 1991). In this sense, in the following
I discuss two main aspects that might distort the claim that a stronger relevance of
income taxes is indicative of a more progressive tax system.
First, differences in collection from income taxes might be driven by taxation of
natural resources. Taxes from natural resources do not demand a real tax effort by tax-
payers and are not assume to have a progressive incidence. Hence, it would be highly
misleading to ascribe income taxes associated to exploitation of natural resources to
more progressive taxes or a higher acceptance by wealthy actors to pay taxes. Data
since the 1990s show that revenue collected from the exploitation of natural resources
has increased remarkably in both countries during the last decades. For instance, in
Peru, revenue (tax and non-tax revenue) collected from the hydrocarbon and mining
sectors increased from 7.3 percent during the period 1990 to 2003 to 17.2 percent in
the period 2004 to 2009. This increase, which explains the sharp rise in the relevance
of income taxes in Peru after 2004,42 is more modest in Colombia where revenue from
these sectors raised from 10.3% to 16.3% (Acquatella et al. 2013). In addition, the
raise in revenue from natural resources was not only smaller in Colombia than in Peru.
While in Colombia additional revenue from natural resources was mainly channeled
through non-tax revenue (mainly royalties and dividends of the partly nationally owned
ECOPETROL company), in Peru much of this revenue was collected through income
taxes.43 Hence, revenue from natural resources can be expected to play a major role in
Peru´s income tax record than in Colombia. As a result, the characterisation of the in-
come taxes as more progressive taxes is probably more accurate for the Colombian case.
42See Figure A2.4 in appendix C
43Around 90% of the total fiscal revenue collected from the mining sector, the dominant sector in Peru, is
in form of income taxes while in Colombia less than 20% of the revenue from the hydrocarbons sector
(oil and gas), the predominant sector in Colombia, was collected via this type of taxes (Acquatella et al.
2013, Campodónico Sánchez 2007, World Bank 2005).
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Thus, if anything, the differences between Peru and Colombia in terms of Rrelevance of
more progressive taxes highlighted above are most probably underestimated.
Second, the two main income taxes, the personal income tax and the corporate in-
come tax, are assumed to strongly differ in terms of tax incidence. While the personal
income tax is commonly accepted to be progressive, the incidence of the corporate in-
come tax is an issue of heated controversy (e.g. Shah & Whalley 1991). Unfortunately,
it is not possible to find data that offer this level of disaggregation for sufficiently long
time series. What existing data show, however, is that the relevance of the personal
income tax has been historically higher in Colombia than in Peru, especially before the
1990s (IMF 2012). More recent data shed doubts on whether this trend was maintained
and suggest that the relevance of the personal income tax has been gradually decreas-
ing in Colombia (OECD/IDB/ECLAC 2014). There is however no strong evidence that
Peru is relies now more on the personal income tax than Colombia.44 Hence, especially
before the 1990s tax collection from income taxes can be expected to have been more
progressive in Colombia than in Peru. Consequently, similarly to the situation described
in the previous paragraph, also from this perspective, if anything, the differences be-
tween both countries in terms of their reliance on progressive taxes are most probably
underestimated.45
Overall, existing data indicate that, despite being comparable cases with regard to
variables used in the tax performance literature, Colombia and Peru show surprising
divergences in the way they tax. Furthermore besides economic and political changes
in both countries some fundamental differences in their tax system remain over time.
Compared to Colombia, Peru is relying consistently more on indirect taxation to finance
44It is quite clear that the role of the personal income tax has decreased in Colombia since the 1990 but
it is difficult to make strong statement based on the OECD/IDB/ECLAC Data (2014) since a lot of
the Colombian revenue collected through income taxes is no allocated to neither the corporate income
tax nor the personal income tax. Assuming that less than 50% of the taxes collected through income
taxes that are not allocable have a progressive incidence that is similar to the one assumed for personal
income taxes, the overall incidence of income taxes in Colombia can be expected to remain clearly more
progressive that in the case of the Peruvian income tax.
45See OECD/IDB/ECLAC (2014). This data also support the previous claim that much of the collection
from income taxes in Peru has been driven by taxing mining enterprises. The collection of corporate
income tax as a percentage of GDP increased from an average of 2.4% between 2000 and 2004 to 5.2%
in the period 2005-2010 (after the mining boom). In terms of tax composition, this meant that, while
corporate tax collection represented 14.6 % of the total tax collection in the first period, in the more
recent period it rose to 29.4%, nearly doubling its relevance. The differences are far more modest in
Colombia.
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its state. This is the case, even though Peru has profited strongly from the international
price cycle for natural resources, which has raised its income tax collection considerably.
Colombia maintains a strong reliance on income taxes. Yet the role of the most obviously
progressive component of these, the personal income tax, seems to have been decreasing
since the 1990s.
2.4.3 Explaining divergence: reducing uncertainty for economic elites
Economic and administrative factors are not able to explain the differences in the Pe-
ruvian and the Colombian historical tax records. Certainly, performance in particular
years can be connected to economic crises and changes in legislation. However, the fact
that the relevance of the different taxes varies so much across both countries and that
this difference remains quite consistent over time is surprising. In what follows, I offer
an explanation of this empirical puzzle based on the arguments elaborated in section
2.3.
Unstable party system and weak business organisations in Peru
The Peruvian political system has been highly unstable during the last decades (Soli-
mano 2003). Peru went through two autocratic periods between 1968-1979 and 1991-
2001 (Gurr et al. 2011) and also had a series of coups d’état. In addition, during the
1950s and 1960s, Peru was unable to develop strong traditional parties. The lack of a
democratic tradition and especially the lack of continuity in party competition nega-
tively affected the development of strong party identities and attachments (Planas 2000,
p. 78). Under these circumstances party organisations are weakly institutionalised and
rely heavily on individual leaders.
As a result, one of the main characteristics of the Peruvian political system is its
high electoral volatility and weak party system institutionalisation (Scully & Mainwar-
ing 1995, p. 81).46 Table 2.3 indicates the degree of this problem by showing the
electoral results in Presidential Elections since the 1980s. No party besides the Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) has been continuously part of the electoral
46See also Coppedge (1998) for an overview of different measures of party system institutionalisation. All
measures support the idea that Peru has had an extremely unstable political party system.
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competition and survived the Fujimori regime in the 1990s. Moreover, a number of par-
ties that received a large share of votes in one election suffered big vote losses or even
disappeared from the screen in the following elections. For instance, Accion Popular
(AP), the winner of the first democratic Presidential Election in 1980 with 45.4% of
the vote, fell to 7.3% only five years later.47 The weak and unstable parties and party
systems, personalistic politics and anti-party rhetoric still remain today. These were in
fact reinforced during the Fujimori dictatorship, which specifically claimed to be an al-
ternative to these ‘sins’. Yet, the Fujimori regime itself remained a highly unpredictable
and personalistic system and, due to its poor institutionalisation, was unable to pro-
vide reliable political interlocutors (Levitsky & Cameron 2003). The parties existing
today have similar characteristics (e.g. Valladares Molleda 2009) and the most recent
election results indicate the continuation of the highly unstable political party system
(Center for Latin American Studies 2011) . Most parties are rather movements build
around political leaders such as Ollanta Humalla, Heiko Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo,
or Alan García. So, some political platform might be stable overtime but they lack
institutionalisation.
Overall, it is safe to say that ‘Peru has seldom had institutionalized political parties,
if that term implies organizations with deep-seated ideologies, coherent rules, and lives
beyond a particular leader or founder’ (Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 67). Under these
circumstances, political elites had no interest in broad and coherent long-term political
visions and political discussions were not programmatic but rather personalistic. The
result were policies based on ‘partial and largely evanescent agreements between or
among individual elites, who either could not speak for, or had no desire to speak for
the party organizations they represented’ (Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 74).
Also Peruvian economic elites have been poorly institutionalised. Peruvian busi-
ness may historically be characterised as ‘an archipelago of interest groups’ (Durand
1998, p. 253). The Confederacion Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas
(CONFIEP), the peak organisation of Peruvian business, was only founded 1984 (Du-
47In 1963, Peru had the last democratic elections before the military regime led by Juan Velasco Alvarado.
At that point, APRA and Accion Popular, two parties that were to reappear in the political system in
the 1980s controlled 73% of the vote share: Alianza Accion Popular 39% and Partido Aprista Popular
34% (Center for Latin American Studies 2011).
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Table 2.3: Vote share in Peruvian presidential elections (First roung)
1980* 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2006
Accion Popular 45.2 6.25
Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) 9.6 10.23
(AP+ PPC) FREDEMO (55.0) (16.48) 27.6
Unidad Nacional 24.3 23,8
APRA 27.4 45.74 19.2 25.8 24,3
Izquierda Unida (IU) 14.4 21.26 7
Cambio 90 24.6 64,4 49.8
Unión por el Peróu 21,8 30,6
Peru Posible 40.3 36.51
Frente Independiente Moralizador 9,9
Alianza por el Futuro 7,4
Only vote shares above 5% are listed.
Sources: Tanaka (1998, p. 104) and Center for Latin American Studies (2011)
rand 2002, p. 323). Shared goals and coordinated action among business leaders were
therefore mostly absent until then (Durand 1998, p. 253). The motivation behind
this organisation was from the very beginning defensive: after the negative experiences
which business had had in the previous decades in negotiating with the state the pri-
vate sector had the desire to create an organisation strong enough to resist being at
the discretion of political actors (Wise 2003, p. 207-209). But, in fact, the CONFIEP
was not very successful in changing the situation as it remained highly contested within
the fragmented business community. Furthermore, during the Fujimori regime, the di-
alogue between economic elites and political elites did not improve as much as some
businessmen expected (Cotler 2000). The situation in 1990 – after the climax of the
economic crisis and at the start of Fujimori’s regime – appeared a perfect context to
improve this type of dialogue. On the one hand, Fujimori needed domestic private cap-
ital investment, given the lack of international capital due to the crisis; on the other
hand, after having supported Fujimori’s autocoup in 1992 the economic elites expected
to experience better communication with the Fujimori government (Durand 2002, p.
323-324). Nevertheless, although intra-business coordination improved, the CONFIEP
did not develop into a strong representative of business interests. In particular, it did
not succeed in proactively shaping public policy and remained merely a reactive actor.
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Fujimori himself played a major role in hindering this development because he specif-
ically feared the development of a strong business actor (Cotler 2000, p. 298-299).48
During the last decade, the relationship between the political and the economic sphere
has been less antagonistic. Still, there is not much coordinated and negotiated action
based on long term visions shared between the state and the broader private sector.
Also, intra-business coordination remains weak and targeted lobbying for narrow de-
fined interest remains the predominant strategy for individual businesses to influence
politics (Durand 2006, Dargent 2011).
Overall, Peru has constituted the worst possible environment for the negotiation of
long-term agreements between political and economic elites. On the one side, economic
elites have been highly factionalised and have faced high uncertainty about the reliabil-
ity of their political counterparts. On the other, political elites have preferred a ‘slicing
policy’ (Durand 1998, p. 260) to avoid unified and coordinated business action. During
the Fujimori regime, although the expectations of coordination between economic and
political elites were not achieved, the interaction between economic and political elites
improved from a relationship characterised by conflict, as it was during the 1970s and
1980s, to one better described as mutual tolerance. This logic remains in place today
and economic elites tend to react defensively to state policies and focus on narrowly
defined interests. It is true that in recent years, income taxes have improved their per-
formance remarkable in Peru. In fact, since 2005 they have contributed to overall tax
collection at levels that are close or even above those of income taxes in Colombia.49
However, this rise in income tax collection should not be attributed to a more coop-
erative interaction between economic and political elites but, as discussed in section
2.4.2., to increased collection of revenue from the mining sector in a context of a high
commodity prices. In this sense, it is noteworthy, how even under these extraordinary
circumstances for income taxes, the reliance of the Peruvian tax system on indirect
taxes remains indisputable. A comprehensive reform towards a more progressive tax
system has been a commonly stated policy goal for decades but no government has
been able (or willing) to implement it (Wise 2003, Durand 2006). In fact, leaving aside
48Cotler (2000) clearly shows that Peruvian business organisations were aware of the disadvantages asso-
ciated with their weakness and fragmentation.
49See Figure A2.5 in appendix C.
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the goal of progressivity, many have pointed at the necessity of a substantial reform of
the Peruvian tax system Ascher (e.g. 1989), García & Valderrama (e.g. 2006, p. 456-
463). However, the only comprehensive reform took place in 1991, in the context of an
extremely acute economic and political crisis.50
Stable party system and strong business organisations in Colombia
Despite suffering the longest active civil war in the world, historically the Colombian po-
litical system is considered to be one of the most stable ones in Latin America (Coppedge
1998).51 Colombia has remained formally a democracy since 1958. Compared to other
countries ion the region, it has suffered a limited amount of major political events such
as major constitutional reforms or coups d’état (Solimano 2003). The National Front
Pact in 1958 between the Liberal and the Conservative Party was the basis for Colom-
bia’s political stability during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. This pact defined for a
period of 16 years an alternation in power and an equal distribution of elected posi-
tions among these two main traditional parties (Hartlyn 1988). Economic elites were
highly integrated into these parties, so that, in practice, the pact between the political
elites included all traditional economic elites as well. Although the National Front Pact
expired in 1974, de facto the political logic remained in place longer. However, the
strong clientelistic party-networks on which the system’s stability was based gradually
eroded and the political equilibrium definitely got out of balance at the end of the 1980s.
Demands for more democratic participation, less corruption and more ambitious social
policies converged into the definition of a New Constitution in 1991.
Until the end of the National Front Pact, the party system was stable per definition
(Dix 1989, Collier & Collier 1991, p. 502- 506).52 Especially since the introduction of
the New Constitution in 1991 the situation has changed and party fragmentation and
50A good overview of the situation and reforms made in the field of taxation during the 1990s can be
found in Baca (2000).
51It is easy to imagine that sustained guerrilla activities have had a significant effect on economic de-
velopment in Colombia (Camacho & Rodriguez 2013). Still, the effect on tax composition might have
been limited. As guerrilla activities were far stronger in rural areas characterised by low development
and production (Holmes et al. 2006), the most relevant tax bases were not so affected. Moreover, by
comparing Colombia to Peru, this issue is at least partly controlled for because Peru also suffered strong
guerrilla activities during the period of analysis (Leon 2012).
52Collier and Collier (1991) describe the Colombian political system as ‘Electoral stability and social
conflict’ and Peru’s system as a ‘Stalemated party system’.
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electoral volatility have increased strongly. Besides being highly valuable from a nor-
mative and democratic perspective, the constitutional reform set new incentives that
distorted the stability of the political party system, weakened party organisation and in-
creased personalism in politics (Olivera et al. 2010, Dargent & Muñoz 2011, Mainwaring
2006). As a result, while Colombia had historically belonged to the most institution-
alised party systems in Latin America (e.g. Scully & Mainwaring 1995), analyses of
more recent periods of time point out that, since the 1990s, Colombia has been among
the rather less institutionalised countries in the region (Payne et al. 2006). For instance,
as an indicator of this growing instability, the vote share of the traditional parties has
rapidly eroded; while in the 1994 election, more than 90% of the votes went to two
parties that already existed in 1950 – partido conservador y liberal– , in 2010 it was only
10% (Table 2.4) .
Table 2.4: Vote share in Colombian Presidential Elections
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Liberal Party 56.4 49,5 41,0 58,4 47,8 45.3 34.6 31.8 11.8 4.4
Conservative Party 31,4 46,8 46,8 35,8 12,2 45.0 34.3 6.1
(Lib. P. + Cons. P.) (87,8) (96,3) (87,8) (92,2) (60,0) (90.3) (68.9) (31.8) (11.8) (10.5)
Mov. de Salvacion Nac. 23.7
Si Colombia 26.9 5.8
Primero Colombia 53.1 62.4 46.5*
Polo Democrático 22.0 9.2
Partido Verde 21.5
Only parties that received above 20% of the vote share at some election are listed.53
*2010 Santos won under the party label Partido Social de Unidad Nacional. This party can be
considered the same as Primero Colombia, the platform under which Uribe, formally an independent
candidate, ran in the 2002 and 2006 elections .
Sources: Dargent & Muñoz (2011, p. 104) and Center for Latin American Studies (2011)
531994 Alianza Democrática M-19 received a remarkable 3.8% of the vote. 2002 an alliance of left oriented
parties received 6.2% and 2010 Partido Cambio Radical 10.1% (Center for Latin American Studies 2011)
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This is not to say that parties were strong before the introduction of the New Consti-
tution and weak after that. Especially in the 1980s, but also before, Colombian parties
faced increasing party unity and cohesion problems as well as growing social disaffection.
However, they remained strong in terms of winning elections and controlling political
power. Since the New Constitution came into force, this ability has been weakening
gradually. Using Archer’s words, the constitutional change and the connected attack
on clientelistic networks definitely weakened the ‘deeply entrenched partisan loyalties
[that] gave the [traditional] parties a reservoir of support, so they could maintain control
over the electoral arena despite poorly disciplined and increasingly out of touch party
organizations’ (1995, p. 165).
Thus, although the Colombian political system had been able to provide reliable and
stable political interlocutors over a long period of time, this capacity was increasingly
eroded and, with it, the credibility of government when offering long-term agreements.
Colombia also stands out in Latin America in terms of strength of business organ-
isations (Schneider 2010a). The tradition of strong and broad business organisations
is long (Schneider 2010b, Doner & Schneider 2000). Historically, the most influential
business organisation in Colombia is the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros - Fedecafé
(Urrutia 1983).54 Other strong business organisations in Colombia are the Asociación
Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) and the Consejo Gremial, both of which
have gained more relevance over time and particularly since the 1990s.
The political support of these organisations is one of the factors explaining their
strength. Political actors explicitly supported the foundation of big peak organisations
(Urrutia 1983). Moreover Colombian business organisations received control over re-
markable resources which them to provide significant benefits to their members. This
did not only include highly privileged access to policy forums but also access to monetary
resources.55Therefore, joining these organisations was highly attractive for businesses,
54It is important to underline that, although it was a sectoral association, Fedecafe deals with a wide
range of activities from infrastructure development to marketing. In general ANDI, and Fedecafe are
seen as institutions that include major firms in other sectors (Schneider 2004).
55This is connected to how governments in Colombia delegated the management of large sums of financial
resources to the business organisations (Thorp & Durand 1997). The most extreme example of this
is the control by Fedecafe over the use of the resources generated by an specific export tax (Doner &
Schneider 2000, p. 264). Beyond competences, as a more objective indicator of the strength of business
organisations, Schneider (2010a) shows that Fedecafe and ANDI are the best-staffed organisations in
Latin America. Peru can be considered to be rather weak in this regard.
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if not in fact necessary if one wanted to succeed, and business organisations were thus
able to consolidate as stable and relevant actors. Moreover, besides their organisational
strength, ‘public and private elites in Colombia seem in most periods to be thoroughly
networked and interconnected’(Schneider 2010a, p. 229). Contact between politicians
and business organisations to discuss and communicate policy decisions have been com-
mon, systematic and institutionalised. Also, changing positions between the political
and the economic arena has not been uncommon. As a result, interaction and coordi-
nation among Colombian economic and political elites has been easier than in Peru.
Although the discrepancies between political and economic elites have been open and
on many occasions even fierce (as for instance during the negotiations about tax reform
in 1974 and 1986), dialogue between them has been maintained and in many cases it
was possible to find compromises.56 In this line, it is also remarkable how in the 1970s
and 1980s many business organisations presented themselves explicitly as caring for
nationwide concerns and how, rather than opposing reforms in principle, they tried to
lobby for changes while respecting the general logic of the reform efforts.57 In the post-
1991 institutional setting, the weaker executive and the increased party fragmentation
incentivised more particularistic and short-term oriented lobbying (Olivera et al. 2010).
58 Also, although it is safe to say that economic elites in Colombia remain fairly cohesive
and coordinated as compared to those in Peru (Schneider 2010a), the power of business
organisations to solve coordination problems is considered by some authors to have been
weakening since the 1990s as well (Rettberg 2005).
In line with the argument, the data show how the Colombian tax system has changed
the emphasis on the main sources of their revenue, especially by increasing the relevance
56There are a number of very appealing works assessing the Colombian tax reforms from an economic
perspective. Good accounts highlighting the political process behind these reforms can be found in
Ascher (1989), Perry & Cárdenas (1986) and Flores-Macías (2014).
57See, for instance, Urrutia (1983) on the positions of the business organisations during the tax reform of
1974.
58This suggests that party system stability might have causal priority over the strength of business or-
ganisations (Gerring 2005). As Schneider (2004, p.26-31) indicates, state actors can have incentives to
promote business organisations. It seems reasonable to expect that strategies used to achieve this goal
will be more efficient if relying on stable party systems. However, I would argue that stable party system
are not sufficient neither necessary conditions for the existence of strong business organisations. In this
sense, it seems reasonable that a positive correlation between the variables exists but the strength of this
relationship and whether it is causal is questionable. In fact, when discussing this potential relationship
concludes that “it is hard to tease out any systematic causal relationship between parties and business
associations, save their occasional competition for political investments by capitalists” (Schneider 2004,
p.53) . As a result, I contend that it makes sense to use both variables as separate independent variables.
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of indirect taxes and decreasing the reliance on the personal income tax, probably the
most progressive of the income taxes.59 Also, this deteriorating environment mirrors
in the fact that Colombia has had major problems to implement structural tax reforms
since the 1990s as the failed structural tax reforms in 1995 and 2006 testify(Olivera et al.
2010).60 Thus, in the context of increasing revenue needs associated to the expenditure
expansion during the 1990s, Colombian governments have tended to introduce numerous
smaller tax reforms driven by short term consideration. The extreme manifestation of
this logic has been the introduction of various taxes that were meant to be temporary,
although most of them actually became permanent over time (Olivera et al. 2010).61
The effect of reducing uncertainty
Peru and Colombia can be considered to represent extreme cases within the Latin Amer-
ican context with regard to the two variables proposed as being crucial for understand-
ing tax composition in developing countries: stable political party systems and strong
business organisations. While in Colombia strong business organisations have been his-
torically able and willing to cooperate proactively with the state, in Peru economic
elites have not only been strongly fragmented but have also have a strongly defensive
attitude towards the state. Despite growing similarities over time, government-business
relationships remain far more institutionalised in Colombia than in Peru, where the
coordination between political and economic elites is growing mainly at an individual
and informal level.62
The situation concerning institutionalisation of the political party system is similar.
At the start of the period analysed, differences among Colombia and Peru were substan-
59See discussion in section 2.4.2 and figures A2.4 and A2.5 in appendix C. The effect of some reforms on
the tax composition is particularly evident. So, for instance the effect of the structural tax reform 1986
which is known for its focus on strengthening the performance of income taxes is clearly identifiable. The
figures also show the increasing relevance of indirect taxes in the tax composition which are connected
to the gradual increases in the VAT rates during the 1990s (For details on these reforms see Gonzalez
& Calderón 2002, p.19-23)
60One recent exception is the tax reform approved in December 2012. Although with limitations this
reform is considered to be a structural reform (Salazar 2013).
61Since 2006 the main goal of the different tax reforms has partly changed. Before 2006 most reforms
aimed at increasing revenue. More recent reform have tried to rather simplifying the highly complex
system evolved especially since in the 1990s while having a neutral effect on overall tax collection(Salazar
2013)
62Note that informality provokes a vicious circle because “to the extent that businesspeople feel they have
sufficient access through informal networks, they will have weaker incentives to invest in other formal
channels like business associations or election campaigns” (Schneider 2010a, p. 229).
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tial. Colombia had a highly stable political system able to offer reliable and credible
negotiation partners for businesses, while Peru had the opposite situation. This has
changed over time. The situation in both countries is converging gradually due to in-
creasing instability and volatility in Colombia and an explicit effort in Peru to avoid its
historical ‘pendular policy shifting’ (Gonzales de Olarte & Samame 1991) in Peru.
The theoretical framework elaborated in this paper offers a plausible explanation of the
divergences in tax composition between Peru and Colombia. The institutional setting
to deal with the coordination and credibility problems faced by economic elites and
political actors when negotiating over long-term policy agreement was much stronger
in Colombia than in Peru. As a result, economic elites in Colombia had higher cer-
tainty and broader time horizons when bargaining over fiscal contracts. This enabled
the definition of fiscal contracts in which the economic elites were more predominantly
involved. In this line, the analysis supports the claim that strong business organisa-
tions and stable political party systems affect tax composition by reducing uncertainty
for economic elites about effectively receiving valued services from the government in
exchange for their tax contributions. In Peru, where these institutions were weak, eco-
nomic elites have been reluctant to pay a larger share of the tax burden, which has
led the government to use more regressive taxes intensively. In comparison, Colombia,
where the strength of the party system and business organisations enable long-term
negotiation horizons and the definition of compromises, has had a tax system strongly
reliant on income taxes. Also, in accordance to the argument: in Peru improved contex-
tual factors might explain part of the increased relevance of income tax in the tax mix,
although without any doubt much of the increase is driven by the price cycle of natural
resources. Given that Colombia has also enjoyed increased tax revenue from natural
resources – although in a less dramatic way – the modest decrease in the relevance of
income taxes suggests a lower contribution of more progressive taxes to the tax mix.
These developments are also in line with the proposed argument, as in Colombia the
stability of the political party system and the strength of business organisations have
decreased remarkably during the las two decades.
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2.5 Alternative explanations
There are a number of alternative explanations that might call into question the main
result analysed in the previous section. In this section, I discuss three different options:
reverse causality, omitted variables and the overall level of pressure for redistribution.
The concern about reverse causality implies that stable political party systems and
strong business organisations are not causes of the low relevance of the more progressive
tax types but consequence of it. Potentially, low performance of more progressive taxes,
might lead to an overall low collection of public revenue and a comparatively weak
state. A weak state would be far more easily affected by socio-political and economic
pressures which would lead to a more fragmented and volatile political scene. Also,
a weaker state would make the coordination of business less relevant and attractive,
affecting the strength of encompassing business organisations. With regard to the cases
analysed here, this concern appears to be minor. If historically any of the two states
analysed was stronger, it was rather Peru. Following the MoxLAD Database (Bértola
et al. 2003) since the end of Second World War until the beginning of this analysis (1946-
1969) Peru collected more revenue and had a stronger public sector than Colombia. The
average revenue collection by the central government between 1946 to 1970 was 8.8%
of GDP in Colombia while 14.2% in Peru. In terms of public expenditure and public
investment the differences are also remarkable. In Peru public expenditure represented
15.5% of GDP while in Colombia it reached only 9.5%. In this light, it seems that
the narrative of weak state leading to weak parties system and to poorly coordinated
business organisations does not explain the divergences observed between Colombia and
Peru.
Another concern is potential omitted variable problem. One could argue that the
existence of strong socio-economic cleavages might confound the analysis by affecting at
the same time the stability of the party system, the existence of encompassing business
organisations and the relevance of more progressive taxes. For instance, the existence of
large regional differences, confronting economic interests within the business community
or ethnic fragmentation might aggravate the coordination problems and limit the devel-
opment of stable political parties and encompassing business organisations. At the same
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time, these cleavages can limit the performance of more progressive tax instruments.
Yet, from a socio-economic perspective Colombia and Peru appear to be comparable
cases. As mentioned in the justification of the case selection, Peru and Colombia share
a common history and culture. Also in terms of ethnic and religious fractionalisation
the measures for both countries are comparable (Alesina et al. 2003). Furthermore,
both economies were historically similar. For example by the 1920 both were still
relatively underdevelopment for regional standards (Collier & Collier 1991, p. 85-91).
Industrial production has remained very low and while Colombia can be labeled during
many years as a mono-export economy based on coffee, Peru’s exports were mainly
connected to mining (Thorp & Durand 1997). In fact, if anything, the preconditions for
coordination among socio-economic actors can be expected to have been better in Peru
than in Colombia. In Colombia, the level of economic deconcentration was (and is) far
higher in Peru than in Colombia. While over time multiple regional poles developed
in Colombia, in Peru Lima always accounted for the vast majority of economic activity
(Collier & Collier 1991, p. 88) Given the results, this implies that the alleged omitted
variable seems not to represent a major concern.
The last alternative refers to the the idea that the level of pressure for redistribution
might have been different in both countries. It might be the case that the strength of the
democratic regime63 or the labor movements might have been far stronger in Colombia
than in Peru and that these factors, rather than the ones proposed in this chapter,
explain the different relevance of progressive taxes in the tax mix. In pure institutional
terms the history of democracy in Peru and Colombia is quite similar. Both countries
had their first democratic experiences in the middle of the 20th century. Also, before
the period of analysis both countries experienced a collapse of the democratic system
after a rather short democratic period (Boix et al. 2014). Also the index of democracy
developed by Vanhanen (2002) indicates similar trends in both countries in the period
between 1810 and 1990– before the Fujimori Regime in Peru. In this line, although
it is true that Peru suffered more political instability and Colombia was formally a
democracy for a longer period of time, the underlining level of democratic quality has
63For illustrations of the democracy and redistribution argument see for instance Boix (2003) and Ace-
moglu & Robinson (2006b).
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remained comparable.
Analysing the development of the labor movement is certainly also of interest in
order to capture the pressure for redistribution. Following Collier & Collier (1991)
the labor movement developed earlier and stronger in Peru than in Colombia. Also,
the labor movement developed a relatively higher degree of autonomy from political
actors in Colombia than in Peru were the APRA was able to control much of the leftist
organisations and political demands coming from that political spectrum. In this sense,
the labor movement had a stronger voice in the Peruvian case than in the Colombian
case where it played no pivotal role in the political game as it stayed mostly outside
the political arena. In this line, if anything, the Peruvian economic and political elites
should be considered to have experienced more political pressure from the left. All in all,
also this third alternative explanation does not offer a convincing narrative to explain
the divergences in the tax composition observed between Colombia and Peru.
2.6 Conclusion
Variation in tax composition among developing countries is high. This paper pro-
poses an institutional strength approach to explain this empirical phenomenon. Specifi-
cally, I claim that for countries to develop tax systems with a stronger emphasis on more
progressive taxes, they require stable political party systems and strong business organ-
isations. The intuition behind this argument is simple: In developing countries, due to
restricted administrative capacity, economic elites cannot be forced to pay taxes, even if
the government would be willing to do so. Thus, governments aiming at increasing the
relative or absolute tax contributions of economic elites need to bargain and convince
them that paying taxes is a good investment. To achieve this, limiting the uncertainty
that economic elites attach to the realisation of potential benefits in exchange for their
taxes represents a major challenge. The stability of party systems and the strength of
business organisations can substantially contribute to this goal. On the one hand, strong
business organisations increase cohesiveness among economic elites and allow them to
act as a unitary actor. On the other hand, stable party systems increase the reliability
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and credibility of the political counterpart and reduce the long-term uncertainty associ-
ated to potential political shifts. Hence, the stability of party systems and the strength
of business organisations will lead economic elites to accept higher tax contributions
and a larger share of the tax burden. This will be mirrored in a tax composition skewed
towards more progressive taxes.
The comparative analysis of the Peruvian and Colombian historical tax records sup-
ports this argument. Peru and Colombia show remarkable differences in terms of tax
composition that current theories are not able to explain. In contrast, the factors dis-
cussed above account well for the divergences of these two Latin American countries.
Although the effect might not appear to be particularly strong, it is relevant to under-
stand how difficult taxing economic elites is in developing countries and how little the
relative contribution of income taxes to total tax collection tends to be in developing
countries. Taking this into account, a difference of over 10% in the relevance of the
income tax in the tax composition no longer appears negligible.
Overall, the paper contributes to move the tax and development debate ‘beyond
the broad generalization that politics matter’ (Unsworth 2009, p. 886). Taxation has
a strong political dimension, and tax composition can be considered to reflect power
relations in a society. Thus, development cooperation should not approach this issue as
a merely technical challenge. The goal of higher performing and more progressive tax
systems will not be achieved against the interests of economic elites. In this context,
rather than increasing pressure on economic elites, bargaining is probably the most
promising avenue to raise their relative and absolute tax contributions. This paper
shows that this goal will require an institutional setting capable of offering credible
and reliable negotiation partners able to sustain more ambitious fiscal contracts over
time. Moreover, it points to two specific institutions that can play a central role in this
bargaining and which development cooperation can help to strengthen, namely stronger
business organisations and stable political party systems.
Future research could further evaluate the validity of these arguments by analysing
the experiences of additional countries. The case selection of this paper enabled a mean-
ingful comparison by controlling for many relevant variables. However, only additional
studies can enhance the generalisability of the results and the evidence basis to inter-
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pret the association between the variables as being causal. 64 Moreover, future research
could look into the question of whether, in different regions and regime types, other
socio-political institutions play the role of reducing uncertainty that I ascribed here to
political party systems and business organisations. Finally, the argument strongly sug-
gests an interaction between the two independent variables. When both – the intra-elite
cooperation problem and the governmental credibility problem – are solved, their effect
on the relevance of progressive taxes in the tax composition should be the strongest.
Although both variables are not necessary conditions they can be expected to have a
reinforcing effect on each other. The design of this current research was not able to test
this aspect. Proper testing of this interaction would require the analysis of case studies
covering different constellations of the independent variables. In addition, the argument
could be further developed by analysing how third conditioning variables might distort
the causal mechanism by leading strong and well coordinated business organisation to
use their position, not to proactively cooperate with the state, but to more effectively
resist higher taxation on wealthy actors. Cases such as Mexico and Chile might be
especially useful in this regard.
64The limitations in terms of generalisability are connected to the trade off between ‘comparability’
and ‘representativeness’ in case studies research (Gerring 2004, See for instance). The increase in
case comparability was at the cost of representativeness understood as “the degree to which causal
relationship evidenced (...) may be assumed to be true for a larger set of (unstudied units).” (Gerring
2004, p. 348). For the main goal of this paper, finding suggestive evidence of the plausibility of the
claim, the comparability of the cases was more relevant than their representativeness. Future research
properly testing the claim, whether in a quantitative or qualitative fashion, should actually contribute
to analyse the degree to which this argument travels to other contexts.
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Appendix:
A. Sources and description of the control variables listed in Table 2.1
• Agriculture, VA: Value added of agricultural sector as percentage of GDP (Source:
World Bank Development Indicators)
• Industry, VA: Value added of industrial sector as percentage of GDP (Source:
World Bank Development Indicators)
• Manufacturing,VA: Value added of manufacturing sector as percentage of GDP.
(Source: World Bank Development Indicators)
• Population < 15: Percentage of total population younger than 15 years (Source:
World Bank Development Indicators)
• Population > 64: Percentage of total population older than 64 years (Source:
World Bank Development Indicators)
• KOF Economic Index: KOF Index on Economic Globalisation. It works mainly
with two set on data: data on actual flows and data on restrictions (Source: KOF
Index of Globalization Dreher (2006))
• Trade (% of GDP): Trade as percentage of GDP (Source: World Bank Develop-
ment Indicators
• Urban population (% of total): Urban population as percentage of total population
(Source: World Bank Development Indicators)
• Economic growth: Economic growth of GDP (annual %) (Source: World Bank
Development Indicators)
• GDP per capita: GDP per capita (const. 2000 US$) (Source: World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators)
• Natural resources rents (% of GDP): Natural resources rents as percentage of GDP
(Source: World Bank Development Indicators)
• Gini Index: Market Income Inequality (Source: Solt (2014)
• Average years of schooling: number of years of formal schooling received, on av-
erage, by adults over age 15. (Source: Barro and Lee (2013)
• Size of the public sector: General government final consumption expenditure as
percentage of GDP (Source: World Bank Development Indicators)
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B. Operationalisation of the main tax variables:
Source of the data for Peruvian data is the Peruvian Central Bank. As income tax
I coded the categories ‘Impuestos a los ingresos’ (income tax). The inclusion of the
latter was based on the idea that this tax is also commonly accepted to be progressive.
As indirect tax I coded the categories ‘Impuesto general a las ventas (IGV)’ and ‘Im-
puesto selectivo al consumo (ISC)’. Trade Tax corresponds to the sum of ‘Impuesto a
las importaciones’ and ‘Impuestos a las exportaciones’.
Source for the Colombian Data is the National Planning Department - Departamento
Nacional de Planeacion (DNP). Two different databases are available. The first one
covers the period from 1950 to 2003. The second one covers the period from 1994 to
2010. For the period after 1994 I used newer one. Although differences between the
databases exist, these are marginal and choosing any of them for the overlapping period
would not change the results substantively. In contrast to the Peruvian source, the
first DNP document does not provided the ratio to GDP but only collection in local
currency units. For consistency one GDP series (GDP in Local Currency units- World
Bank Indicators) was used for the whole period of analysis. As income tax I coded
the categories ‘Renta y complementarios’ . As indirect tax I coded the categories ‘IVA
sobre bienes internos’, ‘Advalorem gasol. y ACPM’ and ‘Impuesto a las ventas’ (which
was replaced by the ‘IVA sobre bienes internos’ already listed in 1980). Trade tax has
it own defined trade tax category in the datasets.
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C. Additional Figures:
Figure A2.1: GDP growth and rents of natural resources as percentage of GDP in Peru
and Colombia
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Figure A2.2: Income tax collection as percentage of GDP in Peru and Colombia (1970-
2010)
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Figure A2.3: Trade tax collection as percentage of Total Tax in Peru and Colombia
(1970-2010)
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Figure A2.4: Income & Indirect Tax as percentage of Total Tax in Peru and Colombia
using local sources (1970-2010)
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Figure A2.5: Income & Indirect Tax as percentage of Total Tax in Peru and Colombia
using IMF data (1970-2010)
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Chapter 3
Taxing Higher Incomes: What makes high-income earners
consent to more progressive taxation in Latin America?∗
∗This chapter is co-authored with Sarah Berens (University of Cologne).
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Abstract
When do high-income earners get ‘on board’ with the fiscal contract and
accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? Progressive taxes perform
particularly poorly in developing countries, which suggests that high-income
groups are contributing little to sustain the public systems in these coun-
tries. We argue that the common opposition of the aﬄuent to more pro-
gressive taxation is not merely connected to the administrative limitations
of countries to coercively force them to pay, but also to the uncertainty that
high-income earners associate with the returns that they can expect as an
exchange for their tax contributions. In fact, because governments are not
able to force compliance from high-income earners via coercion, there is a
need to convince them to ‘invest’ in the public system via taxes. The notions
of trust and credibility in political institutions are decisive factors in shaping
the perceptions about whether paid contributions will be used in a sensible
manner, and thereby affect the acceptance of high-income earners to pay
taxes. Empirically, we study tax composition preferences of a cross-section
of Latin American countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for the
year 2012. Findings reveal that higher levels of trust in political institutions
strongly mitigate the opposition of the aﬄuent towards progressive taxation.
The results support the claim that the acceptance of paying a larger share of
the tax burden by high-income earners hinges upon the existence of a more
reliable and credible socio-political environment.
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3.1 Introduction
Taxation is a fundamental task of the modern state. Without sustainable domestic
public revenue the modern state as we know it would not be possible (Pierson 2011).
Nevertheless, the fact that taxation is perceived as being vital for modern politics does
not shield it from being an ‘inherently conflictual’ issue (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006b).
One main discussion in this regard is the question of how the burden of taxation is
distributed among citizens. Far from being a mere technical question, the decision
about how and especially whom to tax is highly controversial. Drawing upon this debate,
this paper focuses on understanding the conditions under which wealthy taxpayers in
developing countries accept more progressive taxation. In particular, we explore the
circumstances under which high-income earners get ‘on board’ the fiscal contract and
accept paying a larger share of the tax burden.
Augmenting tax contributions from high-income earners is crucial for developing
countries. Tax collection in low- and middle-income economies is very modest when
compared to industrialised countries. Taxing the market incomes of the poor and the
middle class, even assuming perfect compliance, does not lead to a sufficient amount of
public revenue to finance the public system in countries with massively skewed income
distribution and market incomes close to the poverty line (see Fairfield 2010). The
weaker revenue levels have remarkable implications for the countries’ economic outlooks
as well as the living conditions of many of its citizens. An increasing body of literature
in the field of development studies highlights the centrality of well-financed states for
development (Fjeldstad 2014). Interestingly, the remarkable gap in tax collection is
mainly attributable to particular taxes. Whereas regressive taxes - most prominently the
valued-added tax (VAT)- are performing well, the more visible and politically sensible
progressive taxes, as for instance the personal income tax, are lagging behind. Economic
and administrative considerations partly explain and justify a stronger emphasis on less
progressive tax types in these countries (see Keen & Simone 2004). However, given the
striking size of the gap, it evokes the intuition that, beyond technicalities, high-income
earners are simply not contributing a fair share to the overall tax effort.
Commonly, taxation is connected to coercion. Monitoring the wealthy in order
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to ensure that they pay their taxes is, however, a difficult task for governments in
many developing countries. Their administrative capacities are limited and increased
capital mobility and options to evade taxes over the last decades has made the work of
overstrained tax administrations even more difficult.65 However, to achieve a meaningful
increase in tax collection, governments in developing countries have to go “where the
money is” (Fairfield 2013), and exploit the widely under-tapped tax base that wealthy
taxpayers represent (see Goñi et al. 2011).
Against this background, the incapacity of governments to force high-income earners
to assume a larger share of the tax burden gives even more credence to the alternative
strategy for increasing tax contributions: the capacity of states to lure wealthy taxpay-
ers into “quasi-voluntary compliance” (Levi 1989). The fiscal contractualism literature
shows that a sustained tax effort needs a certain level of consent from those being taxed.
To achieve this consent, citizens and political actors need to agree on a fiscal contract
that defines a feasible exchange of goods for services. As Bird and Zolt highlight “tax
systems must, over time, represent in some sense the basic values of at least a mini-
mum supporting coalition of the population” (2013, p.30). The welfare state literature
provides arguments that support the claim that high-income earners can benefit from a
more encompassing tax system. In what they call the ‘paradox of redistribution’, Korpi
& Palme (1998) emphasize how a progressive tax system accompanied with a universal
welfare system is more efficient in reducing income inequality and poverty. Moreover,
when the state is better financed, it can increase public investment levels in the educa-
tion and health care sectors, which is also beneficial for the entire society in the long run,
and therefore incentive-compatible with the interests of the wealthy (Hossain & Moore
2002). Also, a well-financed state is key to solving coordination problems endemic to in
some of the major problems of developing countries, such as infrastructure development
(IMF 2011).
Considering this contextual challenge, we argue that rather than a lack of potential
benefits, it is the reliability of the supply side of the fiscal contract that limits the
acceptance of more progressive taxation by high-income earners. Along this line, we
65The extensive literature on tax evasion underlines this point (Schneider 2005, Schneider et al. 2010,
Djankov et al. 2002, Torgler 2005, Slemrod 2007, Loayza & Rigolini 2011, Berens 2014).
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consider that principal-agent and collective action problems lie at the core of the problem
of resistance to taxation. When the state is perceived as being unreliable in handling
tax revenue in a purposeful and sensible way, high-income earners will be less likely
to accept taxation in general and comparatively higher tax contributions in particular.
More precisely, we hypothesize that confidence in political institutions strongly mitigates
the opposition of high-income earners to progressive taxation. If political institutions
can assure these individuals that the revenue will be used properly and that all citizens
will contribute a ‘fair’ share to the tax effort, the opposition to more progressive taxes
should decline. If not, the opposition to progressive taxation will be high, even in
presence of numerous potential benefits.
From a methodological point of view, most of the increasing amount of literature on
taxation in developing countries has been focused on the macro level (e. g. Goñi et al.
2011). In this paper we concentrate on public opinion data, thereby adding a different
perspective to the topic. This is a crucial contribution, as this type of data allows for
testing more precisely the claims associated with the idea of consenting to taxation.
We investigate individual support for progressive income taxation in Latin America.
Latin America is a particularly interesting region in which to study our research ques-
tion, as tax schemes here are highly regressive, and specifically the wealthy are accused
of contributing too little (di John 2008). The endurance of the status quo of the tax
system is surprising, given the extensive experience with democratic electoral compe-
tition in the region, something that - following most models of redistributive politics -
should lead to higher levels of taxation on the rich (Meltzer & Richard 1981). More-
over, after having experienced very positive economic developments in the last decade
(OECD/Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)/ECLAC 2014), most countries in
this region have a large tax potential that remains unexploited as well as economic struc-
tures that allow for engaging in more rigorous uses of the personal income tax. Lastly,
from a more practical perspective, although data on progressive income taxation pref-
erences for developing countries are scarce, the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) has collected information on this issue. More precisely, LAPOP added a re-
sponse category to the 2012 survey round that asks respondents about their preferences
concerning tax progressivity (Americas Barometer 2012). This represents a unique op-
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portunity, as most cross-country surveys, especially those executed outside the OECD,
mainly rely on asking about tax-level preferences and individual tax morale, which is not
revealing as to preferences concerning about how the tax burden should be distributed
among the population. 66
We use logistic regression analysis with clustered standard errors and country fixed-
effects to test the theoretical prediction that confidence in political institutions strongly
mitigates the opposition of high-income earners to progressive taxation. Our results
support the hypothesis. The aﬄuent do not become supportive of progressive income
taxation at high levels of confidence in political institutions – which is not a very surpris-
ing finding – but it is only under these circumstances in which they do not express sig-
nificantly stronger opposition. Institutional trust at a systemic level is crucial, whereas
trust in specific public institutions does not have these mitigating effect. These find-
ings are robust to different model specifications and operationalisations of institutional
reliance and levels of income.
We proceed in eight sections. Following this introduction, section 3.2 describes the
fiscal systems in Latin America and their distributive effects. In section 3.3 we present
the academic debate on individual income tax preferences before developing and speci-
fying our argument. The econometric approach is introduced in section 3.4. Section 3.5
presents the main results which are complemented by robustness and sensitivity anal-
yses in section 3.6. We discuss specifically the country fixed-effects in section 3.7. In
section 3.8 we elaborate on the implications of our findings.
3.2 Tax systems in Latin America
Preferences concerning tax progressivity vary remarkably in the Latin American re-
gion.67 Yet, it is safe to say that, although differences between Latin American tax
66For instance Latinobarometro, World Values Survey and, more recently, Afrobarometer include questions
referring to the level of taxation and tax morale. These data have been analysed by Torgler (2005, 2004),
Ali et al. (2014), Daude et al. (2013), Daude & Melguizo (2010). Most of the studies include income
and trust as independent variables in the estimation. In general, they find mixed support for the
effect of income and more robust evidence supporting the idea that trust in political institutions has
a significant positive effect on the different dependent variables. To the best of our knowledge, the
interaction between both independent variables - the main focus of this paper- has not been explored
neither in reference to tax level preferences nor in reference to individual tax morale.
67Section 3.4.1 discusses this in detail.
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systems do exist, wealthy taxpayers face similar tax systems in all of these countries.
Recent studies on the Latin American tax systems agree that the fiscal policies of the
last decades have mostly led to regressive distributive effects (De Ferranti et al. 2004,
Goñi et al. 2011). Heavy reliance on consumption tax, low corporate and especially
personal income taxes, and massive levels of tax evasion have not contributed towards
combating the severe income inequality in the region.
The history of the tax system in Latin America is a history of increasing homogenisa-
tion. During the period of import-substitution industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s
most Latin American regimes actually promoted very progressive tax schemes, but be-
cause of weak administrative capacity “[s]tatutory progressive systems did not translate
into effectively progressive ones” (Sanchez 2006, p. 774).68 Already before, but espe-
cially after the debt crisis in the 1980s, countries in Latin America were urged to reform
their tax policies. The main goal was to simplify the tax system and to facilitate its
management for the weak tax administration.69As a result, the number and the level of
marginal tax rates of direct taxes decreased, and, indirect taxes, most prominently the
VAT, were significantly emphasised (see Sanchez 2006). The newly emerging neolib-
eral discourse, increasing pressure from globalisation and, most notably, the influence
of international finance institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
led efficiency concerns to be prioritised over distributive concerns when evaluating tax
reforms (Sanchez 2006). There was a change in the redistribution paradigm, which
blamed taxation for being a flawed instrument of redistribution. Instead, redistribution
was to be pursued through the expenditure side of the budget, most prominently by
improving targeting. Also, Latin American governments reduced corporate and income
taxes due to fears about capital flight in times of increased market integration and trade
liberalisation (see Wibbels & Arce 2003). These reforms of the 1990s led to tax systems
with regressive effects on the income distribution and low rates of public revenue (Goñi
et al. 2011, Gómez Sabaini & Jiménez 2012). Furthermore, in international comparison
these countries are identified to strongly rely on indirect taxation rather than direct
taxation, which makes up a much smaller share of overall taxation (Goñi et al. 2011).
68Original emphasis.
69An historical assessment of tax reforms in Latin America can be found in Tanzi (2013).
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The regional average for income tax collection as a share of total tax revenue is 28%
whereas it is 38% in the OECD. As for VAT the regional average in Latin America is
61% whereas it is only 41% in the OECD (Goñi et al. 2011). 70
Thus, the region’s tax systems are quite homogeneous already and are continuing
an intense process of convergence.71 As Gómez Sabaini and Jimenez highlight, “the tax
systems of the vast majority of Latin American countries share certain key character-
istics: the composition of their tax structures; the technical, economic, political and
administrative constraints they face; current trends in tax policy and administration;
and a high estimated level of tax evasion” (Gómez Sabaini & Jiménez 2012, p. 9).Over-
all, the fact that the countries in this region are so similar in terms of tax system design
allows controlling for this factor and focusing on how individual factors shape support
for more progressive taxation among wealthy taxpayers.
In addition, the focus on Latin America is particularly interesting because, in this
region, the performance of personal income taxes (PIT) is particularly low, and wealthy
taxpayers are consistently blamed for contributing to little and using political influence
to block reforms (di John 2008). But are wealthy individuals that opposed to progres-
sive taxation? And if yes, why? There are some general technical arguments against
progressive tax systems and a strong emphasis on the PIT. For instance, one of these ar-
guments comes from the classical economic literature which argues that taxation leads
to distortion, and thereby retards economic growth (Alesina & Rodrik 1994). Also,
the in Latin America the tax base for the PIT is small which supports the arguments
of those putting into question the redistributive capacity of this tax in the context of
this region (Goñi et al. 2011). Still, most observers agree that, rather than it being
a technical debate, getting wealthy taxpayers to pay more taxes represents a political
challenge. The main explanation for the low performance of progressive taxes is that
high-income earners will always oppose them as they anticipate bearing the costs but
not benefitting from the expenditures. But even accepting the often claimed ‘efficiency
70Most scholars would agree that, despite some exemptions on basic products (for a discussion, see Tanzi
2000), VAT has a regressive incidence, since low-income earners consume a larger share of their income
compared to the rich (Wibbels & Arce 2003, p. 115).
71The Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT) provides, for instance, extensive information
on the evolution of tax rates during the last two decades, which underlines this strong regional trend;
see http://www.ciat.org/index.php/en/products-and-services/ciatdata/tax-rates.html.
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loss’ of progressive taxation (Stiglitz 1987),72 a higher performance of progressive taxes
can liberate resources and have both socially and economically desirable effects. For
instance, having public revenue available that could not be reasonably generated by
government by further exploiting regressive tax bases, can enable public investment in
areas where developing countries often have major gaps, such as transport and energy
infrastructure. Also, the perception that the aﬄuent pay their fair share of taxes can
have positive effects on tax morale, tax compliance and social capital in general (Doer-
renberg & Peichl 2013). In fact, as will be argued, the wealthy can benefit greatly from
the activities enabled by paying higher tax contributions. The expectations about how
the tax money will be used – rather then the lack of potential benefits – would therefore
explain their opposition to more progressive taxes.
3.3 Theoretical framework
3.3.1 The main argument
Under which circumstances do high-income earners accept progressive taxation? The
general orthodoxy suggests that, in expectation of redistributive expenditure patterns,
taxpayers with incomes above the medium income should oppose taxation in general,
and progressive taxation in particular (Meltzer & Richard 1981, Romer 1975). If this
very simplified model captures the main impetus behind the decision to accept pro-
gressive taxes, this would have far-reaching implications for the implementation of pro-
gressive tax schemes in developing countries. Given the administrative constraints that
these countries face in trying to effectively and efficiently force high-income earners to
pay taxes, the ability to convince these taxpayers to voluntarily accept progressive tax-
ation appears to be the only alternative to increasing revenue collection through more
intensive use of progressive taxes.
We claim that, indeed, there is scope to offer high-income earners beneficial fiscal
agreements and convince them to accept progressive taxation. In particular, we argue
that opposition to progressive taxation is not primarily connected to an a priori lack
72For a discussion on the distributive and labor market effects of progressive taxation, see Røed & Strøm
(2002), who put into perspective the general orthodoxy of dead-weight loss effects of progressive taxes
(see also Fuest & Huber 2001).
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of potential benefits of taxation, but rather to the low level of credibility that high-
income earners tend to ascribe to political actors in developing countries in solving
different concerns. In this sense, the challenge of convincing high-income earners to
accept progressive taxation becomes preliminarily a game of credible commitment and
not one of coercion (Timmons 2010b).
When deciding whether to accept higher taxes on them, high-income earners have
two main concerns: How will my money be used? And will others also contribute to
the tax effort?73
The first problem can be conceptualised as a principal-agent problem. Taxpayers,
as principals, do have a very limited capacity to control the actions of politicians.
Consequently, the question of whether the governments can credibly commit to (implicit
or explicit) agreements and goals over the short- and the long term is crucial. Whereas
the ability to make credible promises is an issue for all governments, on average in
developing countries this ability can be expected to be even weaker due to higher levels
of political and policy instability (Lupu & Riedl 2013). The importance of credibility
will also be exacerbated because the time horizon required to fulfil the process in fiscal
policies –from tax contributions through public policy design and implementation to the
subsequent realization of expected benefits– is always particularly long (Ascher 1989,
p.419).
The second problem is a collective action problem. Although all taxpayers would
benefit from contributing to a common pool in order to enable more robust state action,
each individual taxpayer has an incentive to benefit from the outcomes without bear-
ing the cost (i.e. without paying the taxes). Especially high-income earners who are
supposed to contribute comparatively more should have greater concerns about other
taxpayers free-riding. If they fear that the contributions of others do not correspond to
what was expected, they will oppose the progressive tax.74
73Scartascini and Stein (2009, p. 2ff) refer to these problems in the discussion about fiscal outcomes in
general (before them and without a focus on Latin America, see von Hagen (2008)). Although these
questions are relevant for paying taxes in general. they can be expected to become even more relevant
when considering the decision to accept progressive taxes.
74Most literature on cooperation problems in fiscal bargains – and especially most literature on fiscal
federalism– focuses strongly on the common pool problem created by the incentives for politicians to
acquire benefits for their constituencies without making them bear the cost (Hallerberg & Marier 2004).
The aspect of cooperation problem between taxpayers has received far less attention so far.
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Overall, if high-income earners do not consider the political counterparts to be cred-
ible committed to addressed this concerns, they will always oppose any higher taxes on
them, no matter how attractive the offered services in exchange might be. This will be
the case regardless of whether the envisioned benefits are particularistic or not.
Along this line, we contend that the key to minimising these concerns of high-income
earners towards progressive taxation is trust in political institutions. If high-income
earners trust political institutions, they will be better able to anticipate what they
should expect in exchange for their higher tax contributions and to agree on bargains
involving long time horizons. On the one hand, trust in political institutions will mirror
their expectations that the activities of government officials which might potentially
deviate from the agreements will be monitored, and tax revenue will be used in a sensible
manner more generally . On the other hand, trust in institutions will also imply that
high-income earners can expect that attempts to free-ride will not be tolerated at the
political level.75 Only if there is trust in political institutions will the political apparatus
be capable of making ‘credible commitments’ (in the sense of North & Weingast (1989)
and high-income earners accept progressive taxation.
In support of this claim, other studies have substantiated the importance that indi-
vidual trust in the state plays for preferences on redistribution. As Berens (2014) illus-
trates, especially well-educated individuals consider the quality of public-goods provision
and the quality of public institutions when they make fiscal choices such as entering the
informal sector. Individuals also take into account the reliability of the state in their
redistributive preferences, according to the findings of Mares (2005). Moreover, Roth-
stein et al. (2011) emphasise that a reliable state is a prerequisite for the working-class
to mobilise in support of an expansion of the welfare state. Recent literature suggests
similar relations when it comes specifically to taxing the wealthy. Flores-Macías (2014)
provides first empirical evidence for our argument in his case study on the introduction
of a new wealth tax in Colombia in 2012. The article illustrates how the wealthy became
to accept paying a higher share of their income in response to the government’s strategy
of earmarking the revenue from the new wealth tax to security efforts. Alongside per-
75It might be a problem of capacity to implement this will. This is the reason why in the estimation of
our model in the empirical section, we control for perceived enforcement capacity of the state.
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ceptions of a major security threat, the author identifies the perception of the quality
of public goods (security in this case) and reliable relationships between business and
political actors as the central criteria that contributed to the economic elite’s consent
to be taxed more heavily. Moreover, research by Paler (2013) indicates that, once pub-
lic revenue is based on own tax contributions, the demand to monitor how it is used
increases. It appears that individuals care most about resources that come from their
own pockets rather than from abstract revenue sources.76 Although not part of Paler’s
experiment, it is easy to imagine that the acceptance of progressive taxation on oneself
leads to even greater motivation to control how it is employed. A high-income earner
paying a comparatively higher share of her income in taxes will tend to develop more
ownership over the government’s funds.77 This makes it even more important to have
an institutional environment in which high-income earners feel that they can reasonably
anticipate what they will get in exchange for accepting to be taxed more heavily.78
3.3.2 The limits of coercive taxation and the potential benefits of paying
progressive taxes
Our argument is based on the claim that in order to tax high-income earners, their
consent is essential. If coercion is the only strategy available for governments to tax
progressively, in practice this would dramatically constrain developing countries from
being able to use progressive taxes. Although it is a matter of degrees, developing
countries tend to have very limited administrative capacities to properly implement
progressive taxes against the wills of high-income taxpayers. This implies that if high-
income earners strongly resist taxation, we can expect that they will contribute little
to overall tax effort. Weak monitoring capacities make evading in many countries easy
76However, when information about usage is provided, individuals care equally about both resources from
tax revenue and windfalls.
77Paler’s analysis does not focus on the effect of individually paying more taxes on monitoring political
action but on the effect of a shift in the belief about the share of taxes paid by all citizens in total
revenue. The precise discussion of the potential causal mechanisms linking taxes and political action
can be found in Paler (2013, p. 720-722).
78This argument echoes the broader argument made by North & Weingast (1989). Their main points are
that institutional arrangements are crucial for improving the ability of governments to credibly commit
to agreements and that wealth holders make their lending to the government and their acceptance
of taxes conditional on this ability. They illustrate these claims by analysing the evolution of the
constitutional arrangements in17th century England and their impact on the access of the Crown to
funding.
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and thereby attractive (see Alm & Finlay 2013). On top of that, from a political
perspective, it is easy to imagine, that even if individual countries have the capacity
to force high-income earners to pay progressive taxes, the option to actually use this
coercive capacity is not be particularly credible. First, the incentives of governments
to use coercion against high-income earners will be heavily constrained due to the fact
that, in many settings, political and economic power tend to overlap. As Best points
out, even though “tax size and composition are primarily a reflection of political choice”,
this choice is one “weighted by power” (1976, p. 66). To stay in power, governments
commonly need the support (or at least acceptance) of a large proportion of the high-
income earners. As a result, we cannot expect these governments to be willing to push
too hard for progressive taxation if high-income earners themselves do not at least
tolerate more tax pressure. Second, even if the governments are willing to tax more and
more progressively, employing coercion to implement progressive taxes is economically
and administratively costly. At some point, the marginal cost of coercive tax collection
will exceed its marginal revenue benefits. Again, this problem will be exacerbated in
developing countries, as the weaker the capacities of the states, the earlier that the
net revenue collection of coercive taxation will be negative. Especially the coercive
implementation of progressive taxes may face this problem rapidly as it demands trying
to tax those best equipped to oppose and resist taxation.79
Therefore, consent to progressive taxation is particularly relevant for governments
with weak administrative capacities, as the ones included our sample (Levi 1989).80
But as Levi (1989), Alm et al. (1992) and others have shown using historical accounts
and laboratory experiments, consent to taxation will only arise if citizens expect to
receive valuable returns in exchange. The question is: What can governments – or
more generally states – offer high-income earners in exchange for accepting to pay
comparatively more taxes than other taxpayers?
In this regard, it is crucial to highlight that, as a first step, the decision to pay
79A number of studies show that an increase in the marginal effective tax rate increases the likelihood of
tax evasion (see, for instance Allingham & Sandmo 1972), so that an increase in income amplifies the
incentive to conceal income from the authorities (Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann 1996).
80Consent is connected to the more precise idea of ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ (Levi 1989, p. 52 ff) Our
argument does not refer to compliance to legislation but more generally to the acceptance of progressive
taxes. To avoid confusion between our focus and the broader tax compliance debate we restrict ourselves
to the concept of consent.
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taxes and in particular accept paying more taxes compared to other citizens with lower
incomes depends on the capacity of high-income earners to pass the burden of taxation
to low-income earners. The progressivity of the tax will determine how these costs are
distributed among the different taxpayers. All else being equal, the more progressive
the tax, the higher the relative contribution of the wealthy to the common pool. In
principle, high-income earners will prefer to keep their relative contribution as low as
possible. In the most extreme case, if they are able to receive the benefits associated
with better-financed states without having to bear the costs they will always oppose
progressive taxation (and, in fact, taxation in general). However, especially in develop-
ing countries, economic and political constraints limit the feasibility of augmenting the
revenue without relying more strongly on progressive taxes.81 Along this line, we assume
that bargains between the government and the high-income earners are independent of
the bargains between the government and other social groups and that, therefore, high-
income earners will need to pay for the envisioned state action themselves. In essence,
if the wealthy do not accept to pay more taxes, we presume that the revenue base will
not allow for financing state action from which the wealthy themselves may potentially
benefit.
Different strands of literature are increasingly pointing at the direct and indirect
benefits that the wealthy can receive in exchange for supporting a better-financed state.
At the most basic level, scholars in the tradition of the democracy and redistribution
literature, such as Acemoglu & Robinson (2006b) or Boix (2003) suggest that taxation
paid by the wealthy (we would argue especially progressive taxation) can be conceived
as a concession by the elites to avoid social revolt. Even if the additional revenue paid
by the high-income earners is used for redistributive expenditures, they will benefit
from the social peace and political stability that ensure their social position. Other
scholars closely connected to the literature on welfare states and the development of so-
cial systems have pointed to how high-income earners accept and support redistributive
fiscal policies – to which progressive taxation might belong – as long as they believe
81In many developing countries, the tax basis is small and highly concentrated. Also, the fiscal effort of the
poor in developing countries is already quite high (e.g. high rates of VAT), making it economically not
recommendable -but more predominantly politically very sensible -to further increase their contributions
(see, for instance Goñi et al. 2011).
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that they also benefit from the public goods provided (see most prominently Korpi &
Palme 1998). Along this line, specifically on developing countries for instance, Hossain
and Moore (Hossain & Moore 2002) show that it is actually only under these circum-
stances that economic elites support social expenditures in the health and education
sectors (see also Rudra 2008). Also, Moene and Wallerstein demonstrate that providing
public insurance “against risks that private insurance markets fail to cover” (Moene &
Wallerstein 2001, p. 860) is very much in the interest of wealthy actors. Overall, also
high-income earners can benefit from state action financed by taxes. Assuming there are
no alternative sources of revenue, this implies that there is scope to imagine instances
under which high-income earners accept progressive taxation and assume a larger share
of the tax burden in order to make the realisation of these benefits possible.
3.3.3 Empirical expectations
Our argument implies that trust in political institutions should mitigate opposition to
progressive taxation associated with higher levels of income. Higher income should be
associated with stronger opposition to progressive taxation in partocular when the level
of trust in political institutions is low. The argument developed above leads to the
following testable hypothesis:
H 1 The higher the level of trust in political institutions, the lower the
effect of higher income levels on the support for progressive taxation.
By contrast, there are few reasons to expect the poor not to support progressive
taxation.82 The credibility and competence they ascribe to the political institutions
might affect how much they are willing to pay in taxes. But this does not alter the
fact that they would like to reduce their relative contribution level to the common pool
and pass as much of the tax burden as possible on the high income earners. Hence,
progressive taxation will always be attractive for low income earners (see Barnes 2015).
82One possible situation would be that poor citizens perceive states to be more corrupt than economic
elites, and thereby prefer that even wealthy people do not pay taxes. An even more radical view would
be one in which poor taxpayers accept paying more than the wealthy in exchange for them holding and
investing their wealth in the country.
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3.4 Empirical setup
The focus of our analysis is the individual’s preferences on the progressivity of the income
tax. The 2012 survey round of the Latin American Opinion Project (LAPOP) added
a survey item that puts us in the unique position to assess this aspect. The item of
interest is part of a particular battery of questions asked in 10 Latin American countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
and Venezuela.83 The case selection covers countries with similar levels of economic
development in the range of middle- and upper-middle income countries. Moreover,
all 10 countries have experience with (mostly continuous) democratic processes and
structures.84
3.4.1 Tax composition preferences
The dependent variable – individual progressive income taxation preference – is derived
from the survey item (soc1), which provides the following hypothetical scenario for the
respondent: “For every 100 [local currency] that a rich person earns and 100 [local
currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in
taxes?”. Three answers are proposed 30-30, 40-30 and 50-20. The first number reflects
the rate the rich would be paying85. The first answer category denotes a flat-tax rate,
by which all individuals, regardless of their incomes, contribute the same share of their
incomes in taxes. The second and third answer categories refer to a progressive income
taxation scheme, which puts higher tax pressure on high-income earners. The middle
category can be labeled as offering a moderately progressive tax scheme and the third
option denotes a clearly progressive one.86 Based on the question’s framing, we assume
83The LAPOP usually covers almost all the Americas, including the Caribbean. However, this particular
question was asked only in this smaller set and only to respondents with an uneven survey number.
84The democracy status of Venezuela has declined during the last decade, and reveals tendentially au-
thoritarian structures at the time observed. To test the sensitivity of our findings, we therefore analyse
the model excluding Venezuela. The findings remain substantially the same. Estimation results are
shown in the Appendix (Table A3.4).
85(1) “The rich person should pay 50 [local currency] , and the poor person 20 [local currency]”, (2) “The
rich person should pay 40 [local currency], and the poor person 30 [local currency]” and (3) “The rich
person should pay 30 [local currency], and the poor person 30 [local currency]”.
86Please note that although the rate for the rich increases in each answer category , for poor individuals
the tax rate is constant for categories 1 and 2 and it decreases in the third category (from 30 in categories
1 and 2, to 20 in category 3). As a result, it is difficult to disentangle whether the poor’s support for
the 50–20 category is driven by making the rich pay more or by making themselves pay less. However,
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that respondents do not differentiate between revenue from wage labour and capital
when answering the question.
Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of the dependent variable progressive income
taxation preferences in the countries considered. A large share of individuals support a
moderately or highly progressive income tax. The distribution is, thus, skewed to the
left, especially in Chile and Colombia. In some countries, most prominently Venezuela,
Brazil and Uruguay, we find a two-peaked distribution, with a larger share of individuals
(scaling around 35% on average) supporting a flat-tax scheme. In this cases, the group
that prefers the progressive option still remains the largest group, amounting round
50% of the sample.
Even though the item is categorical in nature, the clustering at the two ends of
the distribution speak to a dichotomous solution. Consequently, we create a dummy
variable that is coded as 1 if the individual supports one of the two progressive income
tax schemes (the 30-40 and the 50-20 categories), and as 0 if the individual expresses a
preference for a flat tax (corresponds to the 30-30 category).87
3.4.2 Independent variables: Income and trust in institutions
First of all, we expect the level of income to affect individual preferences on the progres-
sivity of the income tax. LAPOP asks the respondents to indicate an income bracket
(providing 17 categories based on “the distribution of the country”) that reflects their
individual income situation. These income brackets differ across countries meaning com-
parability between countries is limited. Besides comparability issues, income questions
usually suffer heavily from non-response and misreporting. Instead of using these income
brackets, we therefore rely on the respondents’ information on asset ownership. Using
information on household assets in order to assess individuals’ income is a common pro-
cedure in public opinion and household surveys conducted in low- and middle-income
economies (see Filmer & Pritchett 2001, Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006, Howe et al. 2008,
Berens 2015). Concretely, LAPOP asks respondents to indicate if they possess items
this does not represent a major problem for our analysis, as we focus on the determinants under which
the wealthy accept higher taxation on themselves.
87We estimate a probit and a logit model and perform a Brandt test to scrutinize the most appropriate
functional form. The results indicate that the logit model has a superior model fit.
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Figure 3.1: DV: Tax composition preferences by country: original coding
25.04
14.04
60.91
16.09
22.97
60.94
17.42
10.8
71.78
20.83
13.7
65.48
23.29
12.43
64.27
12.91 12.39
74.69
31.06
14.31
54.62
34.41
14.01
51.58
42.21
11.27
46.52
19.18 17.24
63.58
0
20
40
60
80
0
20
40
60
80
0
20
40
60
80
30-30 40-30 50-20 30-30 40-30 50-20
30-30 40-30 50-20 30-30 40-30 50-20
MEX GTM CRI COL
PER CHL URY BRA
VEN ARG
40-30: rich pay 40, poor pay 30
50-20: rich pay 50, poor pay 20
30-30: rich pay 30, poor pay 30
Legend:
Pe
rc
en
t
Note: Item wording: “For every 100 [local currency] that a rich person earns and
100 [local currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should
each pay in taxes?”
such as, for instance, television, car, computer, cellphone or washing machine.88 Based
on this asset-ownership information we create a wealth index by applying multiple cor-
respondence analysis (MCA). MCA is similar to principal component analysis (PCA),
which reduces complex information into an indicator, but it is more approapiate here
as asset items are mostly coded as dichotomous variables (for a discussion on MCA and
PCA see Howe et al. 2008).89
The first dimension of the MCA explains most of the variance, so we use it for the
wealth indicator.90 As we are interested in the differences in income tax progressivity
88The full list contains the following assets: TV, refrigerator, telephone, cellphone, car, multiple cars (2, 3
or more), washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bath, computer, internet,
flat TV, sewage system. Arguably, the value of some of these objects differ between a country’s center
and periphery. Having internet at home might be more expensive in rural areas compared to cities. We
therefore add a control for living in urban areas in the estimation model.
89Only the item ‘car’ differs from a dichotomous answer category. Individuals can indicate to own ‘one’,
‘two’ or ‘three or more’ cars. We create a new item, ‘multiple cars’, which equals one if the individual
owns two or more cars. The item ‘car’ is recoded so that the value one refers to owning one car and
zero for not owning any. The reliability coefficient of the asset items is 0.758.
90To test the reliability of the wealth indicator, we regress it on a set of other items related to the individ-
ual’s income situation, such as the income brackets (q10new), class identity (mov1) and the individual’s
perception of her economic security (q10d). The wealth indicator positively predicts belonging to higher
income brackets, social classes or to feeling less economically at risk at the highest level of significance.
78
Chapter 3
preferences of high-income earners compared to less-aﬄuent individuals, we create three
wealth groups based on the distribution of the wealth indicator within each country,
and subsequently refer to the poor, the middle and the aﬄuent. Following Heinemann
& Hennighausen (2015) we use quartiles. The lowest 25% of the wealth indicator re-
flect the poor. The middle wealth group covers the second and third quartiles -ranging
from 25% to 75% of the wealth indicator- whereas individuals who rise above 75% of
the indicator are considered aﬄuent.91 Adding the wealth groups to the distribution
of our dependent variable shows that the poor have a stronger preference for progres-
sive taxation compared to the aﬄuent. Figure 3.2 illustrates the distribution for the
dichotomised dependent variable.
Our theory predicts that the effect of the individual’s objective wealth, on their level
of consent for progressive taxation is conditional on the individual’s confidence in the
state to be a reliable player in the public goods game. We operationalise the individual
attitude towards public institutions with item B2, which asks the respondents about
their respect for political institutions (“to what extent do you respect the political
institutions of (country)”).92 The categorical scale ranges from 1 to 7, with higher
values meaning greater respect. The item covers a broader concept of the respondent’s
general attitude towards (or image of) the state. We assume that individuals have a
vaguer understanding about the state and public institutions, which steadily evolves
over time through multiple experiences and interactions with the ‘state’ (e.g. with
public officials in bureaucracy, via media coverage about governmental actions, etc.).
The term ‘respect’ adheres to the individual’s assessment of the state’s reliability and
functioning, as one can hardly assume that an individual holds an institution that follows
arbitrary and intransparent rules in high regard (e.g. when corruption and clientelism
are present). However, one could argue that ‘respect’ can also resemble ‘fear’, which
However, our asset indicator does not fully overlap with the more conventional income measures, which
is not surprising, as both are measuring different aspects of the individual’s economic situation (see
Filmer & Pritchett 2001).
91Other studies support the argument that these groups largely match the groups bearing the tax burden
of the PIT in Latin America. Amarante & Jiménez (2015, p. 35–37) analyse the incidence of the PIT
in Latin America for the year 2011 and show how almost all of the PIT burden falls on the top two
deciles (approximately our aﬄuent group). The study also shows how the contributions of the four
lower deciles (approximately our poor group) is generally extremely low, if not absent. Information on
nine of the countries in our sample (all except Guatemala) is available in the study.
92In Spanish: “Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)?” (LAPOP
2012, B2).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of progressive income tax preferences by wealth group and
country: Dichotomous coding of the DV
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would allude to a powerful state that does not necessarily follow a democratic rule of
law. We refute this claim, as the Spanish connotation of ‘respeto’ very much points to
the individual’s regard of the state in a positive sense. A high level of respect for the
country’s political institutions thus reflects a belief that the performance of the political
institutions is somewhat ‘just’. It is this type of respect that is important for taxation
preferences: perceiving political institutions as unreliable should reduce the willingness
to entrust them with more tax revenue.
Besides the individual’s institutional respect, we also consider a broader measure
for the individual’s institutional ‘trust’. Trust and respect are closely related concepts.
But whereas our ‘institutional respect’ measure captures the individual’s diffuse image
of political institutions, we capture the individual’s assessment of a set of institutions in
our ‘institutional trust’ measure.93 We calculate an ‘institutional trust’ index with the
use of principal component analysis (PCA) based on the underlying dimension of indi-
93We use the terms ‘institutional trust’ and ‘institutional respect’ only to differentiate between the two
different measurements.
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vidual responses to all items that inquire about the respondents ‘trust’ towards public
institutions. LAPOP asks the respondent about her trust in the justice system, political
parties, the national legislature, national police, supreme court, political institutions,
the likelihood of a fair trial in a judicial process and the likelihood that ‘citizen’s basic
rights are well protected by the political system’.94 The items reflect all parts of the
public system, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. We use the predicted
values of the first dimension of the PCA, as it carries the most explanatory power. The
‘institutional trust’ measure, thus, relies on more information, while the ‘institutional
respect’ measure captures more precisely the assessment of the individuals when asked
explicitly about political institutions as a more general category.
3.4.3 Controls
Taking into account the literature on redistributive preferences and the recent contribu-
tions on tax preferences (Barnes 2015, Heinemann & Hennighausen 2015), we add a set
of control variables.This includes standard controls such as age95, gender (female), and
years of education. We also control for the respondent’s employment situation (public
employee, unemployed, non-employed, retired; ‘employed’ serves as reference category).
96 Similar to income, higher education should lower preferences for a more progres-
sive tax system, as education influences the chances of higher earnings.97 In line with
the literature on preferences for redistribution we also control for household size and
marital status (Alesina & La Ferrara 2005). The rationale for this is that the married
and people with children will anticipate benefitting from state expenditures financed
94We run a PCA analysis on the following LAPOP items: B1, B2, B3, B10a, B13, B18, B21 and B31.
We deliberately exclude items that ask the respondent to indicate trust in the current government (e.g.
trust in the president), elections and media, as we are interested in the long-term perception of public
institutions. All items range from 1 to 7 - higher values meaning greater level of trust. Different criteria
support the one component solution.
95As one could think of a non-linear effect of age, such as support for progressive income taxation among
younger individuals and a declining consent to progressive taxation with increasing age, we test how far
age squared influences the dependent variable. As the coefficient is not significant, we drop the squared
term from the analysis to give priority to a parsimonious explanation.
96The non-employed group comprises students and respondents engaged in housekeeping.
97However, as Barnes (2015) argues, individuals who received higher education paid by the state might
have an intrinsic motivation to return this investment via taxation. This would imply that more educated
individuals would be more willing to pay higher taxes on their incomes . Whether this premise works
for the low- and middle-income country context as well is still open for investigation. Especially tertiary
education is mainly available to the social elites in Latin America, reinforcing the hierarchical social
structure. It is therefore possible that the well-educated would prefer to keep the system as closed as it
is and therefore in this setting education has a negative effect.
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by higher revenue or benefitting from specific legislation liberating them from higher
tax pressure. Indeed, as Barnes (2015) emphasises, there are horizontal differences in
one income group when marital status and the number of children are considered. The
magnitude of the effect should however decrease given the weakness of welfare states
in our sample. Also, sharing a household with a low-income earner might spur sup-
port for progressive taxation (Heinemann & Hennighausen 2015, p. 23). Unfortunately,
LAPOP does not gather further information about the income levels of people living
in the respondent’s household. However, this is a minor concern in our analysis, as the
construction of the wealth indicators rely on dimensions that capture household wealth
rather than individual wealth. Moreover, we add a control for living in either urban or
rural areas, as the experience with public institutions might vary in these contexts as a
consequence of the unequal reach of the state (Harbers 2015, see discussion in).
Furthermore, we add attitudinal variables such as political ideology and fairness
perceptions about deservingness of public goods in order to hold constant the individ-
ual’s belief system. (see Heinemann & Hennighausen 2015, for the high-income country
context). Left-wing voters are much more likely to support progressive taxation. Be-
cause of a large number of non-responses on this item, we use privatization preferences
as a proxy for political orientation. 98 Moreover, we consider the individual’s belief
system regarding the question of distributive justice when it comes to welfare benefits.
To do so, we employ the item cct3 which asks the respondent to indicate how much
the respondent agrees with the statement that “people who get help from government
social assistance programs are lazy”. Thereby we capture the degree to which they ad-
here to a welfare provision based on the principle of equity or need (see Reeskens & van
Oorschot 2013, p. 1). Furthermore, we hold constant the individual’s social mobility
experience. An expectation of becoming rich in the future can dampen preferences for
progressive income taxation (Piketty 1995, Benabou & Ok 2001). In this regard item
IDI02 captures the individual’s experience with social mobility by asking the respon-
98It is well researched that the private-public cleavage is strongly attached to the left-right orientation (see
Wiesehomeier & Doyle 2012). LAPOP elicits privatization preferences of the respondent, asking if the
“government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of
the country” (Item ROS1). Preferences are coded in a scale from 1 to 7. The original scale is reversed
to facilitate interpretation- in our estimations lower numbers denote support for a strong role of the
state in the economy. In the robustness section we also estimate the model including variables for ‘left
ideology’ and preference for redistributions.
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dent about her economic situation 12 months ago. The categorical item offers three
options: decreased, (that we label downward mobility), stayed the same (status quo)
or increased (upward mobility experience; downward mobility serves as reference cate-
gory). To address the concern that the impact of having greater institutional respect on
progressive tax preferences only captures the individual’s perception that the state has
higher enforcement and monitoring capacities we add a proxy for enforcement capac-
ity.99 Finally, we control for country specific characteristics via through using country
fixed-effects.100
3.4.4 Model
The left-hand side of the equation presents progressive income taxation preferences.
As Figure 3.1 indicates, the distribution of observations is skewed to the left, meaning
that already the descriptive investigation promotes the use of a dichotomous variable
(1=progressive, 0=flat tax).101 Thus, a logistic regression is applied. We add country
fixed-effects ηj for j countries (Argentina serves as reference category) in order to control
for country-level factors such as the welfare system or level of corruption.102 Overall,
we use the following specification:
Pr(yi = 1) =logit−1(αi + β1wealth groupi + β2institutional trusti
+ β3wealth groupi × institutional trusti
+ βiXi + ηj + εi)
99Preciselly it is item B1 which asks about trust in the justice system. The variables is coded in a scale
from 1 (= low) to 7 (= high). The item is only included in models that use institutional respect as
independent variable as item B1 is part of the PCA measure of institutional trust.
100An overview of descriptive statistics and correlation matrix can be found in the Appendix (Table A3.1
and Table A3.6).
101The DV ranges on a scale from 1 to 3, but the distance between the categories are not necessarily
equal (Long 1997), so that one could consider an ordered probit regression. The Brandt test indicates,
however, that the logit model leads to a better model fit.
102The reduced number of countries included in the sample deprives us from the possibility to apply
hierarchical modeling techniques (see Gelman & Hill 2007). This would be especially appealing to
estimate the effect of country-level variables which is, however, not the main interest of this paper. Our
interest rests on the individual’s perception of institutional reliability and not the objective performance.
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3.5 Results
We display the results of our estimations as logistic coefficients in Table 3.1. The average
probability of preferring income tax progressivity based on the average observation of
the parameters in the model is 61%. Treating all individuals as if they were poor
leads to a predicted probability of 63%, in contrast to 59% for the aﬄuent, holding
all covariates on average. The interaction terms for the wealth groups and respect for
political institutions (M1) support our hypothesis. Opposition to progressive income
taxation declines with increasing levels of confidence in political institutions for the more
aﬄuent individuals. The aﬄuent become less opposed to progressive income taxation
the more positive they are about the reliability of public institutions.103
Table 3.1: Logistic regression: Progressive income tax preferences
Dependent variable: Progressive income tax preference
(M 1) (M 2) (M 3) (M 4)
Wealth group
Middle -0.481** -0.049
(0.155) (0.137)
Aﬄuent -0.626* -0.090
(0.275) (0.073)
Class identity
Lower middle class -0.546+ -0.099
(0.328) (0.127)
Middle class -0.596* -0.308*
(0.263) (0.131)
Upper middle class -0.987** -0.235
(0.353) (0.214)
Upper class -1.898*** -0.802*
(0.340) (0.329)
Respect in pol. inst. -0.117*** -0.108*
(0.028) (0.043)
Institutional trust -0.064** -0.073*
(0.024) (0.037)
Interaction terms
Continued on Next Page. . .
103To assess possible problems of multicollinearity we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF). The
results are not especially worrisome. The mean VIF value for Model 1 is 5.97; for Model 2 it is 3.22;
for Model 3 it is 6.42 and for Model 4 it is 3.05. This indicates that the correlations between the
predictors are moderately high. Yet, the values are certainly low if we consider that the mean VIF
includes the variance inflation factors of all constitutive terms of the interactions, which per definition
are high. To further test the stability of the results and assess problems of multicollinearity, we estimate
a parsimonious model including only the main independent variables of interest. Results can be found
in Table A3.2 in the Appendix. The main effects hold also in these specifications, which suggests that
multicollinearity should not be a major concern.
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Middle × Attitude variable 0.094* 0.021
(0.041) (0.040)
Aﬄuent × Attitude variable 0.117* 0.080+
(0.047) (0.045)
Lower middle class × Attitude variable 0.093+ 0.050
(0.053) (0.043)
Middle class × Attitude variable 0.062 0.057
(0.042) (0.049)
Upper middle class × Attitude variable 0.159* 0.080
(0.078) (0.098)
Upper class × Attitude variable 0.228*** 0.094
(0.069) (0.149)
Controls
Female -0.012 0.008 -0.015 0.010
(0.061) (0.066) (0.062) (0.067)
Age 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of edu. -0.023+ -0.024+ -0.018 -0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Employment situation
Public employee 0.221*** 0.205** 0.224*** 0.213**
(ref: employed) (0.062) (0.067) (0.064) (0.068)
Unemployed 0.043 0.032 0.057 0.041
(0.146) (0.158) (0.151) (0.165)
Non-employed -0.002 -0.013 0.014 -0.004
(0.084) (0.092) (0.085) (0.093)
Retired 0.173 0.157 0.168 0.158
(0.161) (0.153) (0.164) (0.155)
Mobility experience
Status quo -0.069 -0.044 -0.042 -0.019
(ref: downward mobility) (0.087) (0.091) (0.095) (0.098)
Upward mobility -0.179+ -0.148 -0.126 -0.098
(0.102) (0.096) (0.109) (0.102)
Household size -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Married -0.022 -0.047 -0.024 -0.048
(0.047) (0.053) (0.046) (0.051)
Urban -0.286** -0.281** -0.275** -0.273**
(0.098) (0.106) (0.088) (0.099)
Fairness perception -0.054* -0.056* -0.053* -0.054**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Privatization preference -0.048 -0.049 -0.047 -0.048
(0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)
Enforcement capacity 0.001 0.005
(0.012) (0.011)
Constant 1.972*** 1.442*** 2.004*** 1.517***
(0.345) (0.312) (0.387) (0.332)
N (individuals) 5991 5757 5991 5757
N (countries) 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.038
ll -3866.03 -3721.71 -3854.85 -3712.60
BIC 7810.1 7522.2 7788.0 7503.1
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Coefficients for country fixed effects are not displayed.104
104Section 7 focuses on the discussion of country fixed-effects
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In order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimation results, we illustrate the
interaction terms using average marginal-effects plots separately for each wealth group
(Figure 3.3) with 90% confidence intervals and histograms for the income-group-specific
distribution of the independent variable ‘respect in political institutions’.105 Figure 3.3
illustrates how increasing levels of respect for political institutions mitigate the op-
position of the aﬄuent to progressive income taxation. Whereas aﬄuent individuals
significantly oppose progressive income taxation when their level of institutional re-
spect is low, antagonism towards income tax progression associated to belonging to
this wealth group declines when institutional respect is high. At the highest level of
institutional respect, the wealthy even support progressive income taxation. The effect
is robust to the inclusion of the control variable on the individual’s perception of the
state’s enforcement capacity. Thus, the ‘institutional respect’ effect is not driven by the
fact that greater respect simply means that individuals perceive there to be a higher
likelihood of being caught when evading taxes.106 In this specification, the effect is very
similar for the middle wealth group. However, as will be shown, this result is not robust
to alternative specifications, whereas the effect for the aﬄuent is.
For the broader ‘institutional trust’ variable, estimation results are shown in Model 2
and in Figure 3.4. The middle wealth group is unresponsive to institutional trust in this
specification, whereas the effect for the aﬄuent wealth group remains substantially the
same as in Model 1. Again, the aﬄuent become indifferent towards progressive income
taxation only when they express having higher levels of general institutional trust. The
findings, thus, echo our previous results. Holding a general notion of trust towards the
public institutional system mitigates opposition towards progressive income taxation
among the wealthy. Along this line, we find strong evidence supporting the mitigating
effect of institutional trust for the aﬄuent wealth group and a rather inconclusive result
for the middle wealth group. Surprisingly, we also detect strong evidence for a negative
effect of institutional trust for the wealth group of the poor. Regardless of whether we
employ institutional respect or the broader measure of institutional trust as mitigating
variables, in all estimations, higher institutional trust has a negative effect on the sup-
105We display the distribution of the independent variable ‘respect for political institutions’ for each wealth
group as histograms in Figure A3.3 in the Appendix.
106Also, interacting wealth group and enforcement capacity does not show a significant effect.
86
Chapter 3
Figure 3.3: Average marginal effect of wealth group at different levels of respect in
political institutions
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Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 90% confidence interval.
Histograms show the sample distribution of the mitigating variable for the specific wealth group.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded). 
port of the poor for progressive income taxation (see, for instance, Figure A3.4 in the
Appendix). An explanation for this result might be that whereas, from the aﬄuent’s
perspective, the tax rate attributed to each response categories are straightforward as
they increase for them gradually (either 30%, 40% or 50%), from the poor perspective,
the implications for the poor when selecting a response are much less clear (either 30%
in the categories ‘30-30’ and ‘30-40‘or 20% in the progressive category ‘20-50’). In fact,
it might be the case that, similarly as we argue for the rich, the poor are willing to
pay more when institutional reliance is high. In this case, however, this is expressed in
the preference for the flat-tax or the moderately progressive response category . In this
sense, a limitation of our DV measure is that we cannot identify whether respondents
belonging the the ‘poor’ choose their response according primarily to reducing their bur-
den or increasing the one of the aﬄuent. This is much less problematic for the group
of high-income earners, as it is less likely that they would choose the 20-50 response,
driven by moderately reducing the burden of the poor (20 instead of 30) irrespective of
themselves paying substantively more in this category.
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Figure 3.4: Average marginal effect of class identity at different levels of institutional
trust (PCA)
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Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 90% confidence interval.
Histograms show the sample distribution of the mitigating variable for the specific wealth group.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded). 
But assuming for a moment that the poor do indeed become less supportive of
progressive income taxation the higher their reliance on institutions, this might be
explained by the fact that, for the poor, trust in institutions might be a strong indicative
of satisfaction with the amount of support received. Whereas those whose expectations
are disappointed and who feel they should receive more support are also those who
demand higher tax contributions from the aﬄuent.107 Also, the poor might associate
more strongly trust in political institutions, trust in the market and trust in their own
capacities to succesfully escape poverty and change their situation without needing to
rely on the support of the state. If this is the case, we should expect that low-income
earners who have a high level of institutional trust tend to support a more neutral
tax system that would not penalise their own success.108 Unfortunately, none of these
107This argument is in line with research on welfare preferences in the OECD. For instance, van Oorschot
and Meuleman (2012) show how perceived performance of the welfare system has a negative effect on
welfare support.
108Along this line Edlund and Lindh (2013) propose that, in order to understand support for the wel-
fare state, the key is not only trust in state institutions but how much individuals trust the state in
comparison to alternatives, such as the market, to produce social welfare.
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plausible explanations for the negative effect of institutional trust on the preferences
of poor individuals for progressive income taxation can be tested properly with the
available data.
Arguably, an individual’s objective income or wealth situation does not always fully
overlap with their subjective income perceptions (see Lora & Fajardo 2013), meaning
that some of the respondents that we identify as belonging to the richest 25% of the
wealth distribution will not consider themselves to be aﬄuent. We therefore take into
account the individual’s self-identification in social classes. Even though class identity
is becoming much less of a cleavage in Latin America, as Roberts (2002) discusses,
personal income is not necessarily substituting for class identity (see Berens 2015).
When asking the respondents for self-placement, LAPOP offers the following responses:
lower class, lower middle class, middle class, upper middle class and upper class.109
. Comparing our wealth measure to the self-placement in social classes shows only a
moderate overlap: 18% of the respondents that we identify as poor indicate belonging
to the middle class, whereas 25% of the middle wealth group identify themselves as
being in the lower class, for instance. The findings of the regression analysis support
our previous results (Table 3.1 Model 3 and 4). Plotting the average marginal effects
for the interaction term including ‘class identity’ and ‘respect for political institutions’
in Figure 3.5 illustrates that the main tendency in all groups is similar and in line
with the hypothesis: respect for political institutions mitigates resistance to progressive
income taxation among those who perceive themselves as belonging to the wealthier
classes. Yet, although the effect is strong for the upper middle and upper class, it is
far more modest for the other middle class groups. Thus, in contrast to what might
have been expected, the mitigating effect is absent or very weak for those who belong
to the ‘vulnerable class’ squeezed in between the very rich and the poor (Bird & Zolt
2013, p.8) and strong for the upper classes. This is surprising, as the middle class is
commonly considered the group that could potentially gain the most from a more active
and better financed-public system.110
109Item MOV1: “Would you describe yourself as belonging to the ... (1) Upper class (2) Upper middle
class (3) Middle class (4) Lower middle class, or (5) Lower class? (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A”
110Although the results for the general institutional trust measure are similar and the class-specific effects
and tendencies are similar to those discussed in the main text, the mitigating effect in this specification
is far weaker, and for most classes the marginal effect of class identity is only statistically significant for
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Figure 3.5: Average marginal effect of class identity at different levels of respect in
political institutions
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Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 90% confidence interval.
Histograms show the sample distribution of the mitigating variable for the specific wealth group.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded).
Before we move on to the robustness section, the estimated effects for particular
control variables deserve further discussion. With increasing age, individuals tend to
become more supportive of progressive taxation. This effect might be linked to retire-
ment preferences of the individual once the individual has crossed a peak of labour
activity, even though the coefficient for the employment status ‘retired’ is insignificant.
The only influential employment status for progressive income taxation preferences is
public employment. The finding is in line with empirical findings for the high-income
country context of Heinemann & Hennighausen (2015) and Barnes (2015). Moreover,
progressive income taxation preferences decline with increasing levels of education. As
Barnes (2015) illustrates, academics hold strong views on tax policies. Some scholars
argue that having benefited from the public education system, individuals could be ex-
pected to become more supportive of the idea of returning this investment. However,
in our analysis we find the opposite: The more educated are less in favor of progres-
very small ranges of institutional trust.
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sive taxation. Furthermore, neither marital status nor the number of children have a
significant effect on tax composition preferences.
In line with our theoretical expectations, the coefficient for fairness perception shows
that individuals supporting the idea that recipients of governmental transfers are lazy,
oppose progressive income taxation (predicted probability is 57%, compared to 65%
for individuals supporting the opposite view). Moreover, having experienced upward
mobility in the past also exerts a strong impact on income tax preferences. An upward
mobility experience decreases support for progressive income taxation, which might be
explained by the increase in the individual’s income and also by the expectations of
further improvement. Being poor and having experienced downward mobility leads to a
predicted probability of 66% for the outcome variable, in contrast to 61% when a poor
individual has experienced upward mobility. Finally, as expected, being supportive of
privatisation (i.e. advocating for a less stronger role of the state in the economy) appears
to be associated with less support for progressive taxation. The effect is however, not
statistically significant.
3.6 Robustness tests
In order to challenge the strength of our findings we estimate the model without attitu-
dinal variables and add further controls to our baseline Models 1 and 3.111 Subsequently,
we apply an alternative measure of the dependent variable, which excludes the moderate
income tax progressivity category and we test how far trust in particular institutions
resemble the effects displayed above.
3.6.1 The impact of attitudinal variables
In order to address the concern that attitudinal variables are driving our findings, we
estimate the baseline model excluding from the models the controls for fairness per-
111The results also remain stable when the other baseline specifications are used. We restrict ourselves to
these models due to space limitations. For the same reasons, also results excluding individual countries
are not reported here, except for the case of Venezuela, as it is considered a particularly relevant case.
In general, the exclusion of individual cases does not change the results remarkably. For Model 2,
however, it is relevant to note that, although the interaction effect behaves very similarly to the main
result, excluding Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Argentina leads to results in which the
effect misses statistical significance at the lowest level of trust in public institutions. The results for
Models 1 and 3 are robust to the exclusion of individual countries.
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ception and privatisation preferences (M5 and M6 in Table 3.2). The findings remain
substantially unchanged. One could argue that it is not confidence in the state which is
needed to reduce the opposition of the aﬄuent, but rather general social trust. In fact,
social trust might capture the degree to which individuals expect others to ‘cooperate’
and might thereby be crucial regarding the coordination problem of taxation. Moreover,
it is easy to imagine that ‘social trust’ might be correlated with ‘institituional trust’ and
that, as a consequence not including social trust in the model specification might lead
to biased results. To test this aspect in M7 and M8 we estimate models that include
social trust as an additional control variable.112 The results indicate that social trust
is insignificant however, while the coefficients of our main variables of interest remain
unaffected by its inclusion. In M9 and M10 we add to the specification ‘preferences for
redistribution’ instead of ‘privatisation preferences’. Also in this case, the results remain
stable.113
Table 3.2: Robustness tests: Additional controls
Dependent variable: Progressive income tax preference
(M 5) (M 6) (M 7) (M8) (M 9) (M 10)
Wealth group
Middle -0.503*** -0.481** -0.484**
(0.151) (0.155) (0.151)
Aﬄuent -0.665* -0.626* -0.633*
(0.282) (0.275) (0.284)
Class identity
Low middle class -0.568+ -0.546+ -0.557+
(0.324) (0.328) (0.322)
Middle class -0.620* -0.597* -0.601*
(0.265) (0.263) (0.264)
Upper middle class -1.000** -0.987** -0.972**
(0.346) (0.354) (0.364)
Upper class -1.964*** -1.901*** -1.954***
(0.362) (0.338) (0.360)
Respect in political institutions -0.115*** -0.105* -0.117*** -0.108* -0.119*** -0.111**
(0.030) (0.041) (0.028) (0.043) (0.028) (0.040)
Interaction terms
Middle × Respect in pol. inst 0.097* 0.094* 0.094*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Continued on Next Page. . .
112Corresponds to item IT1 in the LAPOP questionnaire: “And speaking of the people from around here,
would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very
trustworthy or untrustworthy...?” The possible responses range from 1 -no trust- to 4-high trust-.
113We also estimate a model using left ideology instead of preference for privatisation. Although we lose a
lot of observation the main finding remains stable. As expected, left ideology has a positive significant
impact on progressive income tax preferences.
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Aﬄuent × Respect in pol. inst 0.121* 0.117* 0.118*
(0.049) (0.047) (0.049)
Low middle class× Respect in pol. inst 0.096+ 0.093+ 0.096+
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
Middle class× Respect in pol. inst 0.062 0.062 0.064
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Upper middle class× Respect in pol. inst 0.153* 0.159* 0.157*
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
Upper class× Respect in pol. inst 0.241** 0.228*** 0.243***
(0.076) (0.068) (0.073)
Controls
Female -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014
(0.063) (0.065) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064)
Age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of edu. -0.026* -0.021+ -0.023+ -0.018 -0.025* -0.020+
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Mobility experience
Status quo -0.068 -0.039 -0.069 -0.042 -0.071 -0.044
(ref: downward mobility) (0.086) (0.095) (0.087) (0.095) (0.088) (0.096)
Upward mobility -0.176+ -0.121 -0.179+ -0.127 -0.184+ -0.131
(0.103) (0.111) (0.104) (0.110) (0.104) (0.110)
Enforcement capacity 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Fairness perception -0.054* -0.053* -0.055* -0.054**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Pref. for privatization -0.048 -0.047
(0.030) (0.031)
Social trust -0.001 0.006
(0.023) (0.022)
Pref. for redistribution 0.042 0.038
(0.028) (0.027)
Constant 1.558*** 1.605*** 1.976*** 1.989*** 1.600*** 1.661**
(0.379) (0.424) (0.321) (0.366) (0.481) (0.540)
N (individuals) 5991 5991 5991 5991 5991 5991
N (countries) 10 10 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034
ll -3880.45 -3866.04 -3869.65 -3300.77 -2927.24
BIC 7839.1 7815.6 7810.1 7788.0 7817.6 7795.9
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Country fixed effects are not displayed. Coefficients for the effect of employment situation,
marital status, urban and household size are not displayed because they remain substantially
the same as in the main model.
3.6.2 Alternative specification of the dependent variable (DV)
As an additional robustness check, we change the specification of the dependent variable,
which is initially based on three response categories. Following Gelman & Park (2009)
we exclude the middle category, which reflects the ‘moderate progressive income taxation
preference’, by choosing a tax ratio of 40-30 in contrast to 30-30, which is the flat-tax
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option, or 50-20, which is the clearly progressive alternative. By excluding respondents
who chose the moderate category, we focus our analysis on the individuals who clearly
support either a flat or a progressive design of the income tax.114
The results of running all the baseline models are presented in Table 3.1 using the
alternative dependent variable, as shown in Table 3.3. The findings remain substan-
tially unchanged, although the results are less strong. Still, the attitude towards public
institutions maintains a robust mitigating effect on the effect of wealth group and class
identification on the preferences for progressive taxation. Compared to the main specifi-
cation, in these models the positive coefficient for enforcement capacity turns significant,
as does the negative coefficient for privatisation preference. By contrast, some variables
loose statistical significance: the mobility experience variables, the fairness perception
variable, the urban habitant variable and the years of education variables. The co-
efficients are, however, similar and the lack of statistical significance might be driven
mostly by the lack of precision connected to the large number of observations that are
lost (around 15%).
Table 3.3: Logistic regression: Progressive income tax preferences with alternative DV specifi-
cation
Dependent variable: Progressive income tax preference
(M 11) (M 12) (M 13) (M 14)
Wealth group
Middle -0.512* -0.077
(0.199) (0.151)
Aﬄuent -0.623+ -0.087
(0.341) (0.082)
Class identity
Lower middle class 0.110* 0.087+
(0.054) (0.052)
Middle class 0.071** 0.067
(0.026) (0.044)
Upper middle class 0.196** 0.105
(0.071) (0.097)
Upper class 0.161+ 0.046
Continued on Next Page. . .
114We also estimate a multinominal logit model to exploit all the information available in the original
variable. The results show that dichotomising seems a reasonable approach, as our main independent
variables of interest seem to have no significant effect when it comes to choosing the 40-30 category
instead of the 30-30 alternative, whereas they do have a strong and significant effect when it comes to
choosing the 50-20 category. Main results can be found in Table A3.5. Estimations using a conditional
logit model lead to similar results. Results can be provided upon request.
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(0.095) (0.158)
Respect in pol. inst. -0.122** -0.125***
(0.042) (0.029)
Institutional trust -0.029 -0.059*
(0.028) (0.028)
Interaction terms
Middle × Attitude variable 0.093 0.009
(0.057) (0.047)
Aﬄuent × Attitude variable 0.115+ 0.087+
(0.061) (0.051)
Lower middle class × Attitude variable 0.093+ 0.050
(0.053) (0.043)
Middle class × Attitude variable 0.062 0.057
(0.042) (0.049)
Upper middle class × Attitude variable 0.159* 0.080
(0.078) (0.098)
Upper class × Attitude variable 0.228*** 0.094
(0.069) (0.149)
Controls
Age 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.008*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of edu. -0.023 -0.024 -0.017 -0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Mobility experience
Status quo -0.003 0.008 0.026 0.034
(ref: downward mobility) (0.118) (0.126) (0.122) (0.128)
Upward mobility -0.088 -0.063 -0.026 -0.005
(0.129) (0.125) (0.129) (0.125)
Urban -0.177 -0.165 -0.170+ -0.160
(0.112) (0.117) (0.103) (0.110)
Fairness perception -0.049 -0.047 -0.047 -0.045
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Privatization preference -0.075* -0.075* -0.075* -0.074*
(0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037)
Enforcement capacity 0.043** 0.047**
(0.016) (0.018)
Constant 2.267*** 1.870*** 2.340*** 1.934***
(0.366) (0.323) (0.405) (0.365)
N (individuals) 5135 4927 5135 4927
N (countries) 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.038
ll -3866.03 -3721.71 -3854.85 -3712.60
BIC 5931.0 5709.4 5907.0 5690.0
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Country fixed effects are not displayed. Coefficients for the effect of employment
situation,marital status, gender and household size are not displayed because they
remain substantially the same as in the main model.
3.6.3 General or particular institutional trust?
We contend that when individuals judge whether public institutions are reliable partners
in the public goods game, the key is not their trust in a particular institution, but their
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general trust in the public system. Along this line, our argument states that trusting
one entity might not be sufficient because fiscal revenues are manage and decided upon
at numerous institutions and therefore might be subject to malfeasance in any part of
the broad public apparatus. To tease out if trust in a particular institution is able to
individually mitigate the opposition of the aﬄuent to progressive income taxation, we
analyse the mitigating effect of trust in the three branches of state power: the executive,
the legislative and the judiciary.115
Figure 3.6: Average marginal effect of class identity at different level trust in specific
branches of government
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Trust in the National Legislature
Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 90% confidence interval.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded).
Probably in general, trust in the executive is most commonly perceived as the pre-
dominant factor. The intuition is, that if aﬄuent individuals trust the executive, that
will be enough for them to accept progressive income taxes because they will expect
their additional contributions to be used in their interest. Figure 3.6 illustrates that
this intuition is wrong. Although the result is similar to the main result, trust in the
executive has no clear mitigating effect on the effect of wealth group.The same counts
115We employ the LAPOP question B21a (on trust in the executive) B13 (on trust in the legislative branch)
and B10a (on trust in the judicial branch).
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for the judiciary. Surprisingly, only trust in the legislature has a clear mitigating effect.
Especially, for Latin America this result might appear as unexpected because countries
in this region are widely considered to have notoriously weak horizontal accountability
(Kenney 2003). In fact, legislatures in Latin America are known to play a less significant
role in the budget process than legislatures in other regions, and also a less significant
role than what is stated for them in formal rules (Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 299 ff).
Overall, the results show that – against what would be commonly claimed – trust
in the judicial system or in particular leaders of the executive does not not shape the
willingness of aﬄuent individuals to pay higher taxes. By contrast, trust in the legis-
lature, which is the institution meant to be responsible for discussing and politically
overseeing state action, mitigates their willingness to accept a larger share of the tax
burden. Considering that individuals might have far more problems attributing respon-
sibilities and actions to the legislature than to the judiciary or executive branches, it
can be argued that perception of the legislature mirrors a more general attitude towards
the political system and its capacity to control state action. In this sense, these results
support our argument, that a general notion of institutional trust is more decisive for
mitigating the opposition of the aﬄuent to progressive taxation than trust in specific
public institutions.
3.6.4 The role of partisan attachment
In our estimations we control for political ideology, but it could be argued that rather
than political ideology, the key question is whether the party favoured by the respondent
is in power. According to an increasingly supported argument, partisanship distorts
the evaluation of the performance of certain policies rather than the other way round.
Retrospective perceptions as well as expectations about the future will be more positive
when the favoured party is in power and more negative when it is not (see for instance
Bartels (2002) and Tilley & Hobolt (2011)).
Most of the analyses focusing on partisan bias explore how party choice influences the
evaluation of economic performance (For example, see Evans & Andersen (2006), Gerber
& Huber (2009, 2010), Wlezien et al. (1997)).116 Connected to this strand of literature,
116Numerous researchers have raised concerns about the accuracy of responses in surveys on this kind of
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Kayser and Wlezien (2011) focus on the strength of partisanship and demonstrate how,
the effect of economic performance on election outcomes is strong when the proportion
of voters with strong partisan affinities is low, whereas when the proportion of partisans
increases, economic performance matters less. These arguments have clear implications
for our analysis as they suggest that the relevance of our main independent variables
might vary according to whether the party favoured by the respondent is in power.117
It seems very plausible that, when deciding whether to support progressive taxa-
tion, the question whether my favoured party is in power will be relevant. If the party
in government matches the individual’s preferences, the respondent might overestimate
the government’s future success chances and be more confident that the government will
be active on issues he values. Moreover, he will underestimate the risk of the misuse of
tax revenue. As a result, it seems likely that, especially when it comes to high-income
earners – who would be the ones most affected by more progressive taxes – those in
support of the government will be more willing to accept progressive taxes. By con-
trast, wealthy taxpayers who do not support the incumbent government should oppose
progressive taxes most prominently, as they underestimate the potential performance of
the government and will be especially troubled about how and for what the government
will use their tax contributions. Moreover, focusing on the interaction effect of interest
in this paper, trust in public institutions should affect the acceptance of progressive
taxation by wealthy supporters of the government less because, as their favoured party
holds power, at least in the short term they should not be worried about the capacity
of institutional mechanisms to monitor and control government actions. The situation
is very different for wealthy taxpayers who do not support the incumbent government.
The mitigating effect of trust in public institutions should be particularly strong in this
case. If wealthy taxpayers do not favour the government – and, in addition, they dis-
trust public institutions – their opposition to progressive taxation should be the highest.
topics. One specific concern is whether differences in the evaluation of policies between supporters of
different parties might be the consequence of respondents strategically overpraising the favoured party
or criticising the opponent rather than substantial differences in beliefs or perceptions. Recently Bullock
et al. (2015) and Prior et al. (2015) have analysed this aspect more precisely by using experiments to
disentangle the effect of alternative explanations. Their results suggest that in fact the differences in
factual beliefs are less pronounced than commonly assumed.
117This also implies that simply controlling for alignment with the government would not be correct, as
partisan attachment and alignment with the government is expected to mitigate the effects of other
independent variables.
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By contrast, their opposition to progressive taxation should decrease remarkably if they
trust public institutions because, even though they may dislike the incumbent govern-
ment, they will expect that the use of their tax contributions will be properly monitored
and controlled.
Figure 3.7 gives initial evidence supporting the claims elaborated upon above. It
illustrates the interaction effect as presented in the main result for one subsample in-
cluding only supporters of the government, and for one alternative sample including only
respondents who do not support the incumbent government. The substantive magni-
tude of the interaction effect is similar in both cases. However, it it noteworthy that the
effect of wealth on support for progressive taxation is strongly negative and statistically
significant at low levels of trust for the sample of respondents who do not support the
government, while it is not significant for those who do support the incumbent govern-
ment. At high levels of trust, the effect of wealth among those respondents who do not
support the government is even positive and significant suggesting that at high levels of
trust, the wealthy even turn to supporting progressive taxation.118 By contrast, there
is no evidence of trust in political institutions moderating the support for progressive
taxation among wealthy individuals who support the government.
The results represent first evidence indicating that trust in the system is especially
relevant for convincing opponents of the government to support higher taxation. This is
very plausible, as a partisan government might solve the credible commitment problem,
at least in the short term when facing their voters (Timmons, 2010). However, it
is important to highlight that the magnitude of the effects for both groups do not
significantly differ from each other at any level of trust. Also, although most of the
specifications support the suggested claims, the results are not as robust to different
specifications as the ones presented in the previous section. For instance, the differences
between supporters and non-supporters of government are less pronounced when the
alternative measure for institutional trust is used.119
118It is important to note that against a potential concern that the differences in the interaction effect
among groups are simply arising from a lack of precision in the estimation for the sample of government
supporters that the size of the samples do not differ greatly (aprox. 2000 vs 2300)
119Figure A3.1 in the Appendix illustrates the different marginal effect estimated when using subjective
class identification to divide wealth groups. Also, Table A3.3 in the Appendix shows the results of
estimating the model presented in Table 3.1 for each subsample. Although the effect of wealth is not
significant and strong in all cases, the estimation results clearly support the notion the the effect of
99
The importance of consent
Figure 3.7: Average marginal effect for respondents supporting and respondents not
supporting the incumbent
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Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 90% confidence interval.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded).
Respondents stating that they would vote for the incumbent candidate or party if presidential elections were being held this week are coded as government supporters.
Histograms show the sample distribution of the mitigating variable.
Respondents stating that they would vote but not forthe incumbent are coded as non supporters.(see item VB20- LAPOP).
3.7 Country fixed effects
The analysis of the country fixed-effects shows some remarkable differences among the
countries in the sample. Chile is the country in the sample that, on average, has
the highest proportion of people who support progressive income taxation. 74.7% of
Chileans responding who responded to the question support it. This is well above the
average of the whole sample, which is an already remarkable 60.8%. Also, as shown in
Figure 3.2 above, Chile has the highest acceptance level for all wealth groups: more than
80% of poor and middle-class individuals express a preference for progressive income
taxation and nearly 70% of aﬄuent individuals accept it. Ceteris paribus an individual
living in any other country of the sample except for Costa Rica will support progressive
taxes significantly less.
trust is stronger among non-supporters, and that the opposition to progressive taxation is especially
high for non-supporters with low levels of institutional trust.
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Figure 3.8: Country fixed effects with 95% CI’s
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Focusing more specifically on the main group of interest in this study, the aﬄuent,
the effect of individual countries is particularly strong. Compared to living in Chile,
the probability that the average individual in the pooled sample120 support progressive
income taxation decreases, for instance, by 26 points if the respondent lives in Venezuela,
and by 24 points if he lives in Brazil. The effect is less strong in other countries but
still remarkable. For instance, the probability for the same individual decreases in the
case of Colombia by 8 points, and in the case of Peru by 10 points.
Some interesting patterns arise when analysing the country fixed-effects. The first
interesting aspect is that support for progressive income taxation does not appear to be
closely connected to the actual personal income tax scheme in the country. Along this
line, Chile, the country with the highest support, is in fact the country in the sample
with the highest maximum PIT tax rate (40%). However, Costa Rica – the country
where support for progressive personal income tax is second after Chile – has the lowest
maximum PIT rate (18%).121 Also, the level of corruption seems to explain the patterns
120In this context, the average individual in the pooled sample is defined by setting all categorical vari-
ables at the mode (corresponds to a middle class, male, employed, married, urban individual) and all
continuous variables at their means.
121Data for 2012 as provided by CIAT; see http://www.ciat.org/index.php/en/products-and-
services/ciatdata/tax-rates.html. Interestingly, Chile and Costa Rica represent the extreme cases in
this regard. The remaining countries have very similar rates, ranging between 35% in Argentina and
27.5% in Brazil.
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much less than might be expected. Although on average support for progressive income
taxation is high in some countries where corruption is comparatively low (e.g. Chile and
Costa Rica), the corruption argument is unable to explain, the low levels of support in
Uruguay – another country with very low corruption levels.122
Another explanation of the results presented in Figure 3.8 might be connected to
the actual level of tax collection in these countries. Opposition to progressive income
taxation might be driven by the impression that the state already collects too much
revenue. In fact, opposition seems to be high in those countries with higher levels of
revenue collection, such as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.123 Yet, opposition is also
high in countries with low levels of revenue collection, as for example Guatemala and
Mexico. Along the same lines, the level of expenditures as a percentage of GDP seems
to partly explain opposition to progressive taxation. In those countries where the states
already spend a lot, as for instance in Venezuela (40%) and Brazil (38%), opposition to
progressive taxation is on average higher.124 The exception is again Guatemala, where
support for progressive income taxation and the level of expenditures are both low
(14.2%). Interestingly, the countries characterized by high levels of support, Chile and
Costa Rica, are wealthy countries with comparatively low levels of both; revenue and
expenditures. In this sense, the general negative stance towards progressive taxation in
countries with relatively large public sectors might be driven by a certain disappointment
with the achievements of a state perceived to be already well funded. Finally, the fact
that some countries belonging to the same sub-regions (for example, Colombia and Peru
or Mexico and Guatemala) have similar values for their country fixed-effects supports
the idea that specific cultural and social aspects play a significant role in shaping the
acceptance to pay taxes.
All in all, country effects seem to play a strong role in shaping support for progressive
taxation. Unfortunately, analysing the effects of particular macro-level variables goes
beyond the focus and possibilities of this paper and research design. Some variables
122Following the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010), the level of control of corruption
(Control for Corruption Indicator) is very close in Uruguay and Chile at the highest level, with Costa
Rica at a lower level. All other countries in the sample have clearly lower levels.
123All around 35% of GDP. Data for 2011 as provided by IMF (2012)
124Data for 2012 as provided by the IMF (2015). Indicator: General government total expenditure as
percentage of GDP.
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are obvious candidates and seem to partly explain the differences. But to precisely
disentangle their effects, data on more countries is needed.
3.8 Conclusion
The story of personal income tax in Latin America is not one of unlimited success but
rather the opposite. Personal income taxes make up a much smaller share of general
tax revenue when compared to other parts of the world. This is closely linked to weak
tax administration, abundant tax loopholes and massive tax evasion. All these aspects
explain the governments’ emphasis on VAT, as, despite regressive distributive effects, it
allows for levying at least a certain amount of much-needed fiscal revenue. But beyond
implementation and design issues, in this paper we have argued that the prospects of
escaping the low performance levels of the PIT in particular, and more progressive taxes
in general, is connected to the lack of consent for taxation by those who would mostly
pay them: the aﬄuent.
Along this line, we have defended that the opposition of wealthy taxpayers to tax-
ation is not a given, and that rather than being a problem due to the lack of expected
benefits, it is a problem of trust in public institutions. If higher tax contributions are
used reasonably and effectively, they allow the state to invest in sectors that can gener-
ate remarkable benefits for high-income earners. Such investment prospects can serve
as an incentive for them to accept progressive taxation. However, this will only be the
case if they consider the state as a reliable and capable agent. If high-income earners
fear that their tax contributions will not have positive returns in the form of the private
or public goods they value, they will oppose progressive income taxation.
Making use of the public opinion data of LAPOP for 10 Latin American countries,
we found support for our hypothesis. The more the aﬄuent trust political institutions,
the less they oppose the idea of progressive income taxation. Their willingness to accept
comparatively higher taxes on them hinges on their level of trust in public institutions.
In this sense, against the commonly held assumption, aﬄuent individuals do not a
priori oppose progressive taxation; rather, their opposition is conditional on low trust
in public institutions. Individuals in the middle of the wealth distribution range do
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not associate their tax composition preferences so clearly with institutional reliance,
which is not surprising, as it is likely not their money that might be possibly ‘mis-
invested’. The findings for the poor are surprising in this regard, as they seem to prefer
less-progressive income taxation the more confidence they have in public institutions.
However, the limitations of our data make it difficult to isolate the driving force of this
result, and further research is needed to draw firm conclusions on this relationship.
More generally, our analysis is bound to the limits of survey data. Also, the analysis
can only be conducted for a cross-section of 10 Latin American countries, since the
item was part of a special LAPOP battery of questions not included in further survey
rounds. To rule out time-related impacts on our dependent variable, we need to observe
the proposed link between institutional reliance and preference for progressive income
taxation over time.
The findings have relevant implications for tax reform endeavours in the region.
Most authors agree that the aﬄuent in Latin America are not contributing their fair
share to the tax effort. We have contended that coercion does not offer the answer to the
problem. Although it might be easier to coerce the poor into paying taxes, it is precisely
the high-income groups that will most likely find a way to avoid -or significantly reduce
-their tax burden. As Ardanaz & Scartascini (2013) illustrate, the implementation and
success of progressive income taxation is very much left to the ’mercy’ of the high-
income earners. As a result, the key to increasing a country’s tax revenue in a fair and
meaningful way is ’quasi-voluntary compliance’ by the aﬄuent, or as we call it, consent
for taxation.
Overall, the results shows there is scope to increase progressive taxation in the
region even with the support of the wealthy, and that for this endeavour increasing
the transparency and reliability of public institutions is key. If aﬄuent taxpayers can
reasonably expect a valuable use of their higher tax contributions, they will accept
paying higher taxes. In fact, declared support for income tax progressivity is much
higher across all income groups than what might be expected. The analysis suggests
that the opposition of the wealthy -as least as it is understood here -appears not to be the
main factor blocking reforms towards more progressive taxation. On a more pessimistic
note, the variance in support for progressive taxation is high, but tax collection data
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show that tax systems in the regions are performing quite similarly. Further research
should look at why the apparent support for more progressive taxation is not being
translated into policy changes.
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Appendix
Table A3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DV
prog. income tax pref. 5991 0.61 0.49 0 1
Independent Variables
wealth group
poor 5991 0.086 0.280 0 1
middle 5991 0.544 0 .498 0 1
aﬄuent 5991 0.371 0.483 0 1
class identity
lower class 5991 0.200 0.400 0 1
lower middle class 5991 0.329 0.470 0 1
middle class 5991 0.411 0.492 0 1
upper middle class 5991 0.049 0.216 0 1
upper class 5991 0.011 0.102 0 1
respect in pol. institutions 5991 4.592 1.757 1 7
trust in institutions 5757 0.016 1.956 -4.590 5.113
Control variables
gender 5991 0.478 0.500 0 1
age 5991 40.439 15.882 17 91
years of education 5991 9.603 4.125 0 18
employed 5991 0.514 0.500 0 1
public employee 5991 0.081 0.274 0 1
unemployed 5991 0.053 0.224 0 1
non-employed 5991 0.256 0.437 0 1
retired 5991 0.096 0.294 0 1
mobility experience
downward mobility 5991 0.197 0.398 0 1
status quo 5991 0.515 0.500 0 1
upward mobility 5991 0.288 0.453 0 1
household size 5991 4.188 1.919 0 17
married 5991 0.602 0.490 0 1
urban 5991 0.803 0.398 0 1
fairness perception 5991 3.952 2.025 1 7
enforcement capacity 5991 3.853 1.616 1 7
social trust 5991 2.842 0.868 1 4
privatization 5991 3.772 2.067 1 7
left 5085 5.541 2.502 1 10
redistribution 5991 5.802 1.482 1 7
trust in political parties 5991 3.144 1.690 1 7
Source: LAPOP 2012
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Table A3.2: Parsimonious model: Logistic regression- Progressive income tax preferences
Dependent variable: Progressive income tax preference
(M 15) (M 16) (M 17) (M 18)
Wealth group
Middle -0.601*** -0.180
(0.175) (0.129)
Aﬄuent -0.877** -0.344***
(0.296) (0.101)
Class identity
Lower middle class -0.650+ -0.210+
(0.333) (0.118)
Middle class -0.760** -0.480***
(0.256) (0.120)
Upper middle class -1.155** -0.462*
(0.361) (0.217)
Upper class -1.944*** -0.909**
(0.345) (0.319)
Respect in pol. inst. -0.104*** -0.092*
(0.030) (0.044)
Institutional trust -0.044 -0.052
(0.028) (0.035)
Interaction terms
Middle × Attitude variable 0.091* 0.014
(0.043) (0.041)
Aﬄuent × Attitude variable 0.115* 0.077
(0.048) (0.049)
Lower middle class × Attitude variable 0.091+ 0.049
(0.054) (0.043)
Middle class × Attitude variable 0.060 0.053
(0.043) (0.046)
Upper middle class × Attitude variable 0.146+ 0.067
(0.081) (0.095)
Upper class × Attitude variable 0.217** 0.080
(0.075) (0.167)
Constant 1.216*** 0.736*** 1.350*** 0.913***
(0.154) (0.063) (0.264) (0.104)
N (individuals) 5991 5757 5991 5757
N (countries) 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.031 0.033 0.033
BIC 7859.7 7569.0 7864.7 7577.2
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Coefficients for country fixed effects are not displayed.125
125Section 7 focuses on the discussion of country fixed effects
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Table
A
3.3:
Logistic
regression:
Progressive
incom
e
tax
preferences
R
espondents
that
w
ould
vote
for
the
incum
bent
R
espondents
that
w
ould
not
vote
for
the
incum
bent
(M
1)
(M
2)
(M
3)
(M
4)
(M
5)
(M
6)
(M
7)
(M
8)
W
ealth
group
M
iddle
-0.754**
-0.123
-0.627*
0.030
(0.245)
(0.253)
(0.292)
(0.091)
A
ﬄ
uent
-0.516
-0.039
-0.931*
-0.112
(0.334)
(0.146)
(0.400)
(0.108)
C
lass
identity
Low
er
m
iddle
class
-0.528+
-0.221
-0.936*
-0.113
(0.319)
(0.173)
(0.408)
(0.178)
M
iddle
class
-0.478
-0.579**
-1.228***
-0.227+
(0.368)
(0.191)
(0.282)
(0.127)
U
pper
m
iddle
class
-0.490
-0.367
-1.489*
-0.261
(0.481)
(0.283)
(0.613)
(0.313)
U
pper
class
-0.664
-0.885
-3.020***
-1.024**
(1.958)
(0.881)
(0.509)
(0.356)
R
espect
in
political
institutions
-0.091*
-0.021
-0.184***
-0.229***
(0.042)
(0.061)
(0.036)
(0.065)
Institutional
trust
-0.038
-0.049
-0.130**
-0.139***
(0.043)
(0.071)
(0.045)
(0.032)
Interaction
term
s
M
iddle
X
A
ttitude
variable
0.125**
-0.006
0.148*
0.118+
(0.039)
(0.057)
(0.071)
(0.071)
A
ﬄ
uent
X
A
ttitude
variable
0.106+
0.134*
0.185*
0.106
(0.054)
(0.062)
(0.073)
(0.082)
Low
er
m
iddle
class
X
A
ttitude
variable
0.069
0.065
0.174*
0.092+
(0.053)
(0.058)
(0.078)
(0.049)
M
iddle
classX
A
ttitude
variable
-0.018
0.049
0.217***
0.152**
(0.074)
(0.074)
(0.060)
(0.056)
U
pper
m
iddle
class
X
A
ttitude
variable
0.031
0.094
0.264*
0.117
(0.114)
(0.128)
(0.108)
(0.151)
U
pper
classX
A
ttitude
variable
-0.019
0.112
0.412**
0.224
(0.309)
(0.186)
(0.146)
(0.175)
C
onstant
1.730***
1.246***
1.449***
1.310***
2.059***
1.334**
2.357***
1.452***
(0.312)
(0.296)
(0.403)
(0.350)
(0.434)
(0.405)
(0.370)
(0.424)
O
bservations
2091
2024
2091
2024
2313
2215
2313
2215
B
IC
2797.3
2713.4
2781.2
2701.5
3039.6
2913.4
3026.0
2904.9
M
odelcorrespond
to
the
one
presented
in
Table
3.1.
C
oeffi
cients
for
the
controlvariables
are
not
displayed.
M
ost
controls
have
no
significant
effects.
Years
ofeducation
and
privatization
preference
have
a
significant
negative
effect
in
allestim
ations
run
on
the
non-supporters
sam
ple
and
no
effect
in
the
sam
ple
including
only
supporters.
T
he
sam
e
is
the
case
for
being
a
public
em
ployee,although
in
this
case
the
effect
is
significantly
positive
for
non-supporters.
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Figure A3.1: Average marginal effects for wealth group and respect in political institutions without Venezuela
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Respondents supporting the government
Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 90% confidence interval.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded).
Histograms show the sample distribution of the mitigating variable for the specific class identity group.
Respondents stating that they would vote for the incumbent candidate or party if presidential elections were being held this week are coded as government supporters.
Respondents stating that they would vote but not forthe incumbent are coded as non supporters.(see item VB20- LAPOP).
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Table A3.4: Robustness test: Without Venezuela
DV: Progressive income tax scheme
Middle -0.601*
(ref: poor) (0.305)
Rich -0.811*
(0.319)
Respect in pol. insti. -0.158**
(0.059)
Interaction terms
Middle × respect in pol. insti. 0.127*
(0.059)
Rich × respect in pol. insti. 0.148*
(0.061)
Controls
Female 0.009
(0.061)
Age 0.005*
(0.002)
Years of edu. -0.017*
(0.008)
Employment situation
Public employee 0.232*
(ref: employed) (0.110)
Unemployed 0.015
(0.127)
Non-employed -0.032
(0.075)
Retired 0.158
(0.117)
Mobility experience
Status quo -0.007
(ref: downward mobility) (0.076)
Upward mobility -0.146+
(0.087)
Household size -0.012
(0.016)
Married -0.023
(0.060)
Urban -0.321***
(0.081)
Fairness perception -0.057***
(0.013)
Privatization preference -0.046***
(0.013)
Constant 2.128***
(0.344)
N (individuals) 5751
N (countries) 9
Pseudo R2 0.034
ll -3693.82
BIC 7630.0
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Coefficients for country fixed effects are not displayed.
are not displayed.
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Figure A3.2: Average marginal effects of wealth group at different level of respect in
political institutions excluding Venezuela
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Bold dotted lines correspond to the point predictions. Dotted lines delimit the 95% confidence interval.
Estimation for male, employed, married, urban individuals (corresponds to modes). All other variables at means (rounded).
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Figure A3.3: Histogram: Wealth groups and respect in political institutions
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Figure A3.4: Predictive margins for wealth group and respect in political institutions
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Chapter 4
Party system institutionalisation and reliance on personal
income tax in developing countries.∗
∗This chapter has been published as a discussion paper in the Working Paper Series of the Inter- American
Development Bank.
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Abstract
This paper explores the effect of party system institutionalisation on the rel-
evance of the personal income tax in the tax composition. Based on a fiscal
contractualism approach, I argue that institutionalised political party systems
increase the capacity of political actors to credibly commit to fiscal contracts
agreed with wealthy taxpayers. As a result, in countries characterized by
institutionalised political party systems wealthy taxpayers accept paying a
bigger share of the tax burden, which is mirrored in a greater relevance of
progressive tax types. The analysis of panel data for more than 90 countries
from 1990 to 2010 supports this hypothesis and shows that party system in-
stitutionalisation has an especially significant and strong positive effect on
the relevance of the personal income tax where bureaucratic capacity is low.
At high levels of bureaucratic capacity the effect disappears. The findings
strongly support the claim that, particularly in developing countries, where
bureaucratic capacity tends to be limited, taxation is best understood as a
problem of credible commitment.
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4.1 Introduction
Taxation is high on the international agenda. In the context of the global financial crisis,
contentious debates over tax policy are present in the media and public debates on a
daily basis. The discussion is not restricted to developed countries. The international
development community, which has been focused for a long time on the spending side of
the budget, is increasingly engaging in lively discussions about taxation. All actors now
recognize the centrality of effective tax systems to inclusive and sustainable development,
democratic governance and state-building (United Nations 2008, 2003, UN Millennium
Project 2005). In particular, higher-performing tax systems are crucial for governments
in developing countries in order to have enough resources to cope with challenges such as
poverty reduction, provision of public services, infrastructure development and climate
change.
Although “virtually every scholar agrees that taxes involve politics” (Gould & Baker
2002, p. 91), historically, political scientists have not paid much attention to the topic.
This has changed recently, but the now rapidly growing literature on the political econ-
omy of taxation has been focused on two main aspects: the overall level of tax revenue126
and the occurrence of tax reform.127 The aspect of tax composition however, remains
widely understudied from a political science perspective and mostly restricted to small
N approaches.128
The absence of a consistent body of literature on the political determinants of tax
composition129 is surprising, as it is crucial to understand how the burden of financing
the state is distributed among different social groups. Following standard tax incidence
assumptions, we can expect that the stronger the relevance of progressive taxes in the
tax composition, the higher the burden carried by wealthy taxpayers will be.
Interestingly, developing countries’ poor tax collection records seem to be connected
to the poor performance of progressive tax types (e.g. African Development Bank &
126Mostly operationalised as tax collection to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios
127This literature is mostly based on case studies (e.g. Gillis 1989, Thirsk 1997, Lora 2007). For large
N studies on OECD countries, see Basinger & Hallerberg (2004). Outside the OECD, the number of
studies is even lower and these mostly focus on Latin America (Focanti et al. 2013, Mahon 2004).
128Exceptions are Mahdavi (2008), Kenny & Winer (2006), Timmons (2010a) and Seiferling (2012).
129Tax composition refers to the percentage that each tax type represents as a percentage of total tax
collection.
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OECD 2010, Gómez Sabaini 2007). In general, tax systems in developing countries
rely heavily strongly on indirect taxes and most prominently on the value added tax
(hereafter VAT). Direct taxes - especially those considered to have a more progressive
tax incidence, such as the personal income tax- in many cases play a marginal role.
Economic and administrative considerations partly explain and justify a stronger em-
phasis on less progressive tax instruments in these countries. But many scholars point
out that, from a political perspective, especially in democratic developing countries, the
high level of inequality and the low performance of more progressive tax types is a fact
“hard to reconcile with the workhorse model in political economy, that is, the median
voter model of redistributive politics” (Ardanaz & Scartascini 2013, p. 1637).130
I argue that the concept of fiscal contractualism (Timmons 2005, Moore 2008) can
help to explain this situation. Many developing countries do not have sufficient bureau-
cratic capacities to efficiently use coercion to tax their citizens. As a result, governments
in these countries have a strong incentive (and need) to foster “ quasi-voluntary tax
compliance”(Levi 1989), by which citizens would voluntarily accept paying taxes. This
incentive should be particularly strong when facing wealthy taxpayers. It is unlikely
that their contributions can be explained by coercion. In general, the bureaucratic ca-
pacities are so low that they have little to fear. On the one hand, wealthy taxpayers can
be considered the actors that ate best able to evade taxation and resist it using political
means. On the other hand, given the high convergence of economic and political power,
it is hard to imagine governments putting pressure on actors whose support is crucial
to remaining in power.
Following fiscal contractualism, finding an agreement between the government and
the wealthy on the exchange of services for tax contributions would be a feasible way to
increase the acceptance and willingness of the wealthy to pay taxes. In fact, according
to the argument, both, the government and the wealthy would benefit from such an
agreement. The former would gain access to more resources in an efficient manner;
the latter would have greater certainty that their contributions will be employed to
implement services they value. However, defining and sustaining fiscal agreements is
not an easy task. In particular, if governments cannot credibly commit to taxpayers that
130On this point, see also Timmons (2010b).
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benefits will be provided in exchange for tax contributions, a defensive stance towards
taxation will prevail. This is why taxation should be seen at least “partly as a game of
credible commitment rather than a game of pure coercion” (Timmons 2010a, p. 211).
In this paper, I concentrate on the dimension of commitment and examine the de-
gree to which institutionalised political party systems by enhancing the capacity the
capacity of political actors to make credible commitments to wealthier taxpayers, influ-
ence the share of the tax burden that these taxpayers agree to pay. More precisely, my
understanding of party system institutionalisation emphasizes the stability of the party
system over time. The intuition behind my argument is simple: the relationship between
taxpayers and the government faces classical principal-agent problems. In particular,
the capacity of the political system to sustain agreements over time and to disincentivise
opportunistic behavior by political leaders is a core concern for wealthy taxpayers. Insti-
tutionalised party systems -understood as stable party systems overtime- can mitigate
these problems by encouraging clearer and more stable expectations of the behavior of
political actors in the future.131 Parties that endure tend to have more institutional
strength and more closely attached voters (Tavits 2012, Ezrow et al. 2013). Also, po-
litical parties in stable political party systems tend to have more moderate positions
(Gallagher et al. 2011) and are less personalistic (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006, p. 221).
Finally, stable political party systems tend to have less pronounced policy shifts and
offer continuity in party alternatives over time as well as repeated interaction in party
competition, which is a prerequisite for party system institutionalisation in a broader
understanding(Randall & Svåsand 2002). All these characteristics make the political
environment for wealthy taxpayers more reliable and credible, and therefore enable the
acceptance of tax contributions that would not be accepted in other settings.
In a first step, I discuss the specificities of developing countries and how, due to
limited bureaucratic capacity, in this context the factors enabling credible commitment
are even more important in explaining tax contributions by wealthy taxpayers. The
theoretical discussion leads me to the hypothesis that party system institutionalisation
most prominently affects the wealthy taxpayers’ consent to pay taxes where bureaucratic
131Of course, the level of uncertainty is a problem of degree. Developed countries also face problems
of uncertainty. Yet the level of uncertainty tends to be vastly greater in developing countries, and
uncertainty is present at different dimensions (Lupu & Riedl 2013).
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capacity is low.
In a second step, I examine this hypothesis empirically. Based on a broader sam-
ple than is usually presented in the studies on the political determinants of taxation, I
find evidence supporting my claims. At low and middle levels of bureaucratic capacity,
party system institutionalisation has a strong positive effect on the relevance of personal
income tax in the tax composition. This effect disappears where bureaucratic capacity
levels are high. The results are robust to different specifications, and the effect is partic-
ularly reliable in democratic settings and when government parties have a programmatic
orientation.
The broader significance of these findings is worth considering. First, the results
indicate that focusing on the question of why some governments tax more may obfus-
cate the highly relevant and political question of how governments tax. Morrissey and
Steinmo (1987) have shown how, in the United Kingdom, political parties had a mini-
mal influence on the level of tax revenue, but a strong influence on the tax composition.
Political parties were therefore able to distribute the tax burden among more progres-
sive or regressive tax bases following political considerations. Similar situations might
be taking place in developing countries today. The focus on tax revenue levels might
overlook this process and miss where and why some wealthy taxpayers are willing to ac-
cept paying more taxes. Second, the chapter shows that short-term unilateral promises
have limited effect in getting wealthier taxpayers to pay more taxes. The acceptance
of a bigger share of the tax burden hinges on the existence of more institutionalised
political systems that are able to make credible, long-term commitments.
4.2 Empirical literature on the determinants of tax composition
Most of the work on tax composition and personal income tax has been focused on
economic and administrative variables. One main result of this literature is that the
level of tax collection and the tax composition are heavily influenced by the level of
economic development. Developing countries (in particular low income countries), rely
more on corporate and trade taxes than developed ones.132 Closely related is the fact
132For literature focusing on developing countries see Aizenman & Jinjarak (2009), Agbeyegbe et al. (2006),
Baunsgaard & Keen (2010). The debate on developed economies has been centered on the idea of
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that, in the process of economic globalisation, developing countries have had far more
problems replacing the decrease of trade taxes associated with this process and have
done this most prominently by exploiting the VAT. Furthermore, most studies conclude
that given the lack of an alternative tax base and the administrative challenge presented
by “hard to collect taxes” (e. g., the personal income tax) this strategy appears to be
a reasonable option.
Only recently have political variables received attention in this debate, and the
attention paid to them is increasing rapidly. This process has been driven by the
growing interest in the political economy dimension of public finance in general, and
taxation in particular. 133 Specifically, two main arguments dominate the discussion
about the link between political factors and tax composition. The first one stresses the
effect of political ideology. The second one focuses on the effect of political institutions.
The relevance of domestic political institutions to economic policies in general, and
taxation in particular, is well researched (Bird et al. 2008, Cheibub 1998, Kenny &
Winer 2006, Mulligan et al. 2004).134 The approach relies on the idea that political
institutions affect the incentives for politicians to use particular tax instruments and
react to external pressures or shocks in a certain way. In terms of empirical analysis, the
variables that have received much attention are the number of veto players (Hallerberg
& Basinger 1998), the degree of party dominance (Steinmo & Tolbert 1998), regime
type (Cheibub 1998, García & von Haldenwang 2015)135, the level of decentralisation
(Kenny & Winer 2006) and legislative malapportionment (Ardanaz & Scartascini 2013).
Two reasons explain why de facto most of these empirical studies are restricted
to developed countries. First, data availability and quality are negatively correlated
with level of development. Hence, the more specific the variable tested, the lower the
globalization-induced convergence. Excellent overviews of the debates can be found in Basinger &
Hallerberg (2004), Plümper et al. (2009), Swank & Steinmo (2002).
133A comprehensive overview of the political economy approaches to analysing taxation can be found in
di John (2006). Focusing on Latin America, Machado et al. (2013) analyze the tax systems in this
region, taking into consideration most of the variables suggested by the different approaches.
134There is a broad range of literature on the political determinants of redistributive policies and the size
of the state. These contributions have links to taxation but are outside the scope of this paper, which
strictly looks at the determinants of taxation.
135Works by Bird et al. (2008), Kenny & Winer (2006) and Profeta & Scabrosetti (2010) have taken up
this question and deepened it by analysing the effect of democracy on the performance of particular
tax types. The results indicates that democracies tend to tax more and to rely more strongly on more
progressive tax types.
121
The importance of consent
number of developing countries in the sample. In addition, beyond the data issue, testing
institutional arguments in developing countries also entails a theoretical problem. In
many developing countries, informal institutions play a stronger role than formal ones
(Therkildsen 2001, p. 111). It is harder to assume that institutions, simply by existing,
will be respected and affect the policy process as might be expected. Consequently,
it can be highly misleading to assume a constant effect of formally similar political
institutions across samples of countries, in which they might operate very differently.
Partly overcoming this problem, much of the most influential work on institutions
and taxation in developing countries has a strong focus on historical legacies and path
dependencies. Using an historical political economy perspective, the characteristics of
contemporary tax performance are explained by the constraining effect of socio-political
patterns that emerged in the past (e.g., Mkandawire 2010, Thirsk 1997). Specifically
with regard to the performance of the personal income tax, Lieberman (2003) proba-
bly offers the most prominent contribution. In his book, Lieberman argues that the
historical pattern of interaction between the state and upper-middle classes is a cru-
cial in understanding the consolidation of different “tax states”. In particular, using
a comparison between Brazil and South Africa, he shows how “adversarial tax states”
had far more problems extracting taxes from the wealthier segments of society than
“cooperative tax states’.’
As for the effect of partisanship on tax composition, the account of the literature is
similar to the one on political institutions. There is no doubt that partisanship plays
a major role in defining fiscal policies and shaping the distribution of the tax burden
among social groups. However, much of the evidence is again based on developed
countries.
Interestingly, research on the effect of partisanship in developed economies system-
atically has led to counter-intuitive empirical results. Against common expectations,
studies show that left-leaning governments tend to rely more heavily on regressive taxes.
Several explanations have been proposed for this empirical puzzle. Kato (2003) argues
that, in the context of globalisation, left-leaning governments use indirect taxation more
intensively because they have no alternative to finance the high levels of public expendi-
ture that they aim at. In this line, Beramendi and Rueda (2007) emphasize the relevance
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of the institutional setting in which left-leaning governments operate and show how, in
the absence of corporatism, left-leaning governments are associated with a strong use of
progressive tax instruments, whereas in the presence of corporatism they exploit more
regressive taxes.136 Also, Cusack and Beramendi (2006) have shown how left-leaning
governments rely more heavily on taxing labor than right-leaning ones.
Analyses on the relationship between partisanship and taxation outside the devel-
oped economies are scarce and heavily concentrated on Latin America. In addition,
those studies that exist show inconsistent results. For instance, whereas Hart (2010)
finds evidence that in Latin America left-leaning governments tax less than right-leaning
ones due to a de-emphasis of VAT, the findings of Stein and Caro (2013) - based on a
broader sample, newer data, as well as additional indicators for partisan ideology- con-
tradict these results. Beyond the mixed results, similarly to the problem with formal
institutions, it appears problematic to apply party ideology labels used in the context
of OECD countries to developing countries (Kitschelt & Kselman 2013).
Timmons (2010a) also analyses the effect of partisanship on taxation but in a dif-
ferent framework. In his model, partisanship is not relevant because of the ideological
preferences it might imply for governments, but rather because it can serve as a device
for credible commitment towards voters. Timmons underlines that only if governments
are credible, will taxpayers accept paying more taxes themselves in expectation of ben-
efits in the future. As parties are most credible to their platforms, partisanship should
result in the higher performance of taxes set on them. More preciselly, left-leaning
governments should be able to agree on fiscal bargains with poor taxpayers whereas
right-leaning governments should be more credible to wealthy ones. Timmons’ analysis
of 18 OECD countries supports this hypothesis. Left- leaning governments tend to tax
the poor more heavily but also focus spending on policy areas considered to be more
beneficial to them. By contrast, right-leaning governments rely more on progressive
tax types, but also spend more on policies that can be expected to have a regressive
incidence.
In the following section, building on Timmons’ contribution, I develop a theoretical
136Beramendi and Rueda define a corporatist environment as one where “the policy choices of social
democratic governments are limited by commitments with both labour and capital” (2007, p. 632).
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argument that captures more precisely the conditions under which wealthy taxpayers
accept paying taxes in developing countries. In essence, I argue that the idea that
taxation is a game of credible commitment still holds for developing countries when it
comes to taxing the wealthy. The poor have no clear exit option to avoid taxation, so the
government‚Äôs capacity to credibly commit is not crucial for taxing them. By contrast,
the wealthy have far more options to avoid and evade taxes. In this context especially
when bureaucratic capacity is low the government’s capacity to credibly commit to
the wealthy is key for convincing them to pay taxes. I also claim that, given the
specific characteristics and challenges that most developing countries share and face,
the institutionalisation of the political system rather than the ideology of the party in
government is the factor that will foster credibility. Assuming that governments will
extract taxes from wealthy taxpayers using more progressive tax types, party system
institutionalisation should have a positive effect on the relevance of these taxes in the
tax composition.
4.3 The argument: Institutionalised party systems and the relevance
of progressive tax types
Governments need coercion in order to extract taxes from citizens not willing to pay
them. Using coercion is costly and leads to suboptimal equilibria for both, governments
and taxpayers (Levi 1989, Timmons 2005, 2010a). Hence, governments and taxpayers
have incentives to enter fiscal agreements. Governments prefer to exchange taxes for
services in order to avoid the costs of coercion and gain efficient access to more revenue.
For their part, taxpayers prefer fiscal agreements because they lead to predictable ben-
efits in exchange for contributions. Not complying could be an option but the potential
sanctions in the case of being prosecuted might be high and these payments would not
be linked to any benefits. Thus, as long as the fiscal agreement is better than any out-
side option for both actor, exchanging contributions for state services should represent a
self-enforcing equilibrium (Timmons 2010a). In this situation, taxpayers’ contributions
would be driven by “ quasi-voluntary compliance”(Levi 1989, p. 52-55).
It is precisely the governments in developing countries that should have strong incen-
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tives to foster this type of agreements, especially with the wealthier. In many developing
countries, bureaucratic capacities tend to be limited. As a result, monitoring and sanc-
tioning those who are best positioned to evade taxation, namely the wealthy, can be
expected to be particularly costly and inefficient. 137 In addition, regardless of whether
the capacity to use coercion is there or not, the actual threat to use it against wealthy
taxpayers may lack credibility. Due to the concentration of economic and social power,
small groups of wealthy taxpayers can be assumed to control much de facto political
power (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006a). This disproportionate political influence makes
the wealthy crucial for the government’s political survival. If the support of a substan-
tial segment of the wealthy population is necessary (and in extreme cases sufficient) for
its survival, the government’s threat to coerce wealthy taxpayers will not be credible,
as doing so would lead to it to losing power - a worse outcome.138
But, what about the incentives for wealthy taxpayers to make a fiscal agreement
with the government? Following fiscal contractualism, the condition to enter into a
fiscal-exchange agreement and voluntarily accept paying taxes in the absence of strong
coercion mechanisms is the expectation of getting something valuable in exchange for
taxes.139 If, as is commonly assumed, taxation equals redistribution, wealthy taxpayers
should not expect any benefits from taxation, and there should be no option for quasi-
voluntary compliance. In this case,the only element driving contributions would be the
perceived threat of sanctions.
I argue that this assumption is questionable. In fact, I consider that, in develop-
ing countries, the scope for wealthy taxpayers to potentially benefit from state action
financed by their tax contributions is especially large. Presumably, most policies at
lower levels of development will not focus on redistribution 140 but rather on aspects
137A comprehensive discussion on the question of how bureaucratic capacities influence the pool of policies
available for a specific country can be found in Chuaire et al. (2014). Their analysis has an emphasis on
the ability to respond to risks and uncertainties introduced by the volatility of international markets,
but the argument can easily be transferred to other policy areas such as taxation specifically.
138In my argument I assume that governments have two main motivations: increasing revenue and main-
taining office. I also assume that wealthy taxpayers can act unilaterally to threaten the government
with destabilisation. The logic of the argument resonates with the selectorate theory and similar models
such as the one proposed by Boix & Svolik (2013).
139In addition to the requisite that “rulers will keep their bargains”, Levi (1989, p. 53) underlines the
requisite that “the other constituents will keep theirs”. I consider this element not to be highly relevant
for my argument because, in contrast to Levi, I assume that rulers do have the capacity to offer positive
selective incentives to taxpayers.
140See, for instance, the arguments in Korpi & Palme (1998) and in the democracy and redistribution
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such as infrastructure development, security and basic state services. These are all as-
pects that offer tremendous benefits to wealthy taxpayers.141 However, the common
perception is that, in developing countries, the wealthy tend to enjoy privately-funded
services and dislike taxation. In this line, my argument states that the general op-
position of wealthy taxpayers to taxation is not primarily the consequence of lack of
potential benefits, but rather due to the low credibility that many governments and
political systems in developing countries have in providing good quality public services
in exchange for tax contributions. The process leading from revenue collection through
public policy design and implementation to the realisation of expected benefits is long
and involves many steps (Ascher 1989, p.419). Consequently, intertemporal calculations
play a crucial role in evaluating the expected utility of paying taxes. Most importantly,
if uncertainty about receiving the agreed benefits in exchange for tax contributions is
high, the question whether potential benefits of paying taxes exist becomes irrelevant. If
a government has absolutely no credibility regarding whether it will stick to agreements,
no quasi-voluntary compliance will exist (Levi 1989, p. 53).
Based on the arguments above, the major challenges that developing countries face
when trying to tax the wealthy become evident. The bureaucratic capacity of developing
countries tends to be low. Consequently, the threat of sanctions, where credible, will
also be low. As a result, not being able to force taxpayers into compliance, the main
alternative - namely, developing “ quasi-voluntary compliance” by convincing citizens
of the benefits of taxation- should be especially relevant. However, political systems
in developing countries also tend to have credibility problems. (Scartascini et al. 2013,
Lupu & Riedl 2013).
Most of these credibility problems can be conceptualised as principal-agent prob-
lems. In particular, I highlight two: the problem of potential opportunistic behavior by
politicians and the problem of the political sustainability of agreements. First, wealthy
literature (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson 2006b, Boix 2003).
141Timmons (2005) elaborates on the argument that, in many instances, a well-financed state is a pre-
condition for achieving the provision of goods that taxpayers cannot privately provide efficiently. Also,
Hossain and Moore (2002) discuss how public health and education historically have been drivers of
elites’ commitment towards development. Supporting this idea that elites might benefit from a better-
financed state, surveys on the main obstacles to investment and private-sector development consistently
show that high tax rates are not the main concern, but rather other aspects such as infrastructure,
education levels, policy stability and security (World Economic Forum 2011, 2013).
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taxpayers have a legitimate concern about the willingness of current governments to
follow through and use higher tax contributions as agreed. Once the taxpayers pay, po-
litical leaders might have an incentive to act opportunistically and employ them in other
ways.142In principle, the threat to destabilize the government by withdrawing support
should be enough to keep the political leaders in line. However, the credibility of this
threat is itself limited.143Although coercion is costly for the government, destabilizing a
government is costly for the wealthy. Thus, if the perceived misuse of resources is lower
than the cost of destabilizing the government, the threat by wealthy taxpayers will not
be credible. The same will be the case if the cost of destabilizing the government is
lower than the cost associated with a potential new political scenario. In addition, it
is difficult for taxpayers to evaluate whether their tax money is being used effectively
and efficiently. This is the case even if we ignore the fact that governments might not
offer accurate reports and use their information advantage strategically to make their
own assessments appear justified. Overall, the problem of evaluating the value of taxes
and the costs of destabilizing a government increase the prospects that the government
will act opportunistically and not be sanctioned. Anticipating this, the incentives for
wealthy taxpayers to contribute will be reduced further.144
Second, wealthy taxpayers will be concerned about the capacity of the political
system to sustain agreements over time. As Scartascini et al. point out, “while some
countries seem capable of sustaining most policies over time, in others policies are
frequently reversed, often in response to minor changes in political winds”(Scartascini
et al. 2013, p. 8). Although this concern applies to all public policies, it is exacerbated
in the context of fiscal agreements due to the long time horizons involved. Also, it is safe
to say that concerns about policy instability are stronger in developing countries than
in developed ones (Scartascini et al. 2013, Lupu & Riedl 2013). In developed countries,
we commonly assume that there are not dramatic policy changes due to small changes
142Note that it is irrelevant whether the misuse aims at increasing social welfare or increasing private rents
through corruption, patronage or clientelism. The key is that the content of the explicit or implicit
fiscal agreement is not respected.
143In addition, the power of this threat hinges upon the relative power of the wealthy taxpayers and the
successful coordination between them. Factors driving the ability of wealthy taxpayers to act collectively
are beyond the scope of this paper.
144These arguments resonate with arguments made by Svolik (2009), although he applies this logic to the
discussion about power-sharing in authoritarian regimes.
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in the political constellations. This suggests that the credibility problem of developing
countries might not be connected to specific governments, but most prominently to the
political system as a whole.145
I contend that institutionalised party systems can help mitigate the problems of
policy sustainability and political opportunism via three mechanisms.146First, long-
standing parties and party systems foster more fluid and transparent interactions be-
tween politicians and wealthy taxpayers (or those representing their interests). More
information about the management of resources is generated, as well as more detailed
and continuous discussions on policy options and goals (Svolik 2009). These additional
sources of information improve the quality of the “value for taxes” signal that wealthy
taxpayers receive, and they reduce the information asymmetries between them and the
government. Moreover, party system institutionalisation indirectly increases their ca-
pacity to lobby for future legislation and controls current decisions as stronger and
more stable network develop over time. To a certain degree, all this increases the ca-
pacity of the wealthy to monitor state action and hold politicians accountable. As a
result, institutionalised party systems should reduce the ability of political leaders to
act opportunistically.
Second, institutionalised party systems should also reduce the scope for opportunism
by enhancing party discipline and sharpening the content profile of policy options (e.g.
Mainwaring 1998). As party structures become stronger vis-à-vis leaders, party support
is necessary for politicians to win elections. Furthermore, in order to be credible to voters
in general, and wealthy taxpayers in particular, parties need to preserve their labels.
Therefore, they must show that the party structure is able to monitor and sanction
leaders that do not honor agreed policies and assure continuity in policy terms (Keefer
2013). This reduces the party leaders’ amount of room to maneuver and their scope for
opportunistic behavior.
Third, institutionalised party systems also enhance centripetal forces in political
systems and the capacity to find consensus on core policies. In addition, the durability of
145More or less explicitly, most of the literature on the partisan effect on taxation in OECD countries
suggests that, alongside partisanship itself, low levels of fear concerning political swings are crucial to
understanding developments in tax performance (e.g. Steinmo & Tolbert 1998, Timmons 2010a).
146There are many arguments linking political institutionalisation and economic policy outcomes, although
they are mostly not directly related to taxation (e.g. Flores-Macías 2010).
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party structures increases incentives for both politicians and wealthy taxpayers to invest
in constructive relationship between them (Doner & Schneider 2000). Most importantly,
institutionalised political party systems create an environment that mimics repeated
interaction, which fosters cooperation among parties (Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 296)
and between politicians and powerful social groups (Schneider 2010a, p. 242-244). As
a result, in institutionalised political systems, the concerns about policy sustainability
should be lower, and a change of the governing party is less likely to significantly change
the rules of the game. Overall, the political system becomes more predictable.
Thus, in countries characterized by institutionalised political party systems, the
credibility of the political system to commit to fiscal agreements should be higher at
a systemic and individual governmental level.147 In this line, we should expect party
system institutionalisation to have a positive effect on the amount of taxes that wealthier
taxpayers would voluntarily accept to pay. But we should expect the government’s level
of bureaucratic capacity to moderate the effect of party system institutionalisation on
the tax contributions from wealthy taxpayers. The lower the level of bureaucratic
capacity, the more attractive the option to evade taxes becomes. In this context, the
capacity of a government to credibly commit to fiscal agreements is crucial to collecting
any contributions from the wealthy. By contrast, in states where bureaucratic capacity
levels are high, the credibility of the political system should not affect tax contributions
so significantly. High levels of bureaucratic capacity make the outside option of evading
taxes costly. These negative incentives suffice to make wealthy taxpayers pay taxes
regardless of the credibility of the political system concerning the use of the money.
Assuming that governments will rely predominantly on progressive tax types to extract
revenue from wealthy taxpayers, higher tax contributions by the wealthy should be
mirrored by a more relevant role of progressive taxes in the tax composition.
These arguments lead me to the following testable hypothesis:
The lower the level of bureaucratic capacity, the stronger the effect of party
system institutionalisation on the relevance of progressive taxes in the tax
composition.
147This argument resonates with the argument made by Gehlbach and Keefer (2011) on ruling-party
institutionalisation as a mechanism to increase private investment levels in autocracies (2011).
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4.4 Empirical approach
Main variables
To test my hypothesis and estimate the effect of party system institutionalisation on
the relevance of progressive taxes in the tax composition, I analyse a dataset including
more than 90 countries over a period of 20 years (1990-2010).148 The time constraint
results from poor data reliability before 1990. This is not only an issue regarding tax
collection data, but also concerns other indicators used in the study, most prominently
“Bureaucratic capacity”.
The main dependent variable is “relevance of progressive taxes in the tax compo-
sition”.This variable is operationalised as personal income tax as a share of total tax.
Making general incidence assumptions about different tax types is a highly contested
issue, but there is broad agreement that personal income taxes tend to be progressive.149
Data are provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2012). I employ personal
income tax as a share of total tax collection rather than as share of gross domestic
product (GDP), because my main interest is to analyse the effect on the relevance of
progressive taxes in the overall tax effort rather than the performance of a particular
tax.
Two interacting independent variables are key in this study: party system institu-
tionalisation and bureaucratic capacity. As already outlined, my understanding of party
system institutionalisation emphasizes the stability and continuity of political party sys-
tems over time. In line with Mainwaring and Torcal I understand an institutionalised
party system as one “in which actors develop expectations and behaviour based on the
premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behaviour
will prevail into the foreseeable future” (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006, p. 206) To cap-
ture this dimension, I use the indicator “Party Age” from the Database of Political
Institutions.(Beck et al. 2001)150 It codes the average age of the two biggest parties in
148A list of countries included in the sample can be found in the Appendix.
149The debate on the incidence of different tax types is broad and extensive. Since the path-breaking paper
by Shah & Whalley (1991), much of the debate has focused on the consumption tax. Most studies,
however, support the idea that personal income tax tends to be fairly progressive, especially if compared
to other tax instruments.
150Last update released January 2013.
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government and the main party in the opposition.151 Thus, high values for party age
denote continuity in party alternatives and repeated interaction in party competition
which is a prerequisite for party system institutionalisation in a broader sense (Randall
& Svåsand 2002). Also, average party age can be expected to be highly correlated with
the level of social penetration by the main political parties. In this line, beyond the fact
that this indicator captures the main dimension of party institutionalisation that I am
interested in, this indicator has major practical advantages, as it is available for a much
broader geographical area and offers longer time series than other indicators associated
with the party institutionalisation debate.152. The variable is logged for linearity issues,
as I expect the effect of party system institutionalisation to be stronger if the increase
is at low levels.
The second key independent variable is bureaucratic capacity, for which I use the in-
dicator “Bureaucratic Quality” from the ICRG Database (PRS Group 2012). Compared
to other alternatives, this source offers broad geographic and time coverage.153
Control variables
Many variables affect tax collection and thereby also tax composition. Based on the
literature I have included the most prominent variables in the debate. To control for
economic structure, I include the variable “Agriculture, value added as percentage of
GDP” (World Bank 2012). To capture the development level, I use GDP per capita
in constant U.S. dollars (World Bank 2012). Trade openness might also influence the
tax composition by forcing governments to de-emphasize certain tax types and focus on
others. This aspect is captured by the variable “Economic Globalisation”, which is a
composite indicator based on actual transnational financial flows and capital restrictions
(Dreher 2006). I include the variable “Urban Population” to control for the fact that
urban citizens are easier to monitor and tax. I further control for alternative sources
151Country-year observation for which the age of one party in the subset was not available were excluded
from the sample.
152Marinova (2015) presents an extensive overview of the different measures for party system stability
that have been used so far. Tavits (2012) discusses indicators of the more specific aspect of parties’
organizational strength. She highlights how organizational continuity has been also used as indicator
to measure organizational strength, although she uses more specific indicators to measure different
dimensions of the concept. Her appealing approach, as she admits, is difficult to implement on a larger
cross-national basis, as it is very resource-intensive and much of the required information is not easily
accessible and potentially not reliable.
153I reestimate the model using the legal institutions quality index as a proxy for bureaucratic capacity
(Kunic 2014). The results remain very similar.
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of revenue that might disincentivise taxation by constructing a “Non Tax Revenue”
variable, which is operationalised as the difference between tax revenue and overall
revenue (IMF 2012). Finally, I include the Gini Index to control for the fact that
higher levels of inequality might increase the pressure to use more progressive taxes
(Solt 2009).154
Econometric approach
I estimate a progression of three specifications: a random-effects model, a model
including country fixed-effects, and a model including country- and year-fixed effects.155
Tax performance and party institutionalisation are phenomena that tend to vary
little over time within countries. Thus, in comparison to fixed-effects approaches, using
a random-effects approach is attractive, as it makes use of the between variation. How-
ever, this comes at a considerable cost. If time-invariant characteristics of countries not
controlled for in the model are systematically correlated with the included variables,
the estimations will be biased. This is likely to happen when analysing taxation. Tax
revenue and tax composition depend on a high number of highly correlated determi-
nants (Focanti et al. 2013) and including all potentially relevant determinants in the
specification (e. g., labour composition, institutional inheritance, informality levels or
political culture) is hardly feasible. Fortunately, most of these variables can be expected
to vary little over time, which makes it feasible to control for them using fixed effects.
Thus, to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias, in a second stage I estimate a
model that includes country-fixed effects. The improvement in the identification comes
at the cost of exploiting exclusively the within variation. In a third step, I estimate
a model that includes year-fixed effects, which control for temporary effects such as
global economic crises. Overall, employing all three approaches minimize the risk of
bias and represent cross-checks for the validity of individual estimations. All models
include heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.156
In the following section, I focus on the results for the whole sample of countries.
154I am interested in including the Gini Index capturing market income inequality (before taxes and
transfers). Solt (2009) presents diverse estimations for this Gini Index. I use the average over all
available estimations.
155For a discussion of the advantages of such a conservative approach see Blaydes & Kayser (2011)
156Non stationarity does not appear to be a problem. The Lagram-Multiplier test for serial correlation
suggests concerns about autocorrelation. Clustered standard error should solve this problem (Hoechle
2007).
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Potential heterogeneity on the effect of interest for different subsamples defined by
regime type (democracy vs. autocracies) and nature of the prevalent types of parties in
the system (programmatic and non-programmatic) is analyzed in Section 4.7.
4.5 Main results
Table 4.1 presents the results of the three models discussed above. The first column
corresponds to the GLS random-effects model without country- and year-fixed effects.
The second and third columns show results of fixed-effects models with and without
year-fixed effects.
Table 4.1: Main specifications
PIT as share of total tax
(1) (2) (3)
Party Age (log) 2.531∗∗∗ 4.648∗∗∗ 4.505∗∗∗
(2.12) (3.08) (3.05)
Bureaucratic Capacity 1.651 3.294∗∗∗ 2.982∗∗∗
(1.28) (2.18) (2.00)
Party Age (log)* Bureaucratic Capacity -0.353 -1.097∗∗∗ -1.044∗∗∗
(-0.84) (-2.25) (-2.18)
Gini Index 0.0376 0.0466 0.0635
(0.41) (0.44) (0.58)
GDP p.c. (log) 3.232∗∗∗ -3.876 -3.142
(2.73) (-1.70) (-1.20)
Trade Openness 0.0148 0.0339 0.0664
(0.36) (0.78) (1.23)
Urban Pop. (%) 0.0491 0.109 0.185
(0.68) (0.74) (1.06)
Agriculture (V.A.) 0.0533 -0.186 -0.213
(0.55) (-1.65) (-1.75)
Non Tax Revenue 0.0813 0.0160 0.0213
(1.00) (0.21) (0.29)
Constant -22.36∗∗∗ 31.36 18.47
(-2.08) (1.53) (0.70)
N 1251 1244 1244
N. of countries 95 95 95
Country FE No Yes Yes
Y ear FE No No Yes
t statistics in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; the RE-model includes
robust standard errors. Both FE- models include clustered standard errors by country.
The models work similarly in all three settings, and the control variables show the
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expected signs.157 Only GDP per capita behaves erratically. Although it is highly
significant and positive in the RE- model, it changes sign in the fixed-effects models
and becomes not statistically significant.158 Party system institutionalisation consis-
tently shows a positive association with the relevance of personal income tax in the tax
composition. Also, in all models the interaction term is negative.
Figure 4.1: Marginal effect of party system institutionalisation on the relevance of
personal income tax in the tax composition
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Bureaucratic capacity
Figure based on Model 3 in Table 4.1. Choosing any other model leads to similar results.
Histogram shows the sample distribution of bureaucratic capacity.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the interaction effect.159 The solid sloping line represents
the marginal effect of party system institutionalisation. The dashed lines delimit the
95% confidence interval. The histogram in the background shows the percentage of
observations at different levels of bureaucratic capacity. The downwards slope suggests
that the effect of party system institutionalisation is weaker the higher the level of
bureaucratic capacity. The fact that the lower dashed line crosses the zero line shortly
157The Hausman test and the time-fixed effect test are positive. Consequently, I employ Model 3 in Table
4.1 as my core model and present further analysis based on it. Hereafter, I refer to it as the “main
specification”.
158An explanation for this is that GDP per capita varies little within countries but much between countries.
In general, highly developed countries collect more personal income tax. Exploiting between variation,
GDP per capita will have a strong and significant positive effect. Once country fixed-effects are included
in the specification as GDP per capita has low within variation the estimated effect decreases and does
not reach statistical significance.
159The construction of the graph relies on the code provided by Brambor et al. (2006).
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before the highest level of bureaucratic capacity is reached indicates that the effect is
not significant at this level (4). It is also noteworthy that, as the confidence intervals
overlap at all levels of bureaucratic capacity, the analysis provides no evidence that the
marginal effects of party system institutionalisation at different levels of bureaucratic
capacity are significantly different from each other. Thus, the marginal effect is not
necessarily smaller at higher levels of bureaucratic capacity, but it is less statistically
significant, up to the point of becoming non-significant at the highest level.
Overall, Figure 4.1 supports the hypothesis that bureaucratic capacity moderates
the effect of party system institutionalisation.160 Given that most OECD countries have
high levels of bureaucratic capacity, the results suggest that party system institution-
alisation mainly has a significant effect in non-OECD countries.161 At low and middle
levels of bureaucratic capacity, the effect of party system institutionalisation is consid-
erable and highly significant. One standard deviation at the lowest level of bureaucratic
capacity is associated with a 43% increase in the relevance of the personal income tax
in the tax composition.162 In order to prove my hypothesis, it is important to show
that party institutionalisation affects the collection of the more progressive tax types.
Given the construction of my dependent variable, the greater relevance of the personal
income tax might not be driven by stronger collection of that tax but by lower collection
160If the interaction term is excluded from the model specification (meaning that we assume that party
system institutionalisation and bureaucratic capacity have independent effects on the relevance of PIT
in the tax composition) the effect of party system institutionalisation is estimated to be substantively
lower (coefficient: 1.71 for the preferred fixed country and year effects model) and statistically significant.
Bureaucratic capacity is estimated to not have any significant effect. These results support the relevance
of the approach and argument presented in this chapter as ignoring the interaction hides the fact that the
effect of party system institutionalisation varies remarkably in size and in level of statistical significance
at different levels of bureaucratic capacity.
16174% of the observations for OECD countries (359) have a value of 4.
162At this level of bureaucratic capacity, personal income tax only represents on average 9.6% of the total
tax collection, and the estimated size of the marginal effect of one standard deviation is estimated to
be 4.1%. The marginal effect of one standard deviation at a level of bureaucratic capacity of 1 is 3.1%,
whereas the average value is 9.8%. At a level of bureaucratic capacity of 2, the effect of one standard
deviation is 2.2%, given an average value of 12.8%. After that, the size of the effect decreases significantly.
At a level of bureaucratic capacity of 3, one standard deviation is only associated with an increase of
1.3%, given an average value of 20.8%. The effect is no longer significant at a level of bureaucratic
capacity of 4. In addition, I estimated an error-correction model based on Model 3 to assess short-
and long-term effects of party system institutionalisation at different levels of bureaucratic capacity. (A
graph illustrating the development of the effect can be found in the Appendix and regression tables can
be provided upon request.) The point estimates for the short-term effect are lower and only significant
at the 90% level at low levels of bureaucratic capacity. The point estimates for total long-term effects
are 6.97, 4.56, 2.63, 1.17 and 0.19, respectively, for bureaucratic levels of 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. These effects
are all significant. For example, this means that the substantive marginal effect at the lowest levels of
bureaucratic capacity corresponds to an increase of 73%.
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levels of others. This would contradict my causal chain, as rather than encouraging the
performance of the more progressive personal income tax, higher levels of party system
institutionalisation would be connected to lower performance of more regressive tax
types. Table 2 examines this aspect by running the same model as above, using the tax
collection of other taxes types (Corporate, General Sales, Trade and Income Taxes) as
dependent variables. Further, to focus on the raise in absolute tax collection, in this
case, the dependent variables are measured as a percentage of GDP and not not as share
of total tax collection.163
Table 4.2: Tax collection of different tax types as percentage of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PIT CIT GS TRD INC TOTAL TAX
Party Age (log) 0.844** 0.276 -0.312 -0.615 1.007* -0.305
(2.50) (0.65) (-0.61) (-1.27) (1.89) (-0.43)
Bureaucratic Capacity 0.515 0.237 -0.534 -0.434 0.840* -0.119
(1.41) (0.73) (-0.82) (-1.23) (1.74) (-0.13)
Party Age (log)* Bureaucratic Capacity -0.209* -0.0311 0.149 0.0927 -0.267* 0.0390
(-1.83) (-0.26) (0.86) (0.71) (-1.72) (0.16)
Gini Index 0.0315 -0.0119 0.0442 0.00476 0.0125 0.0899**
(1.46) (-0.58) (1.57) (0.33) (0.36) (2.04)
GDP p.c. (log) -0.399 2.487*** 0.482 0.706 2.406** 2.235
(-0.55) (3.27) (0.35) (1.05) (2.37) (0.97)
Trade Openness 0.0307** 0.00242 0.0688** -0.0367*** 0.0213 0.0567
(2.45) (0.10) (2.10) (-3.44) (0.68) (1.06)
Urban Pop. (%) 0.00672 -0.0367 0.0659 -0.0507 -0.00557 -0.0713
(0.18) (-0.73) (0.79) (-1.13) (-0.07) (-0.51)
Agriculture (V.A.) -0.0312 0.0713* -0.0980 0.0342 0.0388 -0.0562
(-1.17) (1.76) (-1.27) (1.08) (0.65) (-0.43)
Non Tax Revenue 0.00224 -0.00762 0.0667 0.00518 -0.0991 -0.0736
(0.13) (-0.26) (1.34) (0.50) (-1.49) (-0.96)
Constant 2.771 -17.23** -4.428 2.769 -15.95 0.643
(0.42) (-2.54) (-0.34) (0.46) (-1.58) (0.03)
N 1244 1279 1429 1316 1423 1437
N.ofcountries 95 98 102 103 102 103
PIT = Personal Income Tax; CIT= Corporate Income Tax; GS= General Sales Tax; TRD= Trade Tax; INC= Income Tax (PIT+ CIT);
TOTAL TAX= Total tax collection; t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
All models include country- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country. The model specification corresponds to Model 3 in Table 4.1.
The results presented in Table 4.2 provide additional support for the main argument
in this chapter. Party system institutionalisation only has a statistically significant effect
163In the main text, I only present the results of the model corresponding to Model 3 in Table 4.1. Results
employing the alternative models in Table 4.1 do not vary substantively, although the effect of party
system institutionalisation barely misses statistical significance in the RE- model. I also estimate a
seemingly unrelated regression model, including year- and country-fixed effects to take account of the
interrelation between the collection of each tax (Kenny & Winer 2006). Results of this model can be
found in the Appendix. They also support the idea that party system institutionalisation is connected
in particular to higher collection levels of personal income tax.
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on the collection of personal income tax.164 The fact that the effect on income tax is
significant at a 90% level offers additional support to the argument. Although it is much
harder to defend the idea that income tax tends to have a progressive tax incidence, it
has the advantage of broader coverage than my preferred option, the personal income
tax.
Overall, the results suggest that the effect of party system institutionalisation at low
levels of bureaucratic capacity is mainly connected to higher levels of tax collection of
more progressive tax types and not a de-emphasis of the collection of regressive ones. In
addition, the model estimated for total tax collection as a percentage of GDP indicates
that party system institutionalisation is not connected to a general increase or decrease
in tax collection but rather to a change in the tax composition.
4.6 Robustness
There are a number of factors that could call the results into question. In this sec-
tion I discuss them, showing that the results are robust to a number of alternative
specifications.
The inclusion of fixed effects controls for all time-invariant variables, but there are a
number of time-variant variables that might bias the results. To deal with this concern,
I reestimate the main model, including in the specification, subsequently the follow-
ing seven variables: “Age of the largest government party”, “Years in office of the
chief executive”, “Years in office of the party of chief executive”, “Regime Durability”,
“Transition to autocracy”, “Transition to democracy” and “Participation in major vi-
olent conflict”.165 I include “Age of the largest government party” to control for the
164The size of the effect is also remarkable. One standard deviation at a level of bureaucratic capacity of
0 leads to an increase of 0.9% of PIT to GDP collection. Given an average value of 1.2% at this level
of bureaucratic capacity the effect represents an increase of 75%. One standard deviation at a level of
bureaucratic capacity of 1 leads to an increase of 0.7% of PIT to GDP collection. Given an average
value of PIT collection of 1.5% at this level, the effect represents an increase of 47%. At higher levels
of bureaucratic capacity, the size of the effect decreases remarkably. One standard deviation at a level
of bureaucratic capacity of 2 leads to an increase of 0.4% in PIT to GDP collection (an increase of
18%). At a level of bureaucratic capacity of 4, the effect is no longer significant. A graph illustrating
the interaction can be found in the Appendix.
165These correspond to the variables gov1age, yrsoffice, prtyin in the Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et al. 2001), durable in the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall et al. 2014), democracy_trans (Boix
et al. 2013). The ‘’Participation in a large armed conflict” variable is coded as 1 for all countries listed
as being ‘sideA’ in any conflict if ‘Int’ (Intensity level) equals 2 – more than 1000 battle-related deaths
in a given year (Themnér & Wallensteen 2012). An additional robustness test is provided by weighting
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possibility that the effect attributed to party system institutionalisation might not be
related to the age of the parties in the party system but most prominently to the age
of the main party in government. Similarly, “Years in office of the chief executive” and
“Years in office of the party of chief executive” – by capturing the continuity in power
of individual politicians or parties – control for the risk that continuity in power, rather
than in the system, is key to credibility. The durability of the political regime, the
occurrence of major regime transition as well as the participation in a major violent
conflict are included in order to take into account the possibility that, rather than the
institutionalisation of parties, the absence of major events in the broader political scene
might be the factor driving the results. All control variables – except the transition
variables and the major conflict variable – are interacted with bureaucratic quality, as
they are assumed to affect the dependent variables in a similar fashion as party age.
Their effect should be stronger the lower the level of bureaucratic capacity.
For each individual additional control variable, I estimate a model (Columns 1-6). 166
The coefficients for the main independent variables do not change remarkably. This
supports the robustness of the main specification. Only factors related to the broader
socio-political context have a significant effect. Transitioning to an autocracy as well
as being involved in and being a location of a major armed conflict seem to be con-
nected to lower relveance of the PIT in the tax composition. Regime durability has
no significant effect at the lower level of bureaucratic capacity, but it has a significant
effect negative effect where capacity levels are at high. This suggests that the more
durable a regime, the less relevant personal income tax becomes in the tax composition.
A possible explanation is that durable regimes with high levels of bureaucratic capacity
are more successful in introducing and implementing modern taxes such as VAT. This
possibility is in line with the argument that established political systems are better able
to introduce modern tax legislation (e.g., Mahon 2004).167
the age of the parties by the number of seats in the government. This allows taking into account that
it is probably more relevant that all parties also have more power. The results remain robust to this
specification. Results can be provided upon request.
166An additional model, including lagged variables of the main independent variables, was also estimated
to partly address issues of endogeneity. The results remain very similar.
167The results of a regression model identical to those presented in Table 4.3 but including ‘’Regime
Durability” indicate that this variable has a significant positive effect on VAT collection.
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Table 4.3: Models including additional control variables
PIT as share of total tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party Age (log) 3.635** 4.356*** 3.888** 4.807*** 4.348*** 4.397***
(2.32) (2.97) (2.27) (2.87) (2.95) (3.03)
Bureaucratic Capacity 2.689* 2.467 2.557 3.480** 2.731* 2.728*
(1.84) (1.65) (1.49) (2.38) (1.86) (1.85)
Party Age (log)* Bur. Cap -0.807 -1.003** -0.938 -1.023* -0.990** -0.997**
(-1.48) (-2.09) (-1.64) (-1.83) (-2.07) (-2.09)
Gini Index 0.0771 0.0591 0.0247 0.0246 0.0700 0.0730
(0.70) (0.53) (0.28) (0.24) (0.64) (0.69)
GDP p.c. (log) -3.122 -3.083 -4.033 -1.848 -2.938 -2.933
(-1.20) (-1.17) (-1.41) (-0.66) (-1.13) (-1.13)
Trade Openness 0.0727 0.0796 0.0860 0.0727 0.0728 0.0696
(1.33) (1.42) (1.53) (1.37) (1.33) (1.29)
Urban Pop (%) 0.188 0.210 0.166 0.185 0.204 0.206
(1.06) (1.23) (0.85) (1.06) (1.15) (1.17)
Agriculture (V.A.) -0.191 -0.179 -0.144 -0.143 -0.187 -0.183
(-1.55) (-1.44) (-1.24) (-1.19) (-1.52) (-1.46)
Non Tax Revenue 0.0184 0.0332 0.0218 0.0296 0.0208 0.0194
(0.25) (0.44) (0.30) (0.38) (0.28) (0.26)
Age of largest government party (log) 0.748
(0.91)
Age of largest government party (log)* Bur. Cap -0.186
(-0.58)
Chief executive (Years in office) -0.0623
(-0.39)
Chief executive (Years in office) * Bur. Cap 0.0607
(0.89)
Party of chief executive (Years in office) 0.0374
(0.70)
Party of chief executive (Years in office)* Bur. Cap 0.0386
(1.18)
Regime Durability (log) 0.0590
(0.07)
Regime Durability (log)* Bur. Cap -0.340
(-1.00)
Participation in large armed conflict -1.040*
(-1.90)
Transition to autocracy -3.440**
(-2.22)
Transition to democracy 0.0556
(0.02)
Constant 17.68 16.32 28.61 8.597 15.45 15.07
(0.66) (0.61) (0.98) (0.30) (0.58) (0.56)
N. 1244 1244 1144 1172 1244 1244
N.ofcountries 95 95 95 94 95 95
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
l All models include country- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country. The model specification corresponds to Model 3 in Table 4.1.
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Another source of concern is that the results of the main specification might be
driven by particular observations. To deal with that, I employ a number of approaches.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the results from specifications excluding extreme values
of the main independent and dependent variables: party system institutionalisation and
personal income tax collection as percentage of total tax.168 In column 3, I estimate
a jackknife model to verify that the results presented in Table 4.1 are not dominated
by observations in one specific country. 169 Also, the fact that there are only very few
observations at the lowest level of bureaucratic capacity might be driving the results.
To discard this, I re-estimate the analysis, excluding those observations with a value
of zero for bureaucratic capacity (column 4). Similarly, one may argue that the data-
generating processes in countries with very high levels of bureaucratic capacity might be
different from the ones in developing countries, which are the main focus of the paper.
To analyse this aspect, I re-estimate the regression, excluding those observation with
a value of four for bureaucratic capacity (column 5). Finally, in column 6 the only
observations included are those for which the change in Party Age is not simply due to
the time passing but rather due to changes in the parties included in the measure 170
The results of the different robustness tests support the validity of previously pre-
sented estimations. The effect of party system institutionalisation remains highly sig-
nificant at lower and middle levels of bureaucratic capacity and the interaction term
has the expected sign.171
168I define extreme values as those belonging to the highest or lowest 5% in the distribution of the variable
in the sample. For fixed-effect models, I apply the difference to the previous observation; in practise,
this means for the model presented below, excluding all observations where the difference in personal
income tax as a percentage of total tax collection is lower than -2.8% or higher than 2.9%. Refereed to
party age, the rule implies that observations where the difference in the party age (log) to the previous
year is lower than -0.32 or higher than 0.26 are excluded from the analysis.
169A closely related concern is that the fixed-effects estimation masks a significant heterogeneity of the
effect of party age in individual countries. To account for this, I estimated the effect of party age in
individual country estimations. Aggregated results can be found in the Appendix. The graph shows
that, in fact, the effect of party age varies strongly within the different levels of bureaucratic capacity.
However, the distribution at different levels – and especially the median values at different levels – of
bureaucratic capacity support the main intuition and result of the analysis, namely that the effect of
party age declines with increasing levels of bureaucratic quality.
170For instance, in democracies, if there are no changes in the coalitions, the “Party Age” variable will
change only by one every year. Only in election years in which new parties become one of the two
biggest parties in government or the main party in the opposition will the value differ substantially. In
Model 6, only these observations are used. Further, the control variables correspond to the averages for
the variable in the years between substantial changes in the “Party Age” variable.
171Graphs illustrating the interaction terms for the individual models are available upon request.
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Table 4.4: Alternative specifications with sample restrictions
PIT as share of total tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party Age (log) 4.976*** 5.116*** 4.505*** 5.004*** 4.191** 4.393**
(3.37) (2.84) (2.63) (3.23) (2.19) (2.40)
Bureaucratic Capacity 3.288** 3.002* 2.982* 2.981* 3.224 2.686*
(2.09) (1.73) (1.70) (1.91) (1.34) (1.85)
Party Age (log)* Bureaucratic capacity -1.169** -1.093* -1.044* -1.201** -1.006 -1.036**
(-2.34) (-1.91) (-1.89) (-2.38) (-1.31) (-2.03)
Gini Index 0.103 0.0679 0.0635 0.0626 0.163 0.146
(0.82) (0.60) (0.55) (0.55) (0.97) (0.73)
GDP p.c. (log) -4.075 -3.500 -3.142 -3.263 -3.894 -7.850**
(-1.49) (-1.37) (-1.10) (-1.23) (-1.15) (-2.42)
Trade Openness 0.0666 0.0570 0.0664 0.0599 -0.0328 0.138**
(1.13) (1.06) (1.13) (1.12) (-0.50) (2.31)
Urban Pop. (%) 0.177 0.227 0.185 0.130 0.0417 0.00844
(1.14) (1.22) (0.97) (0.84) (0.21) (0.05)
Agriculture (V.A.) -0.209* -0.220* -0.213 -0.224* -0.0916 -0.186
(-1.74) (-1.82) (-1.54) (-1.80) (-0.75) (-1.23)
Non Tax Revenue -0.0393 0.0550 0.0213 0.0134 0.0968 0.223
(-0.45) (0.71) (0.26) (0.18) (1.15) (0.97)
Constant 24.60 18.01 18.47 23.65 25.60 58.09*
(0.87) (0.67) (0.65) (0.92) (1.01) (1.77)
N. 1092 1115 1244 1218 852 312
N.ofcountries 95 95 95 93 79 89
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All models include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Variables in model 6 correspond to average values over the different periods without major changes in the Party Age variable
specification corresponds to Model 3 in Table 4.1.
4.7 Refinements and qualifications
There are good reasons to expect that certain aspects of the political environment might
moderate the relationship between party system institutionalisation and the collection
of personal income tax. In the following, I discuss two factors in order to investigate
whether my main argument can be further elaborated and refined. These two factors
are regime type and nature of the political parties.
From a theoretical perspective, it seems reasonable to expect that the effect of party
institutionalisation might differ in democracies and autocracies, especially considering
the operationalisation I am using for party institutionalisation. In autocracies, electoral
competition and the right to found political parties is restricted, so that higher levels of
party system institutionalisation, measured as party age, will predominantly capture the
141
The importance of consent
capacity of the main government party to survive politically.172As a result, party system
institutionalisation in this context can be expected to measure the consolidation of the
autocratic regime and thereby also the ability of autocratic governments to coercively
tax population outside their power base. However, party system institutionalisation (as
conceived in section 3) should capture the existence of strong and stable roots of parties
in the broader society. In democracies this can be expected to work better, as parties
will represent different political alternatives as well as interact with broad segments of
society. Thus, in both settings, it is possible to imagine party institutionalisation having
an effect on tax composition, although the causal mechanisms linking them might differ.
Whereas a positive effect of party system institutionalisation in autocracies might be
connected to discriminatory taxation of the political opposition, in democracies the
enhanced collection of progressive taxes will be connected to higher levels of credibility of
the political actors and higher levels of quasi-voluntary compliance by wealthy taxpayers,
as prominently argued in this paper.
To analyse this aspect, I re-estimate the main specification, including a triple inter-
action. In addition to the interaction between party age and bureaucratic capacity, I
also interact these variables with an electoral democracy dummy.173 The interactions
in each of the contexts are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 strongly suggests that the intuition of this paper holds better in electoral
democracies.174 Whereas in democracies the positive effect of party institutionalisation
decreases as bureaucratic capacity increases, the opposite is true for autocracies. A
possible explanation is that taxpayers will only be able to resist coercive taxation of weak
autocracies, not of strong ones. Moreover, a strong dictator will have few constraints on
extracting as many resources as possible from his political opponents.175 By contrast,
172Gehlbach & Keefer (2012) analyse the effect of institutional specificities of autocracies and show their
differential effects on private investment. However, taking this into account goes beyond the scope of
this paper.
173To identify electoral democracies, I use two variables of the DPI dataset: fraud and Legislative Index of
Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC). I code as democracies countries in which LIEC value is higher than 6
(“largest party got less than 75%”) and the fraud variable is zero (meaning no fraud was identified). As
the groups are smaller, the risk of individual countries driving the results increases. Therefore Figures
4.2 and 4.3 are based on jackknifed model estimations.
174Regression tables are available upon request. The marginal effects graphs is based on a model including
country- and year-fixed effects.
175This is a setting that resonates with state-autonomy models of taxation, as presented in Timmons (2005,
p. 533).
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Figure 4.2: Marginal effect over political regimes
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Figure based on Model 3 in Table 4.1. Point predictions (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines). Reestimating the results excluding observations for which 
bureacratic capacity equals 4 does not change the results remarkably
it does not appear to be feasible for democracies to use their full coercive potential to
tax predominantly their political opponents, as it would not only be illegal but also
politically costly.
Another aspect that could potentially influence the strength of the causal mecha-
nism linking party system institutionalisation and reliance on personal income tax is
the nature of the parties involved. My argument is that the durability of a party should
lead to a stronger internal organisation and more coherent and predictable behavior
over time. However, one could argue that the durability of the parties is not enough
to capture how parties function in this regard. Political parties differ greatly in their
internal organisation and mobilisation strategies towards citizens (Keefer 2013). Pro-
grammatic parties in particular need to develop credibility, as per definition their main
mobilisation instrument - programmatic appeals- involves “an intertemporally drawn
out exchange in which broad categories of voters receive benefits that often accrue with
delay and indirectly (e.g., employment, growth, social security)” (Kitschelt & Kselman
2013, p. 1455). Consequently, programmatic parties cannot afford to be labeled as
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incoherent and erratic. this is not as crucial for other types of parties, such as clientelist
or machine parties, because they tend to avoid committing themselves to specific policy
goals and emphasize privately targeted benefits to party supporters in a more pragmatic
and less ideological manner (Keefer 2013). 176
Consequently, party system institutionalisation should be particularly relevant for
programmatic parties trying to convince wealthy taxpayers to agree on a fiscal agree-
ment. By contrast, non-programmatic parties are institutionally condemned to not
be especially credible, and being part of the political system for a long time should
not change this remarkably. I analyse this hypothesis by applying a similar strategy
as above on the conditional effect of party age in autocracies and democracies. Con-
cretely, I estimate the main specification including a triple interaction including party
age, bureaucratic capacity and a dummy variable coding whether the largest party in
government is programmatic. 177
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the interaction behaves when the largest governmental
party is programmatic or not. The results support the intuition asserting that the gov-
ernment party being programmatic is key to collecting more taxes via personal income
tax. The nature of the government party moderates the effect of party system institu-
tionalisation at different levels of bureaucratic capacity. If the largest government party
is programmatic, the effect of party system institutionalisation is significant at all levels
of bureaucratic capacity below 4. By contrast, if the largest government party is not
programmatic, the effect of party system institutionalisation is not significant at any
level.178 The fact that the government party is so crucial indicates that concerns about
the capacity of parties to “act collectively to control shirking by leaders”(Keefer 2013,
p. 7) in the short term should not be underestimated. Solving this short-term concern
appears to be a precondition for the variables that solve the more long-term concerns
to have an effect.
176A more elaborate discussion on the strategies of parties and the different incentives that leaders and
members face in different setting can be found in Kitschelt (2000) and Keefer (2013).
177Following Keefer (2011), I code a party as programmatic if GOV1RLC from the Database of Political
Institutions is equal to 1, 2 or 3 (Beck et al. 2001) - that is, if the party can be considered to have a
specific and clearly recognizable orientation with respect to economic policy.
178As a robustness test, I estimate the model substituting the programmatic government dummy for
dummies coding the specific political orientation of the largest governmental party. Whether the parties
are left or right oriented has no notable effect.
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Figure 4.3: The effect of programmatic government parties
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Figure based on Model 3 in Table 4.1. Point predictions (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines).
Histograms show the sample distribution of bureaucratic capacity within the different regime type groups
The results presented in this section provide preliminary evidence that the effect of
interest might be heterogeneous across different subsamples. Still, it is relevant to ac-
knowledge that the subsamples for testing more fine-grained arguments are rather small,
which might undermine the accuracy and precision of the estimations. Therefore, these
results should be viewed with caution and not be overstated. In addition, the effects
do not differ significantly from each other across subsamples, as the confidence intervals
overlap at most levels of bureaucratic capacity. 179 Hence, for instance, we can say that
the positive effect of party system institutionalisation is statistically significant only for
the sample of countries where the largest party in government is programmatic, but not
that this effect is significantly different from the one we identify in the sample in which
the largest party in government is not programmatic. In sum, there is room for refin-
ing the general argument and taking into consideration more fine-grained institutional
setups and identifying more precisely under which circumstances party institutionalisa-
179One exception is the effect at the highest level of bureaucratic quality for democracies and autocracies;
not only is the effect of party age positive and significant for autocracies, it also significantly differs
from the effect estimate in democracies.
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tion has the strongest effect. However, as for now, our ability to test this is limited due
to data constraints.180
4.8 Conclusion
Timmons underlines that “social scientists have expended considerable energy trying to
answer who gets what, when and how. Far fewer papers have addressed the flipside of
the question – who pays what, when, and how” (Timmons 2010b, p. 191). The present
paper represents an effort in this direction. Its most important contribution is to focus
on the peculiarities of developing countries and the specific challenges they face when it
comes to making wealthy taxpayers pay a fair share of the tax burden. In opposition to
other approaches, the present paper has not set the strength of the state’s bureaucratic
capacities at the core of this challenge; rather, accepting that these capacities are weak,
the paper analyzes the circumstances under which wealthy taxpayers could be willing
to accept higher levels of taxation on them in expectation of benefits in exchange.
The central argument of this article is that problems associated with low credibility
of the political system are crucial to understanding the low relevance of progressive taxes
in many developing countries. The analysis supports this argument. The fundamental
conclusion of this paper is that where levels of bureaucratic capacity are low, party
system institutionalisation has a strong positive effect on the relevance of personal
income tax in the tax composition. The results are robust to different specifications and
the effect is particularly reliable in democratic settings and when governmental parties
have a programmatic orientation. Relying on common tax incidence assumptions, this
implies that, in developing countries, where levels of bureaucratic capacity tend to be
low, wealthy taxpayers assume a bigger part of the tax burden in the presence of credible
institutions able to sustain fiscal agreements.
In this sense, the analysis has strong policy implications and complements the in-
creasing research looking into the different political strategies that countries with limited
180Besides the fact that parties are programmatic or not a especially promising avenue of research would
be to analyze the effect of parties relying on strong ethnic platforms (For an overview on the effect of
ethnicity on taxation patterns see Kasara 2007). To the best of my knowledge there is no database
offering the necessary information to analyse this question using the empirical approach employed in
this chapter.
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bureaucratic capacities use to increase revenue collection (Gehlbach 2006, Queralt 2013,
Fairfield 2013). Acknowledging the relevance of bureaucratic capacities, this paper un-
derlines the idea that taxation cannot be approached merely as a technical issue and
highlights the necessity to also understand how socio-political institutions shape which
tax systems are feasible. If governments cannot force taxpayers to comply, they have to
convince them that paying taxes is a reasonable investment. To achieve this goal, the
ability of core political institutions to credibly commit to fiscal agreements and sustain
them over time is crucial. This paper shows that party systems are one of these pivotal
institutions.
Although at first glance it might appear that the advice to improve party system
institutionalisation is abstract and unworkable, there are no reasons to consider that
it is any more abstract or unworkable than the common advice given to developing
countries: improve bureaucratic capacity. If we consider bureaucratic capacity to be
part of a political equilibrium, changing it would not necessarily be any easier than
applying a strategy that could be derived from the present analysis. Furthermore,
using this strategy would have more positive spillover effects on governance and state-
citizen relationships than improved coercive capacities, which might end up being used
to increase tax pressure on those already paying a large amount of their income in taxes
rather than on those where the scope for greater tax effort is bigger.
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Appendix:
List of countries included in the analysis (based on Table 4.1):
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Be-
larus, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China,P.R.,
Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Repub-
lic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Republic of
Yemen;
148
C
hapter
4
Table A4.1: Correlation Matrix
Party Age
(log)
Bureaucratic
capacity Gini Index
GDP p.c.
(log)
Trade
Openness
Urban Pop.
(%)
Agriculture
(V.A.)
Non Tax
Revenue
Party Age (log) 1
Bureaucratic capacity 0.444 1
Gini Index 0.0542 -0.131 1
GDP p.c. (log) 0.458 0.831 -0.178 1
Trade Openness 0.359 0.639 -0.0579 0.740 1
Urban Pop. (%) 0.329 0.556 -0.169 0.787 0.596 1
Agriculture (V.A.) -0.322 -0.629 0.0341 -0.845 -0.696 -0.751 1
Non Tax Revenue 0.0727 0.368 -0.202 0.459 0.479 0.336 -0.404 1
Calculations based on Model 3 in Table 4.1 (N=1244)
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Table A4.2: Estimation results: Seemingly unrelated regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PIT Trade CIT GS
Party Age (log) 3.262∗∗∗ -0.886 1.685 -1.991
(4.67) (-1.16) (1.82) (-1.71)
Bureaucratic capacity 2.029∗∗ -0.955 0.918 -3.276∗∗
(2.78) (-1.19) (0.95) (-2.70)
Party Age (log)* Bureaucratic capacity -0.725∗∗ -0.129 -0.217 0.914∗
(-3.03) (-0.49) (-0.68) (2.29)
Gini Index -0.0434 0.0306 -0.00323 -0.218∗∗
(-1.09) (0.70) (-0.06) (-3.27)
GDP p.c. (log) -1.332 3.064∗ 9.473∗∗∗ -10.55∗∗∗
(-0.99) (2.07) (5.32) (-4.70)
Trade Openness 0.0667∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.000502 0.261∗∗∗
(2.64) (-9.84) (-0.02) (6.21)
Urban Pop. (%) 0.152∗ -0.452∗∗∗ 0.226∗ 0.282∗
(2.28) (-6.18) (2.57) (2.54)
Agriculture (V.A.) -0.121∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ -0.871∗∗∗
(-2.03) (4.84) (7.18) (-8.78)
Non Tax Revenue -0.0226 0.0516 0.0597 0.333∗∗∗
(-0.57) (1.18) (1.13) (5.02)
t statistics in parentheses; , ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001; N. of observations is 1108.
All models include country and year fixed effects as well as standard errors are clustered by country.
Dependent variables: (1)- Personal Income Tax as % of Total Tax Collection; (2)- Trade Tax as % of
Total Tax Collection; (3)- Corporate Income Tax as % of Total Tax Collection; (4)- General Sales Tax
as % of Total Tax Collection
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Figure A4.1: Marginal effect graph using the Legal institutions index as alternative
measure for bureaucratic capacity
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Figure based on Model 3 in Table 4.1. Choosing any other model leads to similar results.
Histogram shows the sample distribution of the Legal Institutions Index (Kunic, 2014).
Figure A4.2: Marginal effect graph using personal income tax as share of GDP as the
dependent variable
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Figure based on Model 3 in Table 4.1. Choosing any other model leads to similar results.
Histogram shows the sample distribution of bureaucratic capacity.
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Figure A4.3: Error correction model: Long term effect of Party Age on the relevance of
PIT in the tax composition at various levels of bureaucratic quality.
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Figure A4.4: Heterogeneity of effects in individual countries aggregated at different
levels of bureaucratic capacity
-50 0 50
Marginal effect of Party Age (log)
Very high
High
Moderate
Low
Very low
The effect for individual countries is calculated based on Model 3 in Table 4.1. In practice
an individual regression is calculated for each country.
No outside values are plotted. The boxplot shows the lower adjacent value, the 25th percentile,
the median, the 75th percentile and the higher adjacent value.
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Table A4.3: Results of regression models ran exclusively on democracies or autocracies
PIT as share of total tax
(1) (2)
Party Age (log) 5.700∗∗ -3.822
(2.75) (-1.27)
Bureaucratic Capacity 3.667 -7.788
(1.87) (-1.44)
Party Age (log)* Bureaucratic capacity -1.447∗ 2.707
(-2.23) (1.61)
Gini Index 0.0407 0.528
(0.30) (1.96)
GDP p.c. (log) -3.821 0.192
(-0.97) (0.03)
Trade Openness 0.0844 0.144
(1.49) (1.65)
Urban Pop. (%) 0.109 0.252
(0.59) (0.88)
Agriculture (V.A.) -0.0535 -0.0659
(-0.31) (-0.47)
Non Tax Revenue -0.0185 0.201
(-0.19) (1.84)
Constant 29.57 -22.11
(0.71) (-0.39)
N 978 262
N.ofcountries 77 39
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country.
The model specification corresponds to Model 3 in Table 4.1
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Conclusion: What has politics got to do with it? The con-
ditions under which wealthy taxpayers consent to taxation
in developing countries.
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5.1 Main findings
The international development community is increasingly recognising the centrality of
higher performing tax systems to inclusive and sustainable development (United Na-
tions 2008, 2003, 2015b). Strengthening tax collection in developing countries is an
urgent need. One fundamental challenge that developing countries face when aiming at
increasing tax collection is that those actors with the economic ability to pay taxes, do
commonly successfully resist them. This makes it difficult to get “where the money is”
(Fairfield 2013).181
The tax collection trends in many countries support this claim. In fact, many
developing countries have made remarkable improvements in terms of tax collection.
However, a closer look at tax data reveals that these achievements do not rely on
an even distribution of the increasing tax burden across the different tax types. The
collection of indirect taxes, arguably more regressive taxes, has seen remarkable rises,
while, by contrast, the performance of more progressive taxes, in particular the personal
income tax, lacks behind (See for instance African Development Bank & OECD 2010).
This suggests that developing countries have found strategies to extract more taxes
from those who Fjeldstad and Rakner considered to have “almost nothing to tax” (Fjeld-
stad & Rakner 2003, p.V), while the tax potential associated to wealthier taxpayers
remains far less successfully exploited. Gaining a better understanding of how and
whether political variables can explain this trend as well as identifying factors that can
help to overcome it have been the focus and the main motivation of this dissertation.
Taxing the wealthy is not only a challenge for developing countries. The high number
of scandals related to tax avoidance schemes at the level of individuals and enterprises
testifies that also OECD countries face major problems in this regard. Still, in this
dissertation I have argued that in developing countries the problem of taxing the wealthy
is qualitatively different.
181Fjeldstad and Rakner sum up very succinctly the overall challenge when pointing out that “[m]any low
income countries face a trilemma with respect to taxation: (1) There is an urgent and obvious need
for more revenues to enable resource poor states to provide and maintain even the most basic public
services. (2) The reality is, however, that those with political power and economic ability are few and
do not want to pay tax. (3) Moreover, those without political power are many, have almost nothing to
tax, and do also resist paying taxes” (Fjeldstad & Rakner 2003, p.V)
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Taxation, regardless whether in Scandinavia or the Horn of Africa, always implies
an element of coercion and an element of consent. Any strategy based on only one
of these elements will fail in the long run. However, I contend that in developing
countries, the scope to increase tax pressure on the wealthy via coercion is very limited.
Low bureaucratic capacity and an uneven distribution of de facto power182 hinders the
creation of a credible and strong threat for wealthy taxpayers not complying with their
tax obligations. Of course, coercion capacities also face limitations in OECD countries
but these are not of a comparable degree. As a result, I argue that working on the
consent side is a promising option for many governments in developing countries hoping
to extract more resources from wealthy taxpayers.
In line with this argument, throughout this dissertation, I have applied fiscal con-
tractualism as the main conceptual approach. This has allowed me to stress two aspects
that are particularly crucial to my analysis. First, in contrast to most of the literature
in the field of tax and development, rather than asking the common question of what
the state needs in order to tax its citizens more effectively and efficiently, I have taken
the perspective of the taxpayers and have asked what wealthy taxpayers need in order
to consent to taxation?183
Second, the fiscal contractualism approach has put the idea of fiscal bargaining and
fiscal exchange at the core of the argument. This has allowed me to examine carefully
potential benefits and costs that wealthy taxpayers associate with taxation and avoid
the common but questionable assumption that wealthy taxpayers will always a priori
oppose higher taxes on them.
The results of the dissertation can be summarized in three main points: First,
wealthy taxpayers are not a priori against taxation. Contrary to what is commonly
assumed, the opposition of wealthy taxpayers to higher taxes on them does not neces-
sarily result from a perception of lack of potential benefits but rather from uncertainty
about their actual realization. Furthermore, the scope for stronger bureaucratic capac-
ities to force wealthy taxpayers into tax compliance is limited. Therefore, especially
in developing countries, taxation of the wealthy can and should be approached as “a
182See Acemoglu & Robinson (2006a).
183This idea resonates the argument by D’Arcy (2011).
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game of credible commitment rather than a game of pure coercion” (Timmons 2010a,
p. 211).184
Second, at the macro level, strong and stable socio-political institutions, such as
party systems and business organisations, facilitate collective action and increase the
capacity of credible commitment between all actors involved in the definition of fis-
cal contracts. In particular, the second and third chapters show that the degree to
which the institutional setting offers credible and reliable negotiation partners is key
for wealthy taxpayers to accept fiscal contracts demanding higher tax contributions by
them. Chapter four presents particularly strong evidence for the positive effect of party
system institutionalisation on the relevance of progressive taxes in the tax composition
in developing countries. The positive effect is strong and highly significant where bu-
reaucratic capacity is low. As the level of state capacity increases, the size of the effect
as well as its statistical significance decreases.
Third, at the micro level, trust in political institutions strongly mitigates the opposi-
tion of wealthy taxpayers to progressive taxation. Moreover, against what is commonly
argued, the results presented in this dissertation indicate that confidence in particular
government institutions or political leaders is not as relevant as trust in the overall
political system.
Overall, the results presented in this dissertation add evidence highlighting the polit-
ical nature of taxation. Many studies suggest that the low tax performance in developing
countries is not so much the consequence of lack of technical capacity but of political
strength (See for instance Welham et al. 2015, p. 21). The results of this disserta-
tion support this statement. A merely technical approach to taxation in developing
countries can be highly misleading, both, in terms of understanding the variance across
countries and in terms of finding suitable strategies to change tax outcomes. This is
particularly relevant when looking into how the tax burden is distributed among dif-
ferent social groups. In this line, this dissertation has drawn the attention to specific
factors at the national and individual level, which limit the political feasibility of fiscal
contracts involving higher contributions of wealthy taxpayers. Thereby it shows how,
184Timmons does not focus on the wealthy but makes this claim for all citizens regardless of their income
level. I would argue that although the credible commitment problem is relevant for all citizens, it is
more relevant the higher the income level of the specific taxpayer.
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alongside economic and technical considerations, political considerations are and will
remain crucial for understanding tax outcomes.
5.2 Policy implications
This dissertation shows that consent to taxation is essential to understand tax outcomes
in developing countries. This is the case, in particular, in the context of limited bu-
reaucratic capacity and when it comes to taxing wealthy taxpayers. Furthermore, the
dissertation identifies the conditions under which wealthy taxpayers are more likely to
consent to progressive taxation. In this sense, the analysis has relevant policy implica-
tions because it provides evidence on core aspects of ongoing debates around taxation
and development.
First, the dissertation sends a warning. Increasing overall tax performance in devel-
oping countries is in the vast majority of cases desirable, if not urgently needed. Still,
the question of who is taxed should not be neglected. There is a certain tendency in the
international development community to focus on tax collection levels and ignore the
tax composition as well as the fair distribution of the tax burden among social groups.
Schumpeter famously wrote “the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all mis-
leading ideologies” (Schumpeter 1991, p. 100)185. Budgets tell us that the performance
of taxes with a stronger incidence on the poor is increasing, while governments are not
being able to extract taxes from those more able to afford paying them: the wealthy.
Some observers would argue that as long as this raise in revenue from more regressive in-
struments is combined with well targeted expenditures there is little to worry.186 In any
case, actors involved in development cooperation should avoid focusing predominantly
on achieving aggregate tax collection goals and should closely monitor the performance
of individual tax instruments.
Second, the thesis underlines the political dimension of taxation and demands a
change of the approach that practitioners use in this field. Commonly, the question
that dominates development cooperation in this field is what governments in developing
185As Schumpeter himself indicates the thought was first formulated by Goldscheid
186In fact, many policymakers and scholar argue that taxing regressively and spending progressively might
be the most efficient way to increase welfare for the poor.
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countries need in order to extract taxes more effectively and efficiently. The predominant
answer is simplification of tax legislation, stronger emphasis on easy to manage taxes
and stronger administrative capacity to better monitor economic activities. This dis-
sertation has changed the perspective and asked the underestimated question of “what
do citizens need in order to consent voluntarily to taxation”. More specifically, and
probably most importantly for the debate in developing countries, this dissertation has
focused on the conditions under which the wealthy would voluntarily consent to tax-
ation. The analysis suggests that in order to answer this question we need to extend
the conventional paradigm that dominates the tax debate and think carefully about
its political dimension. In particular, the paradigm should take into account that the
reality of taxation can be considered to represent a “political equilibrium”. In this line,
without ignoring the relevance of administrative capacities, “demand factors” should
receive far more systematic attention.
Third, closely connected to the first point, the analysis in this dissertation pushes
the tax and development debate “beyond the broad generalization that politics matter”
(Unsworth 2009, p. 886). Everyone agrees that political will and social consensus are
crucial for tax reforms and increased tax effort. The dissertation sheds light on specific
factors that have a direct effect on the political feasibility of new fiscal agreements. In
this sense, business organisations and party systems are seen as pivotal institutions to
amplify the range of politically feasible fiscal contracts for wealthy actors. For supporters
of narrow defined “Public Financial Management Programmes” these might not be core
institutions to work with. Yet, the analysis suggests that to make sustainable changes
to the tax equilibrium, working with the political environment surrounding the public
financial system is necessary.
The main implication of the dissertation is that the challenge to tax the wealthy
in developing countries is rather a problem of credible commitment than of coercion.
Strengthening tax administrations in developing countries enough for them to represent
a credible threat to wealthy taxpayers is a herculian task. The bad news is that even
if we succeed, relying only on building up administrative capacity is condemned to fail.
The good news is that there is scope for wealthy taxpayers to consent to taxation.
Creating the conditions for this potential to materialize might be a strategy worthwhile
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exploring more intensively and this dissertation indicates some handles.
Technical support is necessary but not sufficient to increase the contributions of
wealthy taxpayers in developing countries. In particular, getting wealthy taxpayers
to consent to taxation will not only demand explaining why taxes are necessary and
potentially beneficial, but also decreasing concerns about misuse, increasing control
instances as well as strengthening those social actors able to challenge existing fiscal
contracts and negotiate alternative ones.
Two additional remarks are in order here: The first one is that undoubtedly changes
in taxation, precisely because of its political nature, must remain domestically driven
processes. Taxation belongs to the core of the definition of sovereignty. Therefore, the
scope for external action appears limited and politically it can be extremely sensible to
be accused of influencing decisions in this policy field. The implications listed above
should therefore not be read as a call for a more aggressive imposition of policies but
rather as a call for a more astute approach to this topic. One that ensures that dis-
cussion on taxation are more inclusive and constructive and that minimizes the risks
for unintended consequences such as administrative support being used to tax only the
poor or the political opposition.
The second remark refers to the concern that partly aligning with the interest of
wealthy taxpayers in exchange for higher tax contributions might lead to elite capture.
Far from implying that, the suggestions listed above propose exploiting the potential
of existing power constellations as much as possible. Trying to influence power con-
stellations and to increase pressure on wealthy taxpayers to pay more taxes is often
unfeasible. The alternative is the “best fit approach” (Booth 2011) which respects the
given circumstances and makes the most out of these.
As has been discussed in several chapters, assuming that the interests of the wealthy
and the poor will always be conflicting is questionable and probably commonly overem-
phasized. Consequently, even if the government agrees on spending much of the ad-
ditional revenue collected from the wealthy in aspects that they value, this does not
necessarily mean that these expenditures will not benefit less privileged groups of so-
ciety. In fact, I would precisely perceive it as a role of development cooperation to
help identifying and creating credible and appealing narratives linking taxation to the
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interest of wealthy actors in sectors that are of interest to broader segments of society
(Moore & Hossain 2005).
Finally, against the concern of elite capture, I would contend that far from such an
outcome, engaging more in these kind of open fiscal contract negotiations with wealthy
taxpayers might have a strong governance dividend. There is a growing recognition
that taxation, democracy and state building are linked (Bräutigam et al. 2008). More
citizen engagement on these topics can have positive spill-over effects on other aspects
that go beyond the fiscal exchange itself. In general, citizen-government relationships
might improve remarkably if experiences of success and trust could be achieved in the
field of taxation. Furthermore, there is evidence supporting that citizens who know
what they contribute in terms of taxes can be expected to hold their government more
accountable for their action.
5.3 Avenues for further research
The present dissertation suggests several avenues for further research. First, the results
in chapters two and three could and should be analysed outside Latin America. Also,
the heterogeneity of the effect estimated in chapter four among different countries could
be analysed more extensively. In particular the analysis of the effect of party system
insitutionalisation in different non-democratic regimes appears an exciting avenue to
explore. All these additional studies would further examine the generalisability of the
results and test whether the argument is specific to certain subgroups of countries.187
Second, there is an extensive literature on the effect of IMF programmes and aid
flows on tax revenue in developing countries (Focanti et al. 2013, Crivelli & Gupta
2014, Clist & Morrissey 2011, Benedek et al. 2014). This dissertation has highlighted
the relevance of domestic political factors. In general, the division between scholars
working on the international and domestic sides of political economy appears to be
artificially strong. Both sides could improve from a more careful consideration of the
interaction between the factors at the different levels (Basinger & Hallerberg 2004).
Along this line, further research could analyse how international factors might mitigate
187Gehlbach & Keefer (2011) offer an inspiring starting point through their discussion on incentives to
invest under different types of autocracies.
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or strengthen the effect of the domestic political conditions that have been the focus of
this dissertation.
A third area for further research is the analysis of the fiscal contractualism argument
at the local level.188 The analysis at the country level presented in this dissertation
offers robust evidence supporting the notion that institutional arrangements that favor
collective action and increase the capacity of governments for credible commitment, lead
wealthy taxpayers to consent to paying a bigger share of the tax burden. An analysis
of these arguments at the local level can further strengthen these arguments for at least
two reasons. On the one hand, the different steps of the causal mechanism described
in this dissertation can be better tracked. In this line, it is easier to determine the
incidence of taxation and to find evidence on bargaining processes. On the other hand,
assuming availability of reliable data, it would be possible to go a final step, that this
dissertation could not address, namely, the question whether expenditures are directed
predominantly to activities that benefit those groups that pay more taxes. This element
has been implied in the analysis although it could not be empirically proven.
Along this line, provided better estimates of the incidence from taxes and expendi-
tures would be available at the individual level, it would be interesting to analyse the
effect of different socio-political factors on the size of the gap between what citizens
perceive that they receive in exchange for their taxes and the actual objective net fiscal
effect. Additionally, one appealing aspect to analyse within this framework would be
how the size of this perceived gap relates to individual political behavior.
188Paler (2013) represents a promising example in this direction.
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